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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the ability of Anglo-American law to function as a method of 
historiography in Holocaust-related trials. It is informed by 'empiricist-analytical' (Evans) 
and 'narrative-linguistic' (White) genres of 'good history' and a 'consensus of critique' 
(Bilsky, Wilson) that explicitly identifies the history-law relationship as a flawed 
methodology. Applying theory to practice the thesis focuses its research on the 
collaborative reconstruction of specific historiographies integral to the Holocaust across 
the Adolf Eichmann (1961), Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and David Irving (2000) trials. 
More specifically, in response to competing demands of 'good history', the thesis 
identifies how historians and jurists translated the relevant traces of the past into 'credible 
and intelligible' accounts of (empiricist) or 'convincing representations' as (narrativist) the 
Holocaust regardless of the extra-historical form of legal case and context. The 
historiographies foregrounded are the evolution of extermination policy, the mass 
shootings of the Einsatzgruppen 1941 - 1942, homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-
Birkenau, and the total number of Jewish victims.  
 
Through comparative analysis the thesis finds that the accounts/representations 
subsequently authorised may have been 'cooked' (Wilson) in accordance with case-
specific remits but they were empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content 
(McCullagh, Munslow). With few exceptions, they were also compatible across all four 
courtrooms and consistent with the findings of established Holocaust scholarship both 
past and present. In complying with the generic demands of both empiricist and narrativist 
theories the thesis confirms that the history-law relationship can be a model of 'good 
history'. However, although the stability of accounts/representations indicates the 
constraint of the past traces, and therefore a 'matching' function with the past (empiricist), 
the research confirms the primacy of its 'making' function (narrativist) as the past. The 
thesis concludes that the methodology and outputs of the history-law relationship are most 
appropriately explained through the lens of the 'narrative-linguistic' genre.  
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Introduction and Methodology 
 
This thesis is a study of history and Anglo-American law as collaborative genres about 
'the past'.
1
 Informed by contemporary critiques of both the realist foundations of historical 
scholarship, and the capacity of the law to do justice to its craft, it investigates if and how 
disciplinary collaboration in the courtroom constitutes a model of 'good history'.
2
 Interest 
in the concept of 'good history' originates in the author’s initial unease with the 
implications of a particular set of theories critical of the prevailing Rankean-based 
('empiricist-analytical') genre of history-making.
3
 Incorporated within the broader 
cultural, political and social configuration of the 'postmodern', these theories revisit 
familiar antagonisms long identified between empiricist and relativist perspectives of 
knowledge production. But, informed by the cultural and linguistic 'turns', the challenge 
to history has been identified as much wider and more thoroughgoing than its 
predecessors, making the 'point again in new and urgent ways’ and strengthening 'the 
hand of the sceptics'.
4
 Established critiques of the truthful foundations of Rankean 
scholarship have subsequently been reaffirmed by voices that emphasise the fictive, 
'netted' and present-centric nature of its specific form of 'historying'.
5
 Most critically, in 
contrast to the persistent 'presence' of the past defining and privileging this scholarship, 
these voices insist that 'the past' is not only ontologically distinct, and therefore 
inaccessible, but inevitably preconceived and prefigured ‘as a story of a particular kind’, 
as well as 'linguistically-turned' into familiar plot-lines that ‘float free’ of its remaining 
                                                 
1
 The concept of genre' is understood as the conventions and rules of thinking and practice relating to each 
discipline, Robert Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
p6. Reference to 'history' relates to the academic discipline and its scholarship. 
2
 For the purposes of the thesis ‘good history’ refers to its academic form and relates to claims made during 
both the ‘postmodern challenge’ and the trial instigated by David Irving in 2000 that there can be ‘bad’ 
histories if not following the conventions and rules of academic scholarship, in other words, the conventions 
and rules of the ‘empiricist-analytical’ genre.  
3
 Alun Munslow, 'On “Presence” and conversing with the past: do historians communicate with the past?', 
Rethinking History, 18:4 (2014), p570. 'Empiricist-analytical' in accordance with the generic conventions 
and rules of the Rankean form as evidence based and deductive, Alun Munslow, 'Facts to fight over' in The 
Guardian, 6 February 2001. 
4
 Robert Eaglestone, Postmodernism and Holocaust Denial (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2001), p35; John 
Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History (6th edn.) 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p165. For an overview of 'postmodern' thinking see Jean-François Lyotard, 
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984); 
Roy Boyne and Ali Rattansi (eds.), Postmodernism and Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); 
David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1990); Max Silverman, 
Facing Postmodernity: Contemporary French Thought on Culture and Society (London: Routledge, 1999). 
5
 Mary Fulbrook, Historical Theory: Ways of Imagining the Past (London: Routledge, 2002), p29; Alun 
Munslow and Keith Jenkins, 'Alun Munslow: in conversations with Keith Jenkins', Rethinking History, 
15:4 (2011), pp574, 575, 579, 582, 586; Kalle Pihlainen, 'Escaping the Confines of History: Keith Jenkins', 
Rethinking History, 17:2 (2013), pp236, 241. 
7 
traces.
6
 History, or more accurately historiography, is therefore a 'narrative-linguistic' 
construct, ‘the contents of which is as much invented as found’.
7
 At stake, it is claimed, 
is the epistemological foundations of the prevailing Rankean genre, or, more specifically, 
'the sort of truth to which history aspires'.
8
 Consequently, the concept of 'good history' in 
its academic form is theoretically contested (chapter one). 
 
Similarly, interest in the history-law relationship originates in the emergence of a 
'consensus of critique' that warns of the risks involved when bringing historical inquiry 
into the courtroom.
9
 Situated within two main 'schools of thought', fears of a 'show trial', 
that compromises the procedures and standards of law when turning the courtroom into a 
history seminar ('legal liberalism), contrast with claims, inter alia, of the reconstruction 
of 'cooked' histories when determined through the vagaries of legal norm and practice 
('the law and society movement').
10
 Yet disciplinary collaboration has a long history that 
shows no sign of abating.
11
 Implicit in this history is that historians and jurists have 
effectively negotiated and overcome any potential risks to either of the disciplinary 
partners.
12
 Indeed, if the law was an incompetent method of history-making why would 
historians consistently go to trial? However, those celebrating a record of successful 
litigation have been increasingly challenged by findings of an inherently flawed and 
dysfunctional methodology. Consequently, opinion on the historiographical competence 
of the history-law relationship is likewise contested (chapter two). 
 
                                                 
6
 Munslow, 'On “Presence”', p571. Tom Lawson, Debates on the Holocaust (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2010), pp5, 9; Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp58-66; Alun Munslow, The New History (Essex: 
Pearson Education Limited, 2003), p20; Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London: Routledge, 1991), 
pp5-6; Keith Jenkins, Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline, (London: Routledge, 2003). 
7
 Munslow, The New History, p163; White, Tropics of Discourse, p82. Historiography is accepted as both 
the method and outputs of the history discipline. 
8
 Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern, p139. 
9
 Richard Ashby Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp1, 2; Leora Bilsky, 'The Judge and the Historian: Transnational Holocaust 
Litigation as a New Model’, History and Memory, 24:2 (2012), p122. 
10
 Ibid. The concept of 'cooked' history is raised by Wilson, Writing History, p169 Although synonymous 
with other explanations of history-making (as 'netted' or 'present-centric') it more explicitly reflects 
historiography as a form of intentional reconstruction and therefore it is a concept that is foregrounded 
throughout the thesis. 
11
 From the International Military Tribunal in 1945/46 to the Reinhard Hanning trial at the time of writing 
in 2016 but also through International Tribunals relating to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Court. 
12
 Lawrence Douglas, 'The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom', in David 
Bankier and Dan Michman (eds.), Holocaust and Justice: Representation and Historiography of the 
Holocaust in Post-War Trials (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), p12. 
8 
Combining these two areas of interest, the thesis engages in original research of the 
history-law relationship in accordance with prevailing (empiricist-analytical) and 
contested (narrative-linguistic) genres of 'good history'. Although informed by theory it 
is not a philosophy thesis. Likewise, although relating to Anglo-American practice, it is 
not a law thesis. Rather, it is a historiography thesis, with specific courtrooms as its 
empirical context and specific theories of academic history as its tool of evaluation. In 
selecting an appropriate legal context, it is notable that theoretical debates surrounding 
the history discipline, and the practical collaboration of historians and jurists, are 
historically linked by the Holocaust. Recourse to the Holocaust has been an intentional 
response by those defending the realist foundations of the prevailing 'empiricist-
analytical' genre (chapter one), while historians and lawyers have been 'inextricably 
intertwined’ in not only the prosecution of its perpetrators and deniers but the recovery 
of its memory, protection of its record and authorisation of its facts and truths (chapter 
two).
13
 Consequently, historians and lawyers have formed an arguably 'unique 
relationship’ through which: ‘Jurists could not do without history, and, in the service of 
justice, historians [have] fashioned and refashioned the historiography of the Holocaust'.
14
 
It is therefore appropriate to site the intended research of the history-law relationship in 
Holocaust-related trials. 
 
The focus on Holocaust-related trials is a familiar methodology for the study of the 
history-law relationship. As already implied, a body of literature attests to a breadth of 
research that has uncovered, on the one hand, a record of disciplinary reciprocity, and, on 
the other hand, an “unholy alliance”, the transfer of intellectual ownership to judges and 
politicians and injustice at 'the level of historical consciousness'.
15
 However, although 
                                                 
13
 Eaglestone, Postmodernism and Holocaust Denial; Dan Stone, Constructing the Holocaust: A Study in 
Historiography (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2003); Lawson, Debates; Christopher Browning, ‘German 
Memory, Judicial Interrogation, Historical Reconstruction’, in Saul Friedländer (ed.), Probing the Limits 
of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution” (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press: 1992), 
p34. 
14
 Erich Haberer, ‘History and Justice: Paradigms of the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, 19:3 (2005), pp487, 490. 
15
 Ibid, p509. Devin O. Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965: Genocide, History, and the 
Limits of the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p298. As examples of the reach of this 
body of literature see: Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of 
Holocaust History and Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Lawrence Douglas, The Memory 
of Judgement: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (London: Yale University Press, 
2001); Henry Rousso, The Haunting Past: History, Memory, and Justice in Contemporary France 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Stephen Whinston, 'Can Lawyers and Judges Be 
Good Historians?: A Critical Examination of the Siemens Slave-Labor Cases', Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, 20:1 (2002), pp160-175; David Hirsh, Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials 
(London: GlassHouse Press/Cavendish Publishing, 2003); Donald Bloxham, ‘From Streicher to Sawoniuk: 
9 
providing extensive knowledge of the historical, legal, moral and political complexities 
of Holocaust litigation cases, as well as empirically accountable detail and analysis of 
individual trials (chapter two), there are gaps in its methodological approach and 
assessment. Studies have tended to focus on legal procedure and political context rather 
than the processing of historiographical reconstruction.
16
 Subsequently, attention has been 
placed on the extra-historical and extra-legal (mis)appropriation and (mis)use of the 
Holocaust, including its survivors, rather than the accountability and establishment of its 
facts. Similarly, attention has been placed on the flawed narratives both presented and 
authorised, rather than the evidential foundations of their 'truth-full' content.
17
 Studies 
have also tended to focus on individual trials, rather than employ comparative analysis 
across courtrooms.
18
 Moreover, the assessment of collaborative competence has been 
approached from a range of perspectives, including legal propriety, the securing of justice, 
pedagogy and 'representational efficacy', rather than contested concepts of 'good 
history'.
19
 As a detailed investigation into both historiography in general and the history-
law relationship in particular, this thesis redresses these specific methodological 
omissions.  
 
After confirming that the core function of historical scholarship is the contemporary 
translation of evidentiary traces into empirically accurate and accountable knowledge of 
(empiricist) or representations as (narrativist) 'the past' (chapter one), the thesis focuses 
                                                 
the Holocaust in the Courtroom’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The Historiography of the Holocaust (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp397-419; David Fraser, Law After Auschwitz: Towards a Jurisprudence of 
the Holocaust (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005); Patricia Heberer and Jürgen Matthäus (eds.), 
Atrocities on Trial: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2008); Wilson, Writing History; Bilsky, 'The Judge and the Historian', pp117-156; 
Bankier and Michman (eds.), Holocaust and Justice; Kim C. Priemel and Alexa Stiller (eds.), Reassessing 
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals: Transitional Justice, Trial Narratives, and Historiography (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2012); Lawrence Douglas, The Right Wrong Man: John Demjanjuk and the Last Great 
Nazi War Crimes Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
16
 Ibid. See also Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: 
Viking Press, 1963) and Richard J. Golsan, (ed.), Memory, the Holocaust, and French Justice: The 
Bousquet and Touvier Affairs (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1996). 
17
 As opposed to 'truthful', which implies 'the Truth', Munslow The New History, p194. C. Behan, 
McCullagh, 'Invitation to Historians', Rethinking History, 12:2 (2008), p277. Some studies have highlighted 
pieces of evidence integral to specific trials. See for example, R. L. Cope, ‘Irving versus Lipstadt: a 
historian’s view of the case’, Kleio, 33:1 (2001), pp17-44; D. D. Guttenplan, The Holocaust on Trial: 
History, Justice and the David Irving Libel Case (London: Granta Books, 2002); Richard J. Evans, Telling 
Lies About Hitler: The Holocaust, History and The David Irving Trial (London: Verso, 2002); Deborah E. 
Lipstadt, History on Trial: My Day in Court with David Irving (New York: HarperCollins, 2006). 
18
 See footnotes 15 and 16. See also, Deborah E. Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial (New York: Schocken 
Books, 2011). 
19
 Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, p288. 
10 
attention on how historians and jurists have replicated this methodology within the 
parameters of Anglo-American law.
20
 More specifically, it closely examines how 
historians and jurists have reconstructed specific historiographies of the Holocaust as true 
'beyond reasonable doubt' (criminal) or 'on the balance of probability' (civil) across a 
range of courtrooms acting as discrete discursive (present-centric) contexts investigating 
its past. Employing comparative analysis, and informed by empiricist and narrativist 
theories, it seeks to answer four questions relevant to their respective demands of 'good 
history': (1) although governed by discrete legal forms did Anglo-American law 
determine and establish empirically accountable evidence and facts of or as the 
Holocaust? (2) although case-specific, were the narratives authorised 'truth-full' in 
content? (3) although variously filtered and shaped were they also compatible and 
consistent across trials? and (4) although legally probative were the facts and 
interpretations limited by the past traces (empiricist-analytical) or preconceived and 
prefigured by narratives that 'floated free' of their content (narrative-linguistic)? 
Ultimately, did the history-law relationship operate as a 'matching function' with the past 
(empiricist) or a 'making function' as the past (narrativist)?
21
  
 
Legal Contexts 
 
The trials selected for comparative analysis are the criminal cases of Adolf Eichmann 
(1961-1962) and Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the libel case instigated by David Irving 
(2000). In the case of Zündel the two trials in 1985 and 1988 are included in the research 
since the latter is a retrial of the former and therefore the cases are inextricably linked. 
                                                 
20
 Empiricist: Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta Books, 1997); Fulbrook, Historical 
Theory; Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the 
Postmodern Challenge (Middletown CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2003); Gertrude Himmelfarb, The 
New History and the Old: Critical Essays and Reappraisals (2nd edn.) (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); C. Behan McCullagh, The Logic of History: Putting Postmodernism in Perspective 
(London: Routledge, 2004); David Henige, Historical Evidence and Argument (Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2005); Ann Curthoys and John Docker, Is History Fiction? (2nd edn.) (New South Wales: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2010); Bernard Waites, 'In defence of historical realism: a further 
response to Keith Jenkins', Rethinking History, 15:3, (2011), pp319-334; Andreas Boldt, 'Ranke: 
Objectivity and History', Rethinking History, 18:4, (2014), pp457-474; Tosh, The Pursuit of History. 
Narrativist: Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987); Jenkins, Re-thinking History; F.R. Ankersmit, 
Historical Representation (California: Stanford University Press, 2001); Munslow The New History; 
Beverley Southgate, Postmodernism in History: Fear or Freedom? (London: Routledge, 2003); Alun 
Munslow, Deconstructing History (2nd edn.) (Oxford: Routledge, 2006); Elizabeth Deeds Ermath, History 
in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the Tools of Thought (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Pihlainen, 
'Escaping the Confines of History’ pp235-252; Hayden White, 'The History-Fiction Divide', Holocaust 
Studies: A Journal of Culture and History, 20:1-2 (2014), pp17-34. 
21
 Stone, Constructing the Holocaust, p229. 
11 
The Eichmann, Zündel and 'Irving' trials are not inherently applicable to the intended 
research or methodologically obvious.
22
 Rather, in addition to their recording in English, 
their relevance lies in the diversity of legal case, process and reputation appropriate to 
comparative study (chapter three). Moreover, these four trials took place in not only 
different countries and decades but in diverse national (as well as international) contexts 
relating to the Holocaust. The one shared feature was that none of the countries hosting 
the trials had been directly involved in the attempted mass murder of European Jewry. 
Obviously, the state of Israel did not exist between 1933 and 1945, while both Canada 
and the UK had been classified (and critiqued) as ‘bystander’ nations. But, in each 
country, approaches to and consciousness of ‘the Holocaust’ had been distinctly 
constructed and framed leading up to and surrounding each trial. 
 
It is possibly difficult to imagine that prior to the Eichmann trial in 1961 ‘the Holocaust’ 
was not foremost in the consciousness of either the Israeli government or public. 
Certainly, hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors had immigrated to Israel after 
1948 and by 1960 comprised one-quarter of its population.
23
 Many of these survivors were 
active in commemorative activities (Warsaw Ghetto Uprising) and political lobbying and 
had been instrumental in the enactment of the 'Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) 
Law' 1950, which indicted Eichmann, and the establishment of a national Holocaust 
memorial and research institute, ‘Yad Vashem’, in 1953, dedicated to its ‘Martyrs and 
Heroes’.
24
 Source material and records of the Jewish “catastrophe”, collated during and 
in the immediate years post-1945, was known and constituted substantial archives in Yad 
Vashem.
 25
 Memoirs had been published.
26
 Kibbutzim dedicated to the ghetto fighters, and 
other groups of former resistance, were visible and vocal.
27
 Trials had been held that had 
                                                 
22
 Although it was Deborah Lipstadt who had been forced into court future references will relate to the 
common usage of the 'Irving trial' throughout the thesis. 
23
 Hanna Yablonka, The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann (New York: Schocken, 2004, p36.  
24
 Ibid. Zoë Vania Waxman, Writing the Holocaust: Identity, Testimony, Representation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp108, 112-113. 
25
 See as examples of the attempts by Jewish communities and individuals to document their persecution, 
and then mass murder, prior to, during and immediately after ‘the Holocaust’ had been defined, Waxman, 
Writing the Holocaust; Laura Jockusch, Collect and Record!: Jewish Holocaust Documentation in Early 
Postwar Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Frida Bertolini, ‘Truth and Memory After 
Catastrophe: Historical Fact and the Historical Witness’, Daphim: Studies on the Holocaust, 29:1 (2015), 
pp41-57. ‘Catastrophe’, as well as ‘cataclyism’ or ‘destruction’ was the concept used by Jewish 
documentarians prior to the use of ‘the Holocaust’, Jochusch, Collect and Record!, p3.  
26
 Waxman, Writing the Holocaust; Jockusch, Collect and Record!; Bertolini, ‘Truth and Memory’. 
27
 And became the ‘moral anchors’ in the case prepared against Eichmann, Yablonka, The State of Israel 
vs. Adolf Eichmann, p72. 
12 
brought the subject and actions of leaders of the Judenräte (as collaborators) into the 
public domain.
28
 And yet it is claimed that the majority of survivors had continued to live 
in relative anonymity, while crises accompanying the transition of Israel into a sovereign 
state (including a ‘War of Independence’) had been of more immediate concern.
29
 It is 
also noted that the complexities and traumas of survival had been confined and shaped 
into dominant narratives of heroism and resistance that effectively marginalised and 
silenced many survivors.
30
 The Eichmann trial is identified as the event that not only 
changed these narratives but foregrounded ‘the Holocaust’ as ‘a collective entity’, 
expanded its atrocities, and the suffering (not only resistance) of survivors, to an entire 
nation (and world) and began the processing of its centrality to Jewish identity.
31
 
 
In the very different context and role of Canada, the approach to and consciousness of 
‘the Holocaust’ was not only defined by its ‘bystander’ status in the period 1939 to 1945 
but was closely linked to attitudes towards immigration.
32
 Canada had been an active 
participant in the ‘Grand Alliance’ of countries fighting to liberate German-dominated 
Europe.
33
 However, as detailed reports of the extermination of European Jewry came to 
the attention of the Canadian authorities (from 1942 onwards) the government 
intentionally sought to censure the reporting of the genocide. This containment was not 
unique to Canada (see below) but it was linked to its long-standing approach towards 
immigration in general and Jewish immigrants in particular. As confirmed by Norman 
Erwin, after decades in which restrictive legislation had specifically, although not solely, 
intended to prevent entry to Jewish civilians, the then Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, 
in consistently seeking public support for the war, ‘sensed astutely that Canadians were 
                                                 
28
 Especially the libel trial (1954) instigated by Rudolf Kasztner (as leader of the 'Jewish Relief and Rescue 
Committee' in Budapest in 1944) against charges made by Malkiel Gruenwald that he had aided in the 
murder of his family, and the subsequent assassination of Kasztner in 1957, Ibid, pp27-29. See also 
Yechiam Weitz, 'In the Name of Six Million Accusers: Gideon Hausner as Attorney-General and His Place 
in the Eichmann Trial', Israeli Studies, 14:2 (2009), pp31-37 for background to the so-called ‘Kasztner 
Affair’ and its links to the prosecution of Eichmann. 
29
 Yablonka, The State of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann, p11. 
30
 Ibid, p39. This dominant narrative was not only confined to Israel in the immediate post-1945 years as 
confirmed by Waxman, Writing History and Jockusch, Collect and Record!. 
31
 Waxman, Writing the Holocaust, p113. Annette Wieviorka, ‘The Witness in History’, trans. by Jared 
Stark, Poetics Today, 27:2 (2006), p389. Others warn that the impact of the Eichmann trial has been 
overstated, Waxman, Writing the Holocaust, p115. 
32
 Irving Abella and Frank Bialystok, None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933-1948 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983). 
33
 Declaring war on Germany on 10 September 1939, Norman Erwin, ‘The Holocaust, Canadian Jews, and 
Canada’s “Good War” Against Nazism’, Canadian Jewish Studies, 24 (2016), p106. Randolpf L. Braham, 
‘Canada and the Perpetrators of the Holocaust: The Case of Regina v Finta’, 9:3 (1995), pp293-294. 
13 
uninterested in the murder of Jews and hostile to the idea of Canada becoming a haven 
for Jewish refugees’.
34
  
 
In the immediate post-1945 years Canada relaxed its immigration laws to allow entry to 
Holocaust survivors. However, despite publicity of its atrocities, and increasing numbers 
of survivors allowed into the county, the Holocaust was viewed as a low priority until the 
1960s, with its genocide viewed as a European phenomenon.
35
 At the same time, Canada 
was accused of providing a haven for alleged Nazi war criminals.
 36
 And yet the greater 
foregrounding of ‘the Holocaust’ in both Canadian collective memory and Canadian 
Jewish identity from the 1970s was linked to an increasingly active and vocal survivor 
voice that focused attention on the thousands of Nazi war criminals allegedly living in 
Canada, and the subsequent official and public investigation of these allegations from 
1982.
37
 The resulting ‘Deschenes Commission Report’ (1986) found that the numbers of 
alleged Nazi war criminals in Canada had been exaggerated, but it recommended that 
changes in the Criminal Code should be implemented to allow its courts to prosecute the 
twenty cases it had identified as requiring urgent legal action.
38
 The necessary changes 
were enacted by the Canadian Parliament on 23 June 1987 and included a special clause 
covering ‘Crimes against Humanity’ as well as ‘War Crimes’.
39
 The two Zündel trials 
were located in and contributed to this period of public discussion in which, according to 
Franklin Bialystok, ‘the Holocaust’ began its institutionalisation into Canada’s collective 
memory.
40
 
 
There were a number of similarities between Canada’s and the UK’s approach to ‘the 
Holocaust’ both during and in the immediate post-war years. But there were also stark 
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differences unique to Britain, including its holding of the authoritative mandate of then 
Palestine. As in Canada, antisemitism impacted on both official and public discourses 
relating to the initial persecution of Jews in Germany and the subsequent restrictions that 
applied to Jewish refugees.
41
 Consequently, hundreds of thousands of refugees came to 
Britain between 1939 and 1945 but few were of Jewish origin.
42
 Likewise, the British 
government was regularly informed of the transgression of persecution to extermination 
and elected to repress the information, while attempts by Jewish (and other) voices to 
seek to use the genocide as propaganda or offer proposals of rescue were rejected.
43
 
 
In the immediate post-war years attitudes towards Jewish refugees did not fundamentally 
change, even after the horrors of the extermination programme had been exposed.
44
 
Crucially, public awareness of Nazi atrocities was initially mediated through images and 
narratives of the British liberation of Bergen-Belsen, while the death camps of Eastern 
Europe (liberated by the Soviets) were rarely reported.
45
 Furthermore, although public 
discourse is never monolithic, the identity of the victims was often anonymous or aligned 
to specific countries.
46
 At the same time, after the severities of war, the British government 
and public faced an armed struggle by Jewish groups demanding an independent state in 
Palestine. Hence, reports about Nazi atrocities in Poland jostled with stories of massacres 
in Jerusalem.
47
 Consequently, in contrast to its post-war reputation as moral liberator, the 
number of Holocaust survivors allowed entry into Britain in the immediate post-war years 
was minimal, with Jews, according to Tony Kushner, still viewed as ‘problematic 
immigrants’.
48
  
 
Although attempts to broadcast and detail information of the Nazi period, including the 
mass murder of European Jewry, continued from the 1950s (and in the wake of the 
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Eichmann trial) it is generally agreed that it wasn’t until the 1980s that both attitudes 
towards and consciousness of ‘the Holocaust’ in the UK changed dramatically. With “the 
rise of the survivor” mirrored in Canada, but also a greater willingness of historians to 
engage with the Holocaust, and its increased presence in public consciousness through 
filmic and literary mediums, two key factors are identified as responsible for this change: 
(1) demands for and the agreed inclusion of Holocaust education in the national 
curriculum and (2) the foregrounding of war crimes trials and subsequent debates 
surrounding the enactment of a ‘War Crimes Bill’.
49
 Kushner identified a third as the 
greater prominence of Holocaust denial and demands that the state take action to stop its 
propagation.
50
 By the time of the ‘Irving trial’, within a broader political climate in the 
1990s that focused on the ‘European Project’ in the aftermath of the ‘Cold War’, and a 
‘continental turn’ to Holocaust memory, this specific genocide had shifted from the 
margins to the forefront of British consciousness.
51
 According to Andy Pearce, during the 
same decade the UK had transformed its role into the ‘champion’ of Holocaust 
remembrance in the Western world, culminating with the establishment of ‘Holocaust 
Memorial Day’ in the same month the Irving case opened (January 2000).
52
 
 
Also relevant to comparative study, these four trials encompassed a period in which 
Holocaust historiography not only emerged into a distinct field of study but increased 
exponentially. Following the International Military Tribunal (IMT) it is not surprising 
that initial historian attention had likewise focused on the Nazi leadership and key 
bureaucracies and officials of the National Socialist party and state.
53
 Also in accordance 
with the IMT model, the mass murder of European Jewry was marginalised, if not absent, 
from these studies. But, since the 1960s, and most prominently from the 1970s, the 
historiography extended to not only include the wider ‘polycratic’ administration and 
experienced functionary beyond the Nazi leadership and central bureaucracies, but also 
the Holocaust. In particular, attention was placed on the decision-making process (its 
context, evolution, dating and key stages) that had transgressed anti-Jewish policy from 
persecution to extermination, as well as wider policy contexts (‘anti-modernisation’, 
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economic development, ‘euthanasia’, ghettoisation, the racial categorisation of 
populations, ‘resettlement’, war) that had informed and/or escalated the ‘machinery of 
destruction’.
54
 Attention also shifted away from issues of governance to perpetration and 
from the Nazi leadership to the direct and indirect, or ‘desk’ murderers.
55
 There was a 
categorisation of ‘victims’, ‘bystanders’ and ‘collaborators’, while any focus specifically 
placed on Jewish responses tended to be limited to the controversial subject of the 
Judenräte, and, in comparison, to the heroics of Jewish resistance.
56
 Micro-histories 
uncovered life, death and survival in the ghettos and camps, while local and regional 
studies of allied and occupied countries detailed the diversity and reach of the 
extermination process, but especially, since the end of the Cold War, in the ‘bloodlands’ 
of Eastern Europe.
57
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Across the same decades a variety of analytical frameworks were also appropriated and/or 
emerged as explanations for ‘the Holocaust’. Although long dominated, and polarised 
until recently, within ‘intentionalist/functionalist’ debates of decision-making, leadership 
(monolithic power/weak dictatorship) and genocidal motivation (ideological/structural), 
these frameworks ranged from the primacy of Hitler’s antisemitism, to the contexts of 
fascism and totalitarianism (Marxist oriented), the result of a premeditated programme 
(agency) or ‘cumulative radicalisation’ (ad hoc process), the inherent logic of ‘modernity’ 
(bureaucratic, industrial, instrumental, scientific), perpetrated by ‘ordinary men’ or 
‘willing executioners’ and/or ‘working towards the Führer’, the everyday of Nazi culture 
and ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ (mirroring the then emerging ‘cultural turn’ across disciplines), 
and, since the 1990s, an interplay of centre-periphery networks and relationships (‘neo-
functionalism’), especially in the eastern occupied territories, as well as gender (with 
women largely absent from the Holocaust until the 1980s), collective memory and 
memorialisation (culturally and politically mediated), a return to ideology and race (as 
fantasy not science), comparative studies of colonialism and genocide (reappraising the 
‘uniqueness’ debate) and the ‘voluntaristic turn’ (a governance by consensus rather than 
coercion).
58
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Within this comprehensive and extensive body of scholarship attention was 
predominantly on the actions of the perpetrators, and quite rightly according to Donald 
Bloxham, while scepticism over the subjectivity of any source material other than official 
records had foregrounded the use of perpetrator documentation.
59
 The Jewish victims and 
survivors were, of course, an integral feature of the prevailing historiographies, while the 
publication of personal accounts since 1945 had added important insights based on direct 
experience, perception and understanding of events as they happened.
60
 However, neither 
Jewish source material nor perspectives had been foregrounded in the established 
scholarship. Exceptions included Saul Friedländer, whose research integrated the voices 
of the victims as well as the perpetrators and so-called ‘bystanders’.
61
 Indeed, a common 
criticism has been that the Jewish victims have long been treated as ‘objects’ by historians 
of the Holocaust; as something to study externally rather than being integral to its 
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histories.
62
 It has also been noted that any wider contextualisation of the Holocaust has 
placed it in German and/or European but not Jewish history.
63
  
 
Research largely conducted after 2000 (and therefore after the four trials), and by Jewish 
historians, has attempted to redress what Norman Goda identifies as the ‘strange 
disconnect’ between Jewish histories and perspectives of the Holocaust and the key 
historiographical trends of largely non-Jewish historians in Europe and the US.
64
 This 
research has not only exposed the myth of survivor silence in the immediate post-war 
years, but, in utilising the vast archives of documentation, memoirs and testimonies 
collected and recorded by Jewish individuals and organisations, has challenged a number 
of once prevailing narratives.
65
 For example, on the oft-contentious subject of the 
Judenräte, although greater attention has recently been placed on the complexity of 
contexts impacting on their actions, Dan Michman has critiqued both the confinement of 
Jewish leadership to these German-imposed organisations and their activities in the 
ghettos.
66
 Other research has critiqued the more recent focus on eastern Europe, the 
myopic undervaluation of diaries as first-hand evidence, the neglect of ‘self-help’ and 
community relations in surviving, and myths that sexual violence had not been used 
against Jewish women wherever they were found.
67
. And yet controversies remain. While 
Laura Jockusch is incredulous that it has taken decades for (non-Jewish) historians to turn 
their attention to the victims, and remains sceptical that they have fully realised the 
historical potential of survivor accounts, Michman has identified an “Israeli School” of 
Holocaust research that restricts its historicisation to Jewish reactions and the primacy of 
antisemitism as causation.
68
 Arguably, notwithstanding the contribution to both the 
scholarship and understanding of the Holocaust through these new histories, the 
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seemingly polarisation of ‘Jewish’ and ‘non-Jewish’ is in danger of treating historians as 
monolithic identities as well as constructing a hierarchy of value on both authorship and 
subject.  
 
Arguably more specific to the history-law relationship, but related to the wider 
historiography of the Holocaust, these four trials further encompassed and represented 
the transformation of the ‘survivor’ as both foundational evidence of the Holocaust and a 
form of moral authority beyond its genocide, and then, as the numbers of direct witnesses 
declined and scholarship of the Holocaust increased, the utilisation of historians as both 
expert and witness by proxy (chapter three).
69
 As indicated above, although survivors (and 
many who were subsequently murdered) had long collated, recorded and published 
personal accounts and testimonies of the Jewish “catastrophe”, it was the Eichmann trial 
that brought their evidence and role as spokespersons of the Holocaust to world-wide 
attention. The authority subsequently awarded to survivor testimony in Israel not only 
changed the status of these witnesses as evidence (and role models of surviving) but 
challenged the hierarchy of proof in both history and Anglo-American law that had long 
sourced facticity in official documentation over the retrieving of memory (chapter two).
70
 
Ironically (and shamefully), therefore, in establishing the facticity of the Holocaust 
historians and jurists had applied greater trust to the remnants of the perpetrators over the 
testimonies of ‘people who were there', including those taking part in the later trials.
71
 The 
Eichmann trial, therefore, not only marked a pivotal change to the advent of the witness 
(chapter three) but challenged the ‘cult of the document’ then and still pervading both 
history and the law (chapter two).
72
  
 
The Eichmann trial was also the first courtroom in which a historian (Salo Baron) was 
submitted as evidence of historical background.
73
 However, in comparison to survivor 
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testimony, historian expertise was a minimal component of the Prosecution’s evidential 
base and strategy in 1961. The reverse was the case in the later trials, as witness 
responsibility was not only assigned to established historians but their testimony, both 
oral and written, was now foregrounded as the main source of evidence of the Holocaust 
(chapter three). And yet Anglo-American law inherently diminishes the evidential 
authority of historians, while critiques remain over the validity of the expert to act as 
witness by proxy (chapters two and three).
74
  
 
The four trials therefore provide not only a comparative base of legal case, context, 
process and reputation, but a comparative base of the utility of the direct and/or expert 
witness still relevant to on-going debates in Holocaust historiography. They also took 
place across decades in which ‘the Holocaust’, and its evidence, had been variously 
constituted, debated, explained and understood beyond each courtroom. If and how the 
varying debates and prevailing historiographies impacted upon and/or were reaffirmed by 
each trial is shown in the empirical research.  
 
It is not surprising that the historiographical reach of the Holocaust presented at each of 
the four trials was extensive (chapter three). But only four subjects were common to each 
case: the evolution of extermination policy, the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings 1941-
1942, homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau and the total number of Jewish 
victims. These four subjects therefore comprise the research focus of the thesis. To allow 
a direct comparison of their reconstruction, each historiography is organised thematically 
rather than presented in the form of individual trials (chapters four to seven). To allow 
clarity of both process and findings the relevant accounts presented, evidence 
foregrounded, facts established and surrounding record integral to each historiography 
are extracted from the legal form (see below). The relevant data-streams are also 
organised by chronology (documentation) and type to allow explicit clarification of their 
evidential infrastructure. Although this extraction and organisation belies the 
complexities and submerging of their judicial processing (chapter three) it is necessary to 
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both expose the method and evaluate the competence of the history-law relationship 
operating in each trial.  
 
To likewise allow clarity, the evidential bases of each historiography are limited to those 
items awarded probative weight as established fact (and not merely probative value 
through submission) in the Eichmann and Irving trials and those foregrounded by the 
Judges in their 'Charge to the Jury' in the Zündel trials (see below). This focus belies the 
quantity of items admitted in the Eichmann and Irving trials and referenced in the Zündel 
trials (chapter three). In fact, there was simply too much evidence presented or referenced 
in all four trials and therefore a process of selection had to be applied. However, the 
content and volume of evidence admitted or referenced is irrelevant to both the items 
foregrounded as probative in all four courtrooms and the facts established as 'true' in the 
Eichmann and Irving trials. Consequently, this omission does not impact on the 
historiographical findings authorised (Eichmann, Irving) or projected (Zündel).  
 
Rather, in response to empiricist and narrativist theories of 'good history', once extracted 
from the legal form and organised thematically it is possible to uncover and compare the 
evidential accountability of each historiography, and the consistency and stability, or 
otherwise, of the facts established across discrete courtrooms. It is likewise possible to 
quantify if the narratives authorised were 'truth-full' in content, regardless of their case-
specific form. It is further possible to identify the primacy of evidential (past) content or 
discursive (present-centric) narratives, regardless of legal case and context. Ultimately, it 
is possible to evaluate the 'matching' or 'making' functions of the history-law relationship 
integral to, and distinguishing, empiricist and narrativist explanations of 'good history'.  
 
Primary Source Material 
 
A body of secondary literature relating to philosophy/theories of history, Anglo-
American law and Holocaust litigation cases inform the theoretical framework of the 
thesis. Comparative and critical analysis of this literature is indicated throughout this 
'Introduction' and detailed in chapters one, two and three. It provides background to the 
primary research, as well as confirming the methodological gaps the thesis addresses. But 
the main form of evidence informing the research is the primary source material of the 
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daily transcripts recorded at the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials.
75
 As a public, and in 
most cases of Anglo-American practice, a verbatim record of proceedings, the transcripts 
offer an enviable degree of evidential access and account of each trial.
76
 However, rather 
paradoxically, their volume can be a barrier to research. For example, the published 
record of the Eichmann trial comprises around 1,500 A4-sized pages of text, the 
transcripts of the two Zündel trials total 56 volumes of written testimony (each 250+ 
pages), while the transcripts of the Irving trial record 32 days of testimony and comprise 
around 200 pages of text per day. Comprehending their content can also be challenging. 
Contrary to the popular dramatisation of court cases a trial is not a clear or linear process. 
Rather, the content, and even purpose, of each case is submerged in a convoluted method 
of what Richard Wilson identifies as 'tiresome proceduralism'.
77
 The transcripts mirror the 
resulting incoherent and dense form. But at least the reader is able to consistently re-check 
and verify the content of the relevant case, unlike the court audience.  
 
Gaining access to trial transcripts can also be problematic. Although the transcripts of 
both the Eichmann and Irving trials have been uploaded to specific web-sites, those 
relating to the Zündel trials can only be accessed through the relevant Appeal Court 
archive in Toronto, Canada.
78
 Hence, however public in theory, research on these trials 
reveals the limitations of geography and resource in practice.
79
 One further barrier is 
language. Unlike the Eichmann trial, many transcripts are not translated into any other 
                                                 
75
 Eichmann: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem 
(Jerusalem: Rubin Mass Ltd., 1992), Volumes 1-5, Newcastle University Library. All proceeding 
references to this trial will be prefixed by AET. Zündel: Her Majesty the Queen and Ernst Zündel (251/85) 
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language beyond that of their national host. Unfortunately, since only fluent in English, 
this common practice meant that the author could not access thousands of trials related to 
the Holocaust. 
 
There are also limitations of content inherent in Anglo-American trial transcripts. In 
particular, they omit the complexity of decision-making and procedure conducted long 
before the relevant case comes to court. Subsequently, there is no public record of the 
fundamental decisions determining the principal content of the trial (the 'facts in issue'), 
its evidential framework, or parameters of the 'triers of fact'; or whether there will be a 
trial at all.
80
 Even if comprising a verbatim record, both evidential content (videos) and 
instruction (judicial rulings) during the trial can be omitted. As ruled by the Judge in the 
Irving trial, any administrative discussions would not be recorded, unless of substantive 
relevance to the issues, while any judicial decisions would be transcribed in a separate 
document.
81
 Notably, the evidential content recorded can be a mere citation, or, at best, a 
detailed excerpt or summary of the items referenced or submitted. Moreover, since 
impractical, the transcripts do not include copies of the primary source material referred 
to and/or submitted. Scrutiny of the relevant contemporaneous documentation, or any 
films, maps or photographs shown to the court, is therefore not possible. Even the archive 
of the Irving trial, which includes copies of all documents referred to in the expert reports 
and in court, does not hold the relevant evidence in its original form or entirety.
82
 As an 
English speaker, evidential scrutiny is further limited by the majority of the 
contemporaneous evidence being in its original language of German.
83
 The reader, 
therefore, has to trust the accuracy of both the jurist in her/his representation of the 
relevant evidence and the recording by the transcriber. 
 
But the greatest absence of content in Anglo-American transcripts relates to the findings 
of trials by jury. It is common knowledge that the deliberations of these ultimate 'triers of 
fact' are not recorded. Indeed, it is a criminal offence for a jury member to be asked, or to 
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offer, to reveal any stage of jury decision-making. As Judge Locke reminded the jury in 
the 1985 Zündel trial: 
 
Under no circumstances are you permitted to reveal to anyone what occurred 
within the confines of your jury room during your deliberations.  That is the 
law … That is the way our system of justice survives in this country.
84
 
 
A similar instruction was endorsed by Judge Thomas prior to jury deliberations in the 
1988 retrial.
85
 Consequently, in trials by jury, including the Zündel trials, the most 
decisive stage of fact finding is concealed from public (and historian) knowledge and 
scrutiny. In the Zündel trials the transcripts record both Judges' 'Charge to the Jury', which 
summarise the relevant cases and remind the jury (and court audience and reader) of the 
key arguments posed, evidence foregrounded and points elucidated from cross-
examination. Although informative of historiographical process, and indicative of 
findings, neither Locke nor Thomas authorised any conclusions, or indicated any facts 
established 'beyond reasonable doubt', since that was the sole responsibility of the 
respective juries. It is therefore a barrier to research that the historiographical findings of 
the 'triers of fact' in the Zündel trials remain unknown. 
 
As a written text, the aesthetic characteristics of a courtroom are also missing from the 
trial transcripts. As highlighted by Jonathan Freedland, exchanges in court replicate 'a 
daily performance of extraordinary theatre'.
86
 Yet this 'theatre', including body-language 
and participant innuendo, jurist and witness performance or relationships, is not captured 
despite being a primary source of information.
87
 Likewise, the transcripts do not record 
audience reaction to, or even interplay with, the trial participants. It is impossible to 
capture, for example, the response of a largely Jewish court audience to both Eichmann 
in person and his crimes as they were presented, or the survivor experience of testifying 
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in Eichmann's presence, with the exception of the noted fainting of Yehiel Dinur (a 
survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau) and the halting of his evidence.
88
 Similarly, while 
contempt for Eichmann during cross-examination is evident throughout the 1961 
transcripts, they cannot replicate the continuing interplay between an indicted mass 
murderer of 'the Jewish People' and the legal representative of 'six million accusers'.
89
 In 
the 1985 transcripts the derision of Zündel's defence lawyer, Douglas Christie, directed 
at the eyewitnesses, especially Rudolf Vrba as a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau, is 
likewise palpable. However, they fail to capture fully the survivors’ reaction to Christie's 
antagonistic cross-examinations as well as the reaction of the court audience to denier 
claims and tactics. In 2000 the transcripts of the London trial did not record instances 
observed by one of the expert witnesses for the Defence, Richard Evans, that included 
Irving distributing copies of extracts from his book in court and at times addressing his 
remarks to a 'small clique of his admirers', or members of the Defence team passing 
information to Deborah Lipstadt's lawyer, Richard Rampton, on 'Post-it stickers ... on the 
rare occasions on which he missed something'.
90
 Conversely, the testimony recorded in 
the transcripts should not be taken literally. As noted by David Hirsh, nothing in a trial is 
straightforward, everything is said for a reason and/or effect.
91
 Likewise, as shown above 
and reiterated by Donald Bloxham, no trial is a blank page, with the subsequent 
inscriptions of the Holocaust in the courtroom being far from 'objective'.
92
 As with all 
primary source material, therefore, the content of trial transcripts has to be approached 
with caution, while a wider reading is necessary to compensate for their lack of extra-
historical and extra-legal backgrounds, contexts and insights. Yet, however flawed, they 
remain a comprehensive archive and record of an evolving collaborative investigation 
and reconstruction of the Holocaust by historians and jurists pertinent to the intended 
research of the history-law relationship.  
 
On a more practical level, although recognised from the outset as an essential form of 
primary source material, it was not immediately obvious how the trial transcripts could 
be utilised to investigate the questions of 'good history' posed by the thesis. The content 
of the transcripts was not known to the author prior to the intended research. 
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Consequently, where possible, they had to be read in their entirety, with the content of 
each page of transcript summarised, and then all notes of each trial compared and 
analysed, before a relevant methodology was identified.
93
 The density and haphazard 
nature of both content and legal process, as well as the selection of four trials, ensured 
that this first stage of the research was a lengthy, and at times challenging, method. But 
it resulted in the development of a crucial familiarity of not only the content and reach of 
each trial but the various approaches to and reconstructions of the Holocaust across the 
four courtrooms. More specifically, it was only after rigorous engagement with the 
transcripts that it was possible to identify that four historiographies integral to the 
Holocaust had been similarly investigated at each trial. It was also only after rigorous 
engagement with the transcripts that it was possible to identify that both the processing 
and findings relevant to each historiography could be reconstructed. It was similarly only 
after rigorous engagement with the transcripts that it was possible to determine the form 
through which their reconstruction could be most appropriately detailed and evaluated. 
As already mentioned, the form selected was thematic chapters, with both process and 
findings extracted from the vagaries of Anglo-American practice and organised into a 
narrative that complied with the intended questions of 'good history'.  
 
Chapter Plan 
As an introduction to the theoretical framing of the primary research, chapter one 
identifies and summarises the central tenets of both the 'narrativist' critique and the 
'empiricist' defence of historical scholarship.
94
 It begins with an overview of this latest 
challenge to the discipline and engages with a range of 'postmodern' voices to determine 
the content and form of its suggested 'narrative-linguistic' genre of historiography.
95
 The 
chapter then engages with key voices defending the prevailing 'empiricist-analytical' 
genre. Through comparative analysis of their respective claims the chapter identifies the 
key sites of contention that specifically coalesce around the 'presence' of the past, the 
primacy of evidential content or the fictive form, the mechanics of adjudication and the 
epistemic privileging of history's knowledge. The chapter confirms that the proponents 
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of both genres were directly confronted through a deliberate focus on the Holocaust, and 
Holocaust denial, in a 'knee-jerk' reaction or 'caricature' of postmodern thinking.
96
 It 
likewise confirms that the heated debates of the late 1990's have waned as concepts 
arising from the once identified 'intellectual barbarians at the disciplinary gates' have been 
transformed into insights and assimilated into everyday practice.
97
 However, the 
persistence of the 'empiricist-analytical' (and modernist) genre 'still pervades the 
postmodern era'.
98
 The chapter concludes that, despite a degree of theoretical 
amalgamation, generic contradictions distinguish the 'empiricist-analytical' and 
'narrative-linguistic' explanations of historiography. Consequently, the concept and 
judgement of 'good history' within the academy remains theoretically contested.  
 
As further background to the primary research, chapter two provides an introduction to 
the history-law relationship. Through comparative analysis of both disciplines it first 
identifies the assumed similarities of craft, that, in theory at least, explain and justify their 
long history of collaboration. The claims of a shared craft are then contrasted with the 
distinct norms and practices that define history and Anglo-American law as discrete 
disciplines. The chapter finds that contradictions are evident at all sites of assumed 
symbiosis. The chapter than applies theory to practice and examines existing research of 
the history-law relationship in Holocaust-related trials. It subsequently finds an acclaimed 
record of disciplinary reciprocity alongside a developing 'consensus of critique' that 
foregrounds the inadequacy of ordinary criminal law to deal with both the extraordinary 
crimes and historical complexities of the Holocaust, and the political (mis)appropriation 
of its past and record.
99
 More controversially, it identifies a critique suggesting that the 
law is incapable of delivering justice to the victims and survivors of the Holocaust since 
it legalised every stage of its perpetration. But, foremost, it confirms that knowledge of 
the Holocaust has been variously abstracted, distorted and 'cooked' in accordance with 
legal case and context.
100
 The chapter concludes that in both theory and practice the 
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history-law relationship appears to be a flawed and inherently 'dysfunctional' 
methodology.
101
  
 
As background to the legal contexts informing the primary research, chapter three 
introduces and profiles the criminal trials of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and Ernst Zündel 
(1985, 1988) and the civil case instigated by David Irving (2000). Through both primary 
and secondary research, it demonstrates that the trials were not only sited in different 
countries and decades but were influenced by their surrounding national contexts. In court 
they were governed by different substantive law, legal statutes, foundations of evidence, 
standards of proof, evidentiary rules and 'triers of fact', and outside court they were 
distinguished by different outcomes and reputations. Consequently, the four trials 
comprise an appropriate canvas for comparative study of the history-law relationship in 
practice. As additional background to these trials, chapter three also identifies the 
contribution they make to the existing 'consensus of critique' outlined in chapter two. The 
chapter finds a familiar record of legal breaches of 'due process', the inadequacy of 
ordinary law when faced with historical evidence and opinion, and external interests 
directing all four courtrooms. It also finds a familiar record of distorted and partial 
narratives, that, however grand in reach, could not 'do justice' to the historical 
complexities of the Holocaust.
102
 Through a detailed reading of the daily recorded 
transcripts the chapter likewise identifies a record of practice, integral to Anglo-American 
law, that not only compromised but obscured the evidence and facts of the Holocaust in 
the legal form. The chapter concludes that, when viewed through the lens of the existing 
'consensus of critique', the warnings of the limitations of Anglo-American law as a 
method of historical inquiry are further corroborated by the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving 
trials. But, contrary to conventional wisdom berating the cases in Canada, this critique is 
as relevant to the Eichmann and Irving trials as it is to the Zündel trials.  
 
Comprising the primary research of the history-law relationship, and in accordance with 
prevailing (empiricist) and contested (narrativist) theories of 'good history', chapters four 
to seven focus attention on the collaborative reconstruction of four historiographies 
investigated across the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials: the evolution of extermination 
policy (chapter four), the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings 1941-1942 (chapter five), 
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homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau (chapter six) and the total number of 
Jewish victims (chapter seven). Organised thematically, and once extracted from the 
vagaries of the legal form, each chapter comparatively details the accounts presented, 
evidential foundations foregrounded and facts established on each historiography, as well 
as the content of the narratives subsequently authorised at each trial. Each chapter also 
evaluates the accountability and stability, or otherwise, of each historiographical 
narrative, as well as the primacy of their past evidential content or present-centric (legal) 
form. The thematic chapters ultimately confirm that, although each historiography was 
inevitably 'cooked' in accordance with the case-specific demands of each trial, they were 
also empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content. Furthermore, the authorised 
narratives were, with few exceptions, not only compatible and consistent across 
courtrooms, but reaffirmed the content and findings of prevailing Holocaust scholarship 
both past and present. Each chapter therefore finds that the history-law relationship is 
competent to act as a model of 'good history' in accordance with the demands of both 
empiricist and narrativist theories. However, although the stability of findings across 
discrete courtrooms indicated the primacy of evidential constraint, and therefore a 
'matching' function with the past, each chapter reveals the primacy of the discursive form, 
in this case the legal demands of the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials, that 'floated free' 
of the relevant traces. Each chapter therefore concludes that the methods and outputs of 
the history-law relationship in all four trials are more appropriately explained through the 
'making' function integral to the logic of, and distinguishing, the 'narrative-linguistic' 
genre.  
 
Arising from the findings of the thematic chapters the thesis concludes with a number of 
insights relevant to contemporary debates on historiography in general and the history-
law relationship in particular. Three key findings are foregrounded. In contrast to the 
findings of the existing 'consensus of critique' outlined in chapters two and three, 
disciplinary collaboration at the level of historiographical reconstruction is capable of 
successfully negotiating an inherently flawed methodology to 'do justice' to the past traces 
of the Holocaust, including survivor testimony, historian expertise and established 
scholarship. Indeed, it is concluded that the history-law relationship is a discrete but no 
more flawed a methodology than the history discipline when faced with the complexities 
of the Holocaust. Conversely, in a reaffirmation of the existing 'consensus of critique' 
outlined in chapters two and three, the focus on historiographical reconstruction clearly 
demonstrates that Anglo-American practice is a fundamental barrier to public 
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comprehension of the Holocaust. It is only when extracted from the legal form that the 
evidential infrastructures and facts of the Holocaust are both transparent and verified. 
Consequently, it is concluded that the courtroom should not be utilised if pedagogy, 
especially if related to the rebuttal of Holocaust denial, is the primary objective of its 
participants. Finally, it is asserted that the 'narrative-linguistic' genre is not only the most 
appropriate lens through which to explain the historiographical methods and outputs of 
the history-law relationship, but most appropriately explains the construction of all 
historical knowledge, including Holocaust scholarship. It is therefore concluded that 
historians 'make' the past, however 'truth-full' the content of their histories, and not just 
in the postmodern age.  
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Chapter One. Empiricist and Narrativist Historiography: 
Contested Genres of 'Good History' 
 
Questions relating to 'what is history?' may still be ignored by many practising historians 
but philosophy/theory of history has become a more familiar and populated field since 
the oft-referred-to debates between E.H. Carr and Geoffrey Elton in the 1960s, and the 
arguably antagonistic (and some would say crude) disputes between Richard Evans and 
Keith Jenkins in the late 1990s.
1
 As Evans then insisted, although he was not a 
philosopher, someone has ‘got to take them on at their level’.
2
 A complexity of theoretical 
affiliation, content and explanation has subsequently evolved as a number of historians 
and theorists have continued to grapple with the artistic/scientific foundations of history's 
content and form. Notwithstanding an increasingly cluttered field of terminology, 
contemporary debates revisit familiar antagonisms, or 'history wars', long expressed 
between empiricist (realist) and rhetorical (sceptical) perspectives.
3
 But the latest 
challenge, constituted within the generic label of the 'postmodern', has been identified as 
much wider and more thoroughgoing than its predecessors. As modernist foundations and 
meta-narratives were challenged (and de-centred) across academes (and beyond 
scholarship), more specific to history was the narrativist critique of the prevailing 
Rankean genre that had, since the nineteenth century, not only disciplined its craft but 
legitimated its formal authority and status as a truthful, and therefore privileged, account 
of 'the past'.  
 
As background to the theories informing the primary research of the thesis, this chapter 
identifies and summarises the central tenets of both the narrativist critique and the 
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empiricist defence of the history discipline. It begins with an overview of the latest 
challenge, within the context of the 'postmodern', and engages with a range of authors to 
determine the content and form of its suggested 'narrative-linguistic' genre of 
historiography.
4
 Particular emphasis is placed on foundational arguments that distinguish 
history and 'the past', identify its academic form as a fictive and 'culturally implicated' 
discourse, link history and historians to dominant regimes and relations of power and 
expose the prevailing 'empiricist-analytical' genre (Rankean) as a distinct but “made-up” 
construct of practice, purpose and epistemic authority.
5
 Consequently, although history is 
still viewed as an intellectual and useful discourse, its knowledge of the past-as-history is 
no more 'truth-full' than other genres of 'historying'.
6
 The chapter then engages with key 
voices defending the realist credibility and rationale of the dominant 'empiricist-
analytical' genre. In response to the latest challenge, the chapter confirms that 
amendments have been made to its positivist (scientific) origins. Consequently, 
previously naïve claims of 'correspondence', 'objectivity' and transcendental 'Truth' have 
been revised. However, as these same voices insist, 'empiricist-analytical' techniques 
continue to discipline authorship, while adherence to the content of the past traces 
guarantees that historical knowledge is not solely forged in the present. Accordingly, the 
bipartisan conversation between past and present may be more complex than previously 
admitted or recognised, but the persistent relationship with the primary data of the past 
uniquely distinguishes and adjudicates between history and fiction, history and myth and 
history and propaganda. Consequently, academic scholarship retains its epistemic 
reputation as privileged knowledge of 'the past'. 
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The chapter confirms that the arguments of both genres were directly confronted through 
a deliberate focus on the Holocaust and Holocaust denial. It identifies the use of the 
Holocaust as the empiricists' “court of last resort” and Holocaust denial as the site at 
which 'pomophobia' coalesced.
7
 However, the linking of the postmodern climate to 
Holocaust denial both distorted and misunderstood its thinking. The chapter also confirms 
that since the height of debate in the late 1990's there has been a degree of theoretical 
amalgamation between empiricist and narrativist rationale and practice. Indeed, it is now 
assumed that any perceived threats to the 'empiricist-analytical' genre have been 
assimilated, or at least tamed, if not defeated, while Tom Lawson has argued that 
historians are, to a certain extent, 'all postmodernists now'.
8
 However, the chapter likewise 
confirms that whether assimilated, tamed, defeated, or in part victorious, the 'empiricist-
analytical' (and modernist) genre 'still pervades the postmodern era'.
9
 The chapter 
concludes that, despite a degree of theoretical amalgamation, fundamental contradictions 
between the 'empiricist-analytical' and 'narrative-linguistic' genres of historiography 
ensure that the concept and judgement of 'good history' in its academic form remains 
theoretically contested.  
 
 
In the late twentieth century familiar critiques were once again foregrounded that 
challenged the scientific claims of the dominant Rankean genre of academic history that 
had, since the nineteenth century, reputed to reconstruct the past as it “essentially was” 
and on its own terms.
10
 Within a broader 'intellectual climate' that was 'decentring' 
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modernist (western, male and white) foundations and meta-narratives across academes, 
attention was once again placed on the fictive and relativist foundations of historical 
knowledge.
11
 But, incorporated within the 'constellation of ideas' configuring the 
'postmodern', this latest challenge was charged with making the 'point again in new and 
urgent ways’ and strengthening 'the hand of the sceptics'.
12
 In a now familiar critique, the 
prevailing 'empiricist-analytical' (Rankean) genre of historiography was primarily 
exposed as a discourse about, but distinct from, 'the past'.
13
 Quite simply, since the past is 
ontologically distinct, history uniquely attempts to give meaning to a world that is 
inaccessible, and therefore 'it forever eludes us, [it is] out of reach; we can never “know 
it”'.
14
 Of course the past has left traces, comprising an ‘inexhaustible supply’ of 
‘ingredients’ or ‘clues', but they are fragmentary.
15
 Its events, relationships or situations, 
therefore, have to be retrospectively imagined, organised, given form and significance as 
a narrative and 'by historians working under all kinds of presuppositions and pressures 
which did not … operate on people in the past’.
16
 And: 'Like it or not, the historian 
approaches the past with a superior vision conferred by hindsight'.
17
 Therefore, history, 
or more accurately historiography, can never be a reconstruction of the past 'as it actually 
was', but can only be inferred and interpreted through discursive (present-centric) 
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narratives that ‘float free’ of the past.
18
 It is how the historian fits the two together that is 
‘crucial in determining the possibilities of what history is and can be … ’.
19
  
 
As an 'authored' representation, the subsequent 'stories we tell about the past' inevitably 
engage with the historian's experience 'of being human in the present'.
20
 In turn, the 
'stories' reveal the ‘epistemic well’ that conditions the historian's reality (ontology) and 
approach to the past (epistemology and methodology).
21
 It is present-day contexts, 
discourses and interests that both drive and pre-empt any visit to the archives, and it is 
through an interplay of contemporaneous concepts, ethics, hypotheses and theories that 
the traces are themselves 'culturally implicated' and related explanations, facts and 
historical truths are found.
22
 Generic conventions and rules may seek to discipline the 
practice of academic 'historying', but its process and findings are governed by the 
‘perspectival’ expectations and rigour required of, for example, the Annalist, 
conservative, feminist, Marxist, Subaltern or empiricist historian, however theoretically 
unconscious.
23
 As is commonly accepted, even the much feted 'father' of the 'empiricist-
analytical' genre, Leopold von Ranke, 'was as ideological as they come'.
24
 History, 
therefore, 'is always history from a certain worldview’, or, as commonly concluded, what 
the historian makes it.
25
  
 
Indeed, the multifarious readings and revisions of the past traces are clear evidence that 
there is no privileged route to the past. If this were the case 'there would be no need for 
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each generation or each culture [or each historian] to write history differently'.
26
 Rather, 
as Keith Jenkins infamously stated, the past is 'utterly promiscuous … [it] will go with 
anybody without a trace of jealousy or a hint of fidelity to any particular caller’.
27
 
Consequently: 
 
No historian or anyone else acting as if they were a historian ever returns from 
his or her trip to “the past” without precisely the historicisation they wanted 
to get; no one ever comes back surprised or empty-handed from that 
destination.
28
 
 
Similarly, there can be no privileged position from which competing or diverse 
interpretations can be adjudicated.
29
 There is simply no such thing as a neutral or objective 
perspective or worldview. Consequently, there are no independent means, or ‘vantage 
point’, through which 'true' or 'false' accounts of the past can be distinguished beyond 
aesthetic, ideological or political preferences.
30
 Or, as Robert Eaglestone noted, beyond 
the historian's 'ethical sense of truth'.
31
 Likewise, no lessons can be learnt from the past. 
According to Alun Munslow, the notion that the past is somehow able to inform policy 
in the present 'makes no kind of sense epistemically'.
32
 In turn, historical exposés of 
human behaviour long viewed as simply wrong (gender and racial inequality, mass 
murder) have never guided contemporary actions as the persistence of power hierarchies 
and repeated genocides so clearly show.
33
 Yet, although it is no longer controversial to 
accept that history 'is a representation of the past made in the present', empiricist focus on 
the continued 'presence' of the past ignores the inevitability of history as a one-sided 
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interrogation.
34
 Therefore, the greatest fiction propagated by the 'empiricist-analytical' 
genre is that the traces of the past can somehow 'answer back'.
35
  
 
Of course there are factual statements that inform historiographical representations, but 
meaning, far less laws, lessons or truths, cannot be found at their level of description.
36
 
Likewise, although the traces of the past can alter interpretations, 'the historian's narrative 
freedom is not confined by some dictate in the sources'.
37
 Previous claims that the source 
material acted as a mirror to a past reality, or could speak for itself, may have been revised, 
but the preoccupation with generic conventions and rules cannot adequately explain the 
contested readings, revisions and uses of the same traces, and even the same statements, 
however rigorous the scholarship or evidentially accountable the history.
38
 Therefore, as 
Munslow insisted, the prevailing claim by historians that the sources act as confirmation 
and guarantor of past truths 'reveals both an irresponsibility to their readers and an 
awkward self-deception'.
39
  
 
Yet, it is history's acclaimed factual correspondence with the past that awards its 
discipline and knowledge privileged authority and status over other forms of 'historying' 
(art, drama, film, the novel).
40
 Indeed, according to Munslow, history has always been 
and remains the primary mechanism through which Western society explains itself to 
itself.
41
Subsequently, history is awarded both power and purpose. The work of Michel 
Foucault is commonly recognised as central to the postmodern exposé of history's 
affiliation with present-day regimes and relations of power.
42
 More specifically, Foucault 
identified history, alongside other ‘human sciences’, as one of the key mechanisms 
charged with the acquisition of truths compliant with dominant interests.
43
 In turn, he 
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viewed history as a useful discipline, but not as a means of discovering ‘what actually 
occurred in the past’ as falsely premised by the empiricist (traditional) form.
44
 Rather, 
(effective) historical investigations were necessary to help establish the ‘genealogy’ of 
the dominant ‘regimes’ of power and truth, and subsequently knowledge, in any 
constructed episteme.
45
 As a site and tool of (Western) power, history was subsequently 
accused of being 'the carrier of a disease which was at once the motive force and the 
nemesis of nineteenth century civilization', or, in more general terms, of serving 'nation-
state oriented agendas'.
46
 Professional historians were simultaneously accused of being at 
the forefront of ‘cultural guardianship’, integral to the reproduction of on-going social 
formations, as well as 'compliant and pliable instruments for socially dominant interests'.
47
 
Conversely, any dissenting voices within the academy faced persistent institutional and 
structural pressures to comply, especially if wanting to be academically successful.
48
 It 
was likewise no coincidence that those defending the dominant 'empiricist-analytical' 
genre “float to the top of elite institutions”, while any examination of the discipline's 
curricula, funding and reward infrastructures revealed its 'politically-supported' 'belief 
system'.
49
 Jenkins therefore argued that the question ‘what is history?’ should be 
substituted by “who is history for?”
50
  
 
Incorporated within the exposé of history's relations to and reproduction of powerful 
interests and truths was the so-called 'cultural turn'.
51
 Infamously, within the wider 
configuration of the 'postmodern', history was subjected to the external influences of, 
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inter alia, culture, the everyday ('history from below'), gender, memory, trauma and post-
colonial studies. Consequently, concepts and ideas were imported into the history 
discipline that introduced methodological innovations and reinstated previously ignored, 
or marginalised, voices into its scholarship.
52
 Broadly acknowledged as the more 
'moderate', 'positive' or 'soft' features of the latest challenge, these innovations were 
widely recognised as not only exposing existing hegemonic power blocs and relations but 
democratising both history and the past.
53
 As celebrated by some, 'we are witnessing the 
dissolution of “the West”', or at least its 'metaphysics of comprehension'.
54
 Consequently, 
postmodern 'decentring' opened history up to new sites of potential allegiances, ethical 
uses and political action.
55
 As Munslow then advised, since history is so obviously 'a 
contemporary discourse about how we wish to “use the past”', the prevailing allegiance 
to its modernist colonisation (and burdens) should be abandoned in favour of historical 
interpretations that aim to inform and inspire ethical presents and futures.
56
 Elizabeth 
Ermath agrees and further berates the continued allegiance to modern methods and 
thinking amongst historians that are simply inadequate to the demands and ‘purpose’ of 
historical writing in what she prefers to call the ‘Discursive Condition’.
57
 Thus, instead of 
deriving authority and legitimacy from being the 'fact-checker' of events past, historians 
should actively engage in ‘cultural renewal’, addressing the problems of the present, or, 
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as many have specifically labelled, the useful production of 'practical pasts'.
58
 In other 
words, historians should celebrate and take responsibility for their 'use value' in the 
campaigns and ideas of the present.
59
 As Jenkins infamously suggested to historians, 'go 
with it … why not? You have nothing to lose but your pasts’.
60
  
 
Although Jenkins' explicit indeterminacy was identified as the more 'extreme' conclusions 
of postmodern relativism, even greater antagonism was directed at the so-called 'linguistic 
turn'.
61
 As already noted, identifying history as a 'narrative prose discourse' is a familiar 
and long-standing feature of sceptical critique.
62
 Thus, the latest charge that history was 
primarily a form of literature authored as 'the past' was arguably a repetition of previous 
artistic/rhetorical findings.
63
 According to Stanley Fish, it had constituted a specific 
quarrel that had survived “every sea-change in the history of Western thought …”, with 
those highlighting the rhetorical consistently on the losing side.
64
 However, informing this 
latest challenge was the findings of literary critics that emphasised the linguistic 
designation and infrastructure of all forms of knowledge, history included.
65
 With blame 
long apportioned to Hayden White for importing these findings into history, attention was 
placed on the prefiguration (and caging) of the conventions and rules supposedly intrinsic 
to academic history through the literary mechanisms of 'troping', which act as the 'root 
figures of thought'.
66
 White subsequently identified a specific range of interlocking 
narrative structures and techniques (argument, concepts, ideology and theory), plot modes 
(comedy, romance, satire, tragedy) and key figurative devices (metaphor, metonymy, 
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synecdoche, irony) that not only constructed the familiar principles and practices of the 
Rankean genre (objectivity, third person narration, the primacy of documents, footnotes, 
peer review) but endowed its content and form as 'realist' and conflated its scholarship 
with the past.
67
 In turn, the same linguistic architecture provided the lens (and 
consciousness) through which the historian approached and appropriated the past-as-
history. Consequently, historical narratives are inevitably preconceived by the historian 
(as comedic, heroic, romantic, satirical or tragic), with the past traces emplotted and 
'linguistically-turned' into both appropriate and familiar stories 'of a particular kind’.
68
 
Historical narratives are, therefore, certainly constrained. However, any limitations are 
not sited in the content of the past traces, as commonly asserted, but rather in 'the number 
of modes of emplotment which the myths of the Western literary tradition sanction as 
appropriate ways of endowing human processes with meanings'.
69
 Consequently, in all 
historiography, the 'primacy of the empirical is replaced by the discursive', while the 'form 
always precedes the content of the past'.
70
  
 
As White also reminded historians, the main medium of their craft is through language, 
which, far from being transparent or universal, is a complex and relativist system of 
conventions, meanings and signification that both constitutes our world and informs all 
reading.
71
 Language is also 'loaded with political and moral values; it is never innocent, 
abstracted or apart from social reality'.
72
 Language is therefore notoriously unstable and 
no reading is fixed.
73
 Consequently, language is always “generative” and never 
“mimetic”, even at the level of the individual statement.
74 
Therefore, how can the historian 
prove any correspondence between what s/he apprehends and what s/he formulates in 
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language?
75
 Likewise, in addition to the historian’s present-centric affiliations, how can 
there be an adjudicatory 'court of appeal' between interpretations and readings since: 
'With another linguistic net, we'd catch another world; and how do we know which one 
is preferable, or more valid, or more “true”'?
76
  
 
Furthermore, the past traces, so essential to empiricist histories, are themselves literary 
constructs. Consequently, as texts, they can only act as substitutes for reality but can never 
be reality itself.
77
 Communication between past texts and the historian, or, as coined by 
Ferdinand de Saussure, between the “signified” and the “signifier”, may appear 
straightforward and even transparent, especially if relating to the same language, but it 
involves a process of mediation across texts (and contexts).
78
 Therefore, the past-as-
history is not only literature of a 'certain kind' or 'genre', primarily fictive and prefigured 
through familiar plot-lines, but confined and constructed “intertextually”.
79
 As Jacques 
Derrida infamously contended, despite there being an extratextual reality (both past and 
present) “there is nothing outside the text”.
80
 White therefore concluded, as a 'narrative-
linguistic' construct, historiography, as both method and knowledge, is a verbal fiction, 
‘the contents of which is as much invented as found’.
81
  
 
It is not surprising that this latest challenge to history's epistemic credibility and  rationale 
was, according to C. Behan McCullagh, 'formidable', leaving the foundations of 
empiricist history, as noted by Beverley Southgate, 'irreparably challenged and exposed', 
while Gertrude Himmelfarb specifically accused postmodernism of reversing two 
centuries of scholarship ‘designed to make of history a “discipline”'.
82
 It formed an 
'intellectual climate', according to Deborah Lipstadt, that had not only attacked the 
'Western rationalist tradition', but one that had placed history 'up for grabs'.
83
 Postmodern 
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voices may have celebrated the destabilising of modernist burdens, the exposing of 
hegemonic power-blocs and the opening-up of the past to democratic, ethical and 
practical uses, but others deplored a perceived condemnation to 'a life devoid of the 
certainty of the past and constrained within the walls of our own images of experience’.
84
 
Jenkins was especially foregrounded as 'the Darth Vader of postmodernism’s evil 
empire’.
85
 At stake was the acclaimed epistemological foundations, and subsequent 
esteem, of the Rankean genre, or, as Eaglestone more specifically cited, 'the sort of truth 
to which history aspires'.
86
  
 
Although most practising historians ignored or rejected the application of the narrativist, 
and wider postmodern, critique to the history discipline, a body of literature emerged that 
specifically engaged with its various challenges.87 The respective voices not only 
responded to perceived threats to the prevailing Rankean genre but sought to redress and 
redefine long-acknowledged flaws in its positivist (scientific) origins. Consequently, 
previously naïve theories of correspondence, objectivity and the Truth were amended as 
part of ever more detailed explanations of how and why academic history, despite its 
flaws, still retained its realist and truthful credibility and utility.
88
 In a now familiar 
defence, these 'self-appointed' guardians accepted that history-writing 'constructs rather 
than records or reflects the past'.
89
 As Tom Lawson observed, most historians are 
comfortable with the knowledge that 'past and present collide in their markedly 
provisional narratives'.
90
 However, 'empiricist-analytical' conventions and rules 
(evidence, reasoning, reflexivity, writing style and verification) still guaranteed evidential 
accuracy and accountability, however 'contested', 'constructed', 'filtered' or 
'indeterminate', still secured interpretive discipline, however 'conceptually netted', 
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'interactive', ‘plausible’,
 
 or 'relative', and still recovered cognitive truths, however 
‘approximate’, ‘fallible’, 'inferred', or ‘mediated’.
91
 Histories may be narrative in form, 
but the required adherence to the content of their primary data ensured that they were not 
'unfettered'.
92
 Rather, in the narrativist focus on the authoring of the historical past, its 
critics had ignored the very core, or 'infrastructure', of the historian's craft; its fact-finding 
research.
93
 As Lawson insisted, the bounding of the historian by the sources is 'as self-
evident a truth as the idea that the past does not exist'.
94
 Ultimately, the evidence can 
“answer back”.
95
 Therefore, although the conversation between history and the past may 
be more complex than previously admitted or recognised, empiricist demands and 
discipline continued to guarantee that historical knowledge is not solely forged in the 
present.
96 
  
 
In a direct response to the 'linguistic turn', it was noted that the potential manipulation, 
obscurity and subjectivity of past texts as literary forms was not a postmodern revelation, 
but long acknowledged in the generic convention of source criticism.
97
 Indeed, it is 
integral to history, and the training of historians, that past texts should not be taken at face 
value.
98
 It has also long been recognised that historians interpret past texts through 
reference to other texts.
99
 Yet, however fragmentary, and however literary, the texts still 
relate to 'a referent in reality'.
100
 As Bernard Waites argued, the historian may require 
concepts and theories to help discover the intrinsic properties of past realities, 'but we 
haven't “invented” or “created” them'.
101
 Language may be fallible and unstable but to 
claim that no text can be read as an accurate reflection of something outside itself 'flies in 
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the face of common experience'.
102
 Rather, a vital symbiotic relationship exists between 
external reality, language and the text.
103
 Likewise, as McCullagh claimed, there may be 
many problems in translation, but once 'the language, context and intention of a text are 
known, its meaning can usually be fixed'.
104
 It is therefore generally agreed that when 
examining any past text historians 'are limited by the words it contains, words which are 
not, contrary to what the postmodernists suggest, capable of an infinity of meaning.'
105
 As 
Lawson insisted, to claim that all meanings 'grafted onto the past are of equal 
interpretative value and potential, is simply an act of intellectual nihilism'.
106
 
 
It was accepted that adjudication between competing narratives is more complex than 
simply self-reflexive constraint, and their findings more credible or "goodness of fit" than 
definitive, far less 'the Truth'.
107
 However, despite the absence of transcendental criteria, 
it is still possible for historians (and the reader) to distinguish between valid and invalid 
interpretations, as well as evaluate ‘disconfirmation’, through the application of 
‘mediating levels of reason’, 'rational strategies', 'rational warrant' or simply 'common 
sense' and experience.
108
 Therefore, the multifarious readings and revisions of 'the past' 
are certainly evidence of 'netted' authorship, but, through such adjudicatory reasoning it 
is possible to assess 'cognitive quality' and consequently to insist that some interpretations 
are more 'fair, credible and intelligible' than others.
109
 Also, as Evans observed, it is 
possible: 
 
for one source to have only one permissible interpretation in itself, and 
therefore, to conclude that in a controversy over it, one historian’s reading is 
true and the other’s is false.
110
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Of course, the historian's craft is fallible. Judgements made are not always as rational as 
they should be, the knowledge produced is not always as reliable as it could be, 
conclusions reached are not always credible, while the available evidence can be found 
to have been misleading.
111
 Lawson specifically accepts that the sheer 'presentness' of 
historiography reveals the frailties of 'History' as a discipline.
112
 Ann Curthoys and John 
Docker further identify that in the space between the rigorous scrutiny of the sources and 
its literary form, in what they label the 'doubleness of history', the discipline will always 
be at war with itself.
113
 But, it is still possible to trust historian accounts, since the aim of 
the genre (however linguistically determined) is to reconstruct the best and/or 'plausible 
explanations' based on the available evidence.
114
 There are of course other genres of 
historying, and other forms through which past realities can be truly represented. But, 
unlike the novelist, the historian does not create or invent past events, and, unlike the 
ideologue, s/he does not ransack the past for material to back-up partisan (or practical) 
objectives.
115
 As Evans once asserted, however positioned, 'if political or moral aims 
become paramount in the writing of history then scholarship suffers’.
116
 Almost 20 years 
later John Tosh insisted that the deliberate misuse of evidence distinguishes the ideologue 
and propagandist from the historian, while McCullagh more specifically argued that the 
historian has a 'social responsibility' to protect the community from false and biased 
material.
117
 Consequently, in the conscious rejection of a role in ‘practical pasts’, history 
remains a more 'truth-full' genre and subsequently a privileged form of knowledge about 
'the past'.  
 
However, the most explicit defence of the 'empiricist-analytical' genre was by those 
voices who sought recourse in the Holocaust. According to Michael Dintenfass, the 
evoking of the Holocaust was the most telling sign of the seriousness of the challenge of 
the 'linguistic turn', while Dan Stone highlighted its status as the empiricists' “court of last 
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resort”.
118
 Consequently, the Holocaust became the one site through which history's 
critique and defence was visibly confronted. At the forefront of empiricist voices was 
Evans, who infamously asserted that 'Auschwitz was not a discourse … The gas chambers 
were not a piece of rhetoric'.
119
 Furthermore, ‘the suffering of people in Auschwitz' was 
not a narrative imposed by historians.
120
 Rather, 'Auschwitz was inherently a tragedy' and 
could not be preconceived, and subsequently emplotted, 'as a comedy or a farce'.
121
 
Similarly, John K. Roth argued that relativism had met its match in the Holocaust, 'for 
there is a widely shared conviction that the Holocaust was wrong'.
122
 In other words, 
“absolute moral standards” were both obvious and necessary when faced with the 
evidence of its genocide.
123
 Conversely, if there was no extra-ideological, extra-linguistic 
or extra-textual method, or recourse of “disconfirmation”, how could the reader 
distinguish between honest appraisals and dishonest fictions of the Holocaust?
124
 
According to Berel Lang, the conclusion of relativist logic is that even in the case of the 
most basic elements of Holocaust history 'there is no way of “getting them right”’.
125
 
Evans further insisted that this logic awards fascist histories equal credibility in their 
portrayal of the Holocaust 'in terms of the struggle of different races for the survival of 
the fittest … without fear of contradiction except on moral or aesthetic or political 
grounds'.
126
  
 
Evans was also at the forefront of voices who apportioned blame to the wider postmodern 
'intellectual climate' for not only coinciding 'with the rise of the fascist right in Europe’ 
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but encouraging and fostering claims that Holocaust denial was legitimate historical 
revision.
127
 Or, as charged by Lipstadt, of creating a climate in which its 'irrational animus' 
could not be evidentially exposed and rejected as both 'false' and 'bigotry'.
128
 Although 
Jenkins et al were not directly accused of Holocaust denial, and no postmodern voice has 
ever denied the past reality of the genocide, the focus on the Holocaust and its denial was 
arguably intended to not only undermine the authority of the narrativist critique but to 
shame, if not silence, its protagonists. Hence, as identified by Bonnie Smith in 1995, 
advocates of the postmodern were raised to the heights of: 
 
the new villains for daring to question the orthodoxy of objectivity and truth; 
branded as close to fascists only to be recuperated by agreeing that we have 
learned a bit from them.
129
  
 
Dintenfass in 2000 similarly identified the use of the Holocaust ‘as an incantation to ward 
off the demons of the linguistic turn’, while, in 2010, Lawson berated the routine use of 
Holocaust history 'as the sine qua non of conservative rejectionists of the postmodern 
challenge'.
130
 As Dintenfass concluded: 
 
No past event figures more prominently … against postmodernist theories of 
historiography than the Holocaust … [thus serving] as a limit case that any 
tenable account of historical representation must accommodate.
131
  
 
If the foregrounding of the Holocaust, and its denial, was a deliberate strategy of rebuke 
it was partly successful, as narrativist critics were not immune to the charges. Infamously, 
White, as a direct consequence, rejected the prefiguration of the ‘Third Reich’ as comedic 
or pastoral, which pointed to a degree of stability of form and moral standards in past 
texts.
132
 He also invoked the concept of a ‘middle voice’ as somehow able to operate at 
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the juncture between literal and figurative speech and between factual and fictive 
discourse, which was not too dissimilar to amended empiricist logic.
133
 Although perhaps 
unfairly, White was subsequently accused of being so anxious to avoid giving 
ammunition to deniers that he had undermined what was 'most powerful in his celebrated 
critique of naïve historical realism’.
134
 Yet, in addition to questions about motivation, 
contradictions arise in the invoking of the Holocaust as the ultimate court of empiricist 
appeal. As Dintenfass argued, there is no explanation given to support its prominence in 
the evaluation of narrativist theory.
135
 Indeed, emotion aside, what kind of analytical 
reference point does Auschwitz, rather than any other event in the past, provide?
136
  
 
To the contrary, Eaglestone insisted that postmodern reasoning had begun with, and was 
a 'response to the Holocaust', because of its 'commitment to ethics'.
137
 Consequently, 
postmodern writers had been at the forefront of exposing Holocaust denial.
138
 Likewise, 
Stone argued that the Holocaust was 'the harbinger of postmodernity', precisely because 
it 'throws into doubt older methodologies, and demands the search for new ones.
139
 
Similarly Richard Carter-White noted that 'empirical historiography' may be the dominant 
genre of the Holocaust, but it 'does not exhaust the facticity of Auschwitz'.
140
 Despite his 
empiricist loyalties, Lawson accepted that 'Auschwitz is a discourse' [added italics], with 
its meanings manifold, changing and contested.
141
 In support of the postmodern 
unmasking of the author, Curthoys and Docker agreed that, in the case of such a profound 
event, 'it is particularly important to scrutinise the practices of historians, to notice the 
political and historical specificity of histories of the Holocaust'.
142
 As Eaglestone insisted, 
contrary to fostering Holocaust denial, postmodern thinking had explicitly unmasked the 
authorial link 'between denial and anti-Semitism, fascism and racism', and therefore 
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helped to expose its strategy as not simply 'bad history, not history at all, but anti-Semitic 
race-hatred thinly camouflaged'.
143
 Moreover, although found by some to be a different 
genre, since its followers do not conform to even 'the most basic requirements of historical 
writing, that of empirical accuracy in its individual statements', Carter-White argued that 
Holocaust denial is more effectively refuted through postmodern reasoning precisely 
because 'empiricist historiography' and negationist strategy ‘privilege the same language 
game’.
144
 The huge difference is that the latter fails to fulfil its rules and conventions.
145
 
Consequently, contrary to its reputation, Eaglestone insisted that 'the questions 
postmodernism asks of history and historians are very strong weapons in the fight against 
Holocaust denial'.
146
  
 
It has long been acknowledged that the equating of Holocaust denial and the postmodern 
'intellectual climate' was both erroneous and unjust.
147
 This linking not only proved to be 
a 'knee-jerk' reaction, but indicated a misunderstanding, or 'caricature', of the spectrum of 
postmodern thinking, including its narrativist critique.
148
 In particular, there appears to be 
a consistent blindness to the latter’s differentiation between past realities and their 
reconstruction as historiography. As Southgate reaffirmed, the past may be promiscuous 
but that is not the same as denying its existence.
149
 Rather: 
 
 … it is not possible, without denying the standards of evidence by which we 
live as both historians and human beings, to deny that something (that we now 
refer to as the Holocaust) did happen.
150
 
 
Despite being placed at the 'stronger' end of the postmodern spectrum Jenkins has never 
claimed that historians invent the past, while Munslow contended that experimenting with 
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its traces is not the same as saying it did not exist.
151
 Similarly, epistemic scepticism is 
not the same as lying about the data.
152
 To the contrary, the 'narrative-linguistic' genre still 
employs empiricist-analytical techniques; the difference being that it does so self-
consciously.
153
 Narrativist logic may have exposed the absence of transcendental criteria 
of truth, but, as Eaglestone insisted, postmodern historians also employ positivist 
(checkable facts) understandings of truth.
154
 Once again, in spite of his reputation, Jenkins 
has never disputed that the traces selected by the historian 'cuts down' their ‘logical 
freedom’ to write whatever s/he likes, while Munslow has consistently repeated that 
fictive is not the same as fictional and agrees that historical narrations can do justice to 
the varieties of connections 'inferred from the data stream'.
155
 Indeed, getting the data 
right, and deriving the 'most likely meanings and explanations', is not a big deal since we 
do it all the time.
156
 Thus, the common concept of 'the Holocaust' may be projected as an 
'imaginative creation', or 'cognitive control', with its histories constructed as fictive 
representations rather than “true” copies, but these charges should not be confused with 
a rejection of 'empirical accuracy' or the finding of 'narrative truths'.
157
 As Stone insists:  
 
there is nothing in postmodern awareness of the importance of subjectivity, 
perspective and the authorial voice that prevents a commitment to truth and 
rigorous reliance on the evidence.
158
  
 
As debates continued into the twenty first century an initial fear of ‘intellectual barbarians 
at the disciplinary gates’, and identified 'pomophobia' emerging across the academy, was 
followed by claims that insights had been gained.
159
 As stated by Evans, as early as 1997, 
the 'more moderate' positions of the narrativist and wider postmodern critique had 
                                                 
151
 Daddow and Timmins, 'Darth Vader or Don Quixote?', p141. Jenkins, Re-thinking History, p9. Munslow 
and Jenkins, 'In Conversations', p582. 
152
 Alun Munslow 'History, Discipline and Epistemology' (Review Essay), Rethinking History, 12:4 (2008), 
p563. See also Pihlainen, 'Escaping the Confines of History', p242. 
153
 Munslow, 'Facts to fight over'. 
154
 Combined with ethical (the knowing of experience) understandings of truth, Eaglestone, The Holocaust 
and the Postmodern, pp11, 161-166.  
155
 Jenkins, Re-thinking History, pp12, 13. Munslow 'History, Discipline and Epistemology', p564. 
156
 Munslow and Jenkins, 'In Conversations', p579. 
157
 Southgate, Postmodernism in History, p55. Stone, Constructing the Holocaust, ppxvi, xvii. Munslow 
The New History, pp182, 194. 
158
 Stone, Constructing the Holocaust, pp15-16. 
159
 Evans, Defence, p8. Evans argued later that this statement had been said ‘tongue in cheek’ and was 
surprised that so many people had taken him literally. Ibid, p294. Southgate, Postmodernism in History, 
pp16, 18, 24-25, 29, 54. 
53 
'breathed new life into some old and rather tired subjects', ‘restored individual human 
beings to history’, heightened awareness of authorial subjectivity, and reinstated ‘good 
writing’ as legitimate historical practice.
160
 By 2004 Himmelfarb recognised that the 
diffusion of postmodern categories and concepts had generated such a structural shift 
across the discipline that ‘what would once have been unacceptable is now acceptable, 
and what was once taken for granted is now widely challenged’.
161
 At the time of writing 
(2016) it is largely assumed that any perceived threats to the 'empiricist-analytical' genre 
have been assimilated, or at least tamed, if not defeated.
162
 Conversely, Finney suggests 
that postmodernists have won 'a quiet victory', since 'establishing a place for themselves 
at the disciplinary table'', while, according to Lawson, historians are, to a certain extent, 
'all postmodernists now'.
163
  
 
Indeed, Jenkins stands as an almost lone voice in his 'end of history' or 'postist' 
conclusions.
164
 As recognised in the foregrounding of ‘practical pasts’ (see above), those 
who have arguably replaced his leading role as narrativist critic continue to acknowledge 
the utility of history.
165
 As Munslow insists, the 'narrative-linguistic' critique does not 
mean history is redundant, but that its processing should be more self-conscious, its 
content and form more experimental and its authors more honest about empiricism being 
“history of a particular kind”.
166
 Ermath agrees and likewise suggests the development of 
‘new tools’ of both historical method and thought more appropriate to the ‘Discursive 
Condition’.
167
 More specifically, she recognises the persistent loyalty to the modern 
methods and techniques of the ‘empiricist-analytical’ genre as ‘profoundly impractical 
and probably immoral’ and advises historians to: ‘Get over it’.
168
 Southgate also 
                                                 
160
 Evans, Defence, pp243, 244, 248. 
161
 Himmelfarb, Critical Essays, p28. 
162
 Finney, 'Keith Jenkins', pp172, 179; Munslow, 'On Keith Jenkins', p261; Munslow, 'On “Presence”', 
p570; Tosh, Pursuit of History, p172. 
163
 Finney, 'Keith Jenkins', pp179, 187. Stone would agree to an extent, Stone, 'Introduction', in Stone (ed.), 
Historical Methodology, p9. Lawson, Debates, p3. 
164
 Southgate, Postmodernism in History, p56; Munslow and Rosenstone Experiments, p2; Curthoys and 
Docker, Fiction?, p5; Lawson, Debates, p3; Munslow, 'Genre and History/Historying', pp165-166. As 
Finney argued, Jenkins attempted to amend this stance in Refiguring History, 'but his heart wasn't really in' 
it, Finney, 'Keith Jenkins', pp180-181.  
165
 In the main the editors (Alun Munslow and Robert Rosenstone) and contributors to the Rethinking 
History journal: www.tandfonline/loi/rrhi20#.VynYHWjTVSB (Last Accessed March 2017). 
166
 Munslow and Jenkins, 'In Conversations', p582. See also, Munslow, The New History, p193; Munslow 
and Rosenstone, Experiments, pp10-11; Munslow, 'On Keith Jenkins', p260; Munslow, 'On “Presence”', 
pp573-574. See also the more recent work of Kuukkanen, Postnarrativist Philosophy of History. 
167
 Ermath, Discursive Condition, ppxii-xiii, 91-113. 
168
 Ibid, ppxii-xiii. 
54 
acknowledges that 'history, as a use of the past, can't simply be jettisoned as a modernist 
irrelevance', since it consistently intrudes into our lives.
169
 And, although he agrees with 
Jenkins that the past 'will “go with anyone” there is no reason to distance ourselves from 
it like offended prudes'.
170
 Similarly, Finney continues to admire Jenkins, but he does not 
want to follow him 'to his chosen destination'.
171
 Like Southgate he acknowledges that 
history cannot end because of 'the ways we are haunted by the past'.
172
 But he also 
contends that he and other historians do not see anything in postmodernism 'that precludes 
the holding of continued dialogues about the past that might serve a variety of cultural 
and political purposes'.
173
    
 
In reviewing the latest debates on ‘what is history?’ it is clear that, with the exception of 
Jenkins, there has been a greater degree of theoretical amalgamation across the empiricist 
and narrativist spectrums of historiography than initially premised. As Eaglestone noted, 
previous notions of an intractable debate have become 'cliched' at best.
174
 The ferocity of 
debate has also waned since its height in the late 1990's. Genuine or strategic fear for the 
future of the history discipline has receded. In turn, although Ermath suggests that the 
terminology of the ‘postmodern’ remains confused, and therefore should be avoided, its 
narrativist, and wider critique, has been defended and subsequently clarified, while a 
number of its perceived threats to history's authority have been transformed into insights 
and assimilated into everyday historiographical practice.
175
 In contrast to its 'hyper-
relativity' reputation, it is still possible to 'know' something about ‘the past’ in the 
postmodern age. Empirical accuracy, in the reading of past texts, is similarly important 
to postmodern histories.
176
 As Eaglestone verified, the unmasking of the 'realist' form and 
genre does not 'dismiss “historical rigour”' but places it 'in context'.
177
 More specifically, 
and contrary to attacks on narrativist competence and credibility, knowledge of the 
Holocaust is not only feasible but liberated from its modernist boundaries. Similarly, 
despite being the most visible site of “pomophobia”, Holocaust denial is not only contrary 
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to narrativist techniques but most likely to be defeated through its questions and methods. 
For the majority of postmodern voices, therefore, history, as a 'narrative-linguistic' genre, 
remains both an intellectual and practical discourse. However, the fictive form of all 
historiography always precedes the content and findings of the past-as-history, and not 
only in these postmodern times. Likewise, its purpose or 'use-value' should be both openly 
admitted and extended to a practical engagement with the campaigns, ideas and problems 
of the (discursive) present. 
 
It is likewise clear that, in response to the narrativist, and wider postmodern, critique, a 
complexity of explanation has both redressed and redefined the dominant 'empiricist-
analytical' genre of historiography. Consequently, flaws in its positivist origins have not 
only been recognised but amended in both theory and practice. The narrativity, and 
relative netting, of historical knowledge is no longer disputed. It is no longer controversial 
to accept that history is authored in the present. Nor is it controversial to acknowledge 
that history, as literary in both content and form, can never be a mimetic record of 'the 
past'. However, 'empiricist-analytical' techniques continue to be cited as the source of 
disciplined authorship, with the persistent bounding of the past traces and texts 
guaranteeing that historical knowledge is not merely the result of a one-sided 
interrogation. Crucially, through exercises of rational adjudication, the evidence can still 
“answer back”. In turn, the persistent recourse to the past traces, and texts, awards history 
both its fact-based and 'realist' authority and esteem, and distinguishes history, and its 
'use-value', from present-centric fiction, myth and propaganda. Consequently, although 
the bipartisan conversation may be more complex than previously admitted or recognised, 
history retains its epistemic reputation as privileged knowledge of 'the past'.  
 
It is evident that this defence, regardless of the increased complexity of its explanation, 
is an elaboration or revision of long-standing attempts at ironing out acknowledged 
contradictions of Rankean practice, while continuing to default to “practical realist” 
positions.
178
 Hence, there is persistent recourse to the 'presence' of the past and getting 'the 
(hi) story straight'.
179
 Similarly: ‘The search for truth remains a “Holy Grail” for such 
historians despite their proclamations to the contrary’, and despite being a contradiction 
of their own findings.
180
 History students are still trained into “doing history properly”, 
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while those historians who experiment with, far less disobey, the dominant conventions 
and rules of the Rankean form are few.
181
 Thus, far from heeding Ermath’s advise, the 
'empiricist-analytical' (and modernist) genre of historiography 'still pervades the 
postmodern era'.
182
  
 
An examination of the latest debates therefore concludes that, despite evidence of 
theoretical amalgamation, defining contradictions remain between the 'empiricist-
analytical' and 'narrative-linguistic' genres of academic historiography. In addition to 
disagreements over its purpose and 'use-value', four key distinctions of method and 
epistemic authority are identified. First and foremost, both genres accept that past realities 
existed, but dispute remains over the 'presence' of the past when constructed as 
historiography. Consequently, history has either a “matching” function' with the past or a 
“making” function' as the past.
183
 Secondly, both genres agree that empirical accuracy and 
accountability is foundational to historiography, but distinctions remain over the primacy 
of evidential (past) content or the fictive (present-centric) form. Therefore, historical 
knowledge is either bounded by its past sources and texts or preconceived and prefigured 
into familiar plot lines that 'float free' of their content. Thirdly, all voices accept the netted 
authorship of historiography, but disputes remain over the mechanisms of adjudication. 
Verification of cognitive credibility, and even truth, is therefore sited in either empirical 
constraint or the historian's “elective affinities” (as argument, hypothesis, ideology).
184
 
Finally, all voices recognise that the once-acclaimed history/fiction division is 'an 
oversimplification', but distinct differences remain over the former’s 'realist' authority and 
esteem.
185
 History is therefore either a privileged form of knowledge or no more 'truth-
full' than other genres of historying. These defining contradictions demonstrate that, 
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regardless of the sites of generic amalgamation, the concept and judgement of 'good 
history' in its academic form remains theoretically contested. Consequently, in an 
amendment to Lawson's proclamation, historians may certainly be “all postmodernists 
now” in practice but many remain resistant to its logic in both theoretical affiliation and 
consciousness. 
 
Informed by these generic distinctions, the next chapter begins its applied research of 
'good history' through the discrete form of the courtroom and Anglo-American law. 
Chapter two, therefore, seeks to clarify the rationale underpinning the ‘unique 
relationship’ between historians and jurists by introducing the theory and practice of the 
history-law relationship.  
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Chapter Two: History and Anglo-American Law: A Unique 
but Flawed Relationship? 
 
The relationship between history and Anglo-American law is long-standing and traced by 
Carlo Ginzburg to ancient Greece.
1
 Similarly, comparison between the historian and the 
judge ‘has had a lasting life’.
2
 More recently, historians have been legally admitted to 
court as expert witnesses of 'the past'.
3
 In turn, jurists have ‘readily’ looked to history to 
help decide their cases.
4
 Cited similarities of both objective and practice appear to justify 
their collaboration. Yet, history and the law are distinct disciplines and grounded in 
divergent conventions, rules and utility. However, despite their differences, disciplinary 
collaboration has been consistent, especially during the twentieth century, and most 
obvious in Holocaust-related and other atrocity trials. The ‘Irving trial’ in London in 
2000, the John Demjanjuk trial in Munich in 2011, and the prosecution of Reinhard 
Hanning in Detmold (Germany) in 2016, as well as cases before International Tribunals 
(relating to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) and the International Criminal Court, are 
evidence of continued collaboration into the twenty first century.
5
 Implicit is that history 
and Anglo-American law have not only forged a ‘unique relationship', but that generic 
distinctions have not compromised their integrity once in the courtroom or prevented the 
intended aims of prosecution and 'transitional justice'.
6
  
 
As additional background to the primary research of the thesis this chapter introduces the 
theory and practice of the history-law relationship. Through comparative analysis of both 
disciplines it first outlines their acclaimed similarities of craft. Those identified are then 
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contrasted with the norms and practices that distinguish history and Anglo-American law. 
The chapter finds that, in theory, any sites of potential compatibility are outweighed by 
their distinctions. Since these distinctions have not prevented consistent collaboration, 
investigation of the history-law relationship transfers from theory to practice. The chapter 
acknowledges that the 'unique relationship' between historians and jurists is clearly visible 
in Holocaust-related trials. Therefore, if theory is to be challenged by practice, it should 
be evident in the collaborative processing of the Holocaust. Through a critical assessment 
of a growing body of literature focusing on Holocaust-related trials, the chapter identifies 
a record of disciplinary reciprocity, but likewise finds a 'consensus of critique' that warns 
of the risks of a ‘show trial’, the inadequacy of ordinary criminal law to deal with the 
extraordinary crimes and evidence of the Holocaust, and the political (mis)appropriation 
of its history and record.
7
 It has even been suggested that the law is incapable of delivering 
justice to the victims and survivors of the Holocaust since it legalised every stage of its 
perpetration. But, foremost, is the critique that knowledge of the Holocaust has been 
abstracted, diminished, distorted, domesticated, and inevitably 'cooked'.
8
 The chapter 
concludes that, although opinion over its competence remains contested, the history-law 
relationship appears to be a flawed and inherently 'dysfunctional' methodology.
9
  
 
 
It is commonly reputed that history and the law share a compatibility of objective and 
practice that both allows and justifies their collaboration in the courtroom.
10
 The 
association is easy to comprehend. In theory, both disciplines deal with events passed and 
share the common aim of bearing witness in the present. Both are similarly authorised to 
determine and find, if not 'the Truth' of past events, at least 'essential' or 'probable' truths, 
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and, in the case of criminal law, those truths 'beyond reasonable doubt'.
11
 Infamously the 
oath to ‘tell the truth and nothing but the truth’ is at the heart of the legal system, and, 
although not as prescriptive in history, there is a similar mantra of purpose inherent in its 
dominant 'empiricist-analytical' genre (chapter one).
12
 As Oliver Daddow claimed: ‘The 
search for truth remains a ‘Holy Grail’ for ... historians despite their proclamations to the 
contrary’.
13
 Furthermore, the ability of history and the law to secure truth is officially and 
publicly sanctioned outside of their respective academies. Consequently, both disciplines 
are authorised to not only reconstruct 'the past' but to truly 'know' 'the past'. 
 
Both history and the law are normative in theory and practice. Although more complex 
and prescriptive in law, both historians and jurists are subsequently bound, guided and 
regulated by a system of conventions and rules. Consequently, professional historians 
must prove ‘mastery of all the necessary techniques of archival research and historical 
investigation', long established by 'the PhD’, while jurists are governed by a complex 
network of 'primary' and 'secondary' rules that determines the entire process of materiality 
(evidence and proof).
14
 Both disciplines train a set of practitioners to abide by and carry 
out the demands of their respective crafts. In turn, disciplinary conventions and rules 
effectively police those qualified.
15
 Both disciplines equally rely on authorised peer 
groups to scrutinise professional compliance and competence.
16
 Ultimately, both insist 
that the rigorous application of agreed conventions and rules ensures the production of 
'good history' and 'good law' respectively.
17
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Both history and the law are essentially investigative in practice and utility. They are also 
both primarily evidence based and empiricist in objective and rationale. Moreover, it is 
the evidential accountability of both historical and legal investigations that legitimates 
their disciplinary authority as truthful knowledge and subsequently as 'realist' crafts.
18
 
Fact determination and finding are similarly integral to history and the law and both 
disciplines site the probative value and weight of those established in a hierarchy of 
evidential material that has primary documentation at its apex, although the law places 
greater emphasis on first-hand oral testimony.
19
 Both disciplines admit other forms of 
evidence (drawings, photographs, secondary literature) and similarly register their 
content as a 'soft' option.
20
 Despite the advent of the survivor as foundational evidence 
and witness since the Eichmann trial (chapter three) both history and the law are equally 
'mistrusting' of personal memoir, including survivor testimony, with the 'vagaries of 
memory' similarly viewed as inherently 'unreliable' or biased.
21
 The predominant ‘cult of 
the document’ in both disciplines therefore continues to site evidentiary value and weight 
in ‘physical remnants, over people who were there'.
22
 According to Richard Eggleston, in 
a legal case it is assumed that even the ‘honest witness’ is likely to withhold the whole 
truth and probably lie outright the more irrelevant they think the questions posed.
23
 
Similarly in history, Richard Evans suggests that, while all sources must be approached 
with caution, ‘interviews with participants after the event’ are perhaps ‘the most 
problematical kind of evidence’.
24
 Consequently, both disciplines have been criticised for 
their discriminatory and short-sighted approach to survivor testimony, in particular, and 
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their subsequent failure to value its unique 'epistemic link' and extract its 'experiential' 
truths.
25
  
 
Both history and the law also insist that fact determination and finding is not only 
evidential but rigorous. Although more prescriptive and visible in law, conventions and 
rules effectively guide the historians' and jurists' testing of evidence.
26
 Both disciplines 
similarly utilise cross-examination, deductive reasoning and source criticism as tools of 
investigation and scrutiny.
27
 They equally seek to extract credible and reliable facts, in 
compliance with agreed standards of evidential proof, while corroboration is an equally 
foundational concept and objective.
28
 Both disciplines also insist that the fact finding 
process is balanced and subject to impartial adjudication.
29
 Trust is similarly placed on 
specific 'triers of fact', whether judge, jury or historian.
30
 As found in chapter one, the 
historian of the prevailing 'empiricist-analytical' genre is identified as a mediator between 
past and present, while, in Anglo-American law, the judge and jury 'acts as the objective 
decision-maker in the face of opposing interests'.
31
 Arguably, the very concept of the 'Rule 
of Law' implies ‘procedural integrity’, while the foregrounding of 'due process' imparts 
notions of fairness, impartiality and transparency.
32
 Similarly in history, 'open-minded 
enquiry', and the conversation between past and present by the 'engaged', 'reflexive' or 
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'reasonable' historian, is fundamental to ‘the absolute authority of empiricist 
historiography’.
33
  
 
Informed through 'empiricist-analytical' rationale, both history and the law have faced 
similar sceptical critiques.
34
 During their respective 'postmodern' challenges both 
disciplines have been reluctant to acknowledge that fact determination and finding is far 
from contingent or value-free.
35
 Yet, the 'evidential gap', potential unreliability of key 
sites of evidence, indeterminacy of source material (including legislation), extra-
disciplinary context, and the application of 'netted' (positioned) reasoning, as well as the 
irrational and unconscious, all contribute to the complexity and fallibility of both 
historical and legal decision-making.
36
 Both disciplines also endorse the application of 
'common-sense' and concur that it is infinitely contested.
37
 Consequently, Anglo-
American law, like its history counterpart, has revised its positivist (scientific) origins 
and more readily acknowledges the necessity of interpretation and inferential reasoning, 
as well as the weaving of narrative, to 'make sense' of the evidence and overall 
argumentation.
38
 As shown in chapter one, it is no longer controversial to accept that 
history-writing 'constructs rather than records or reflects the past'.
39
  But, as similarly 
noted by Eggleston, in law, 'the widely accepted thesis is that human beings need stories 
in order to make certain kinds of decisions and, more generally, to make sense of the 
world'.
40
 However, both history and the law insist that narrative is not mere 'story-telling', 
while any interpretations must be plausible.
41
 Thus, although more prescriptive in law, 
both disciplines concur that fact determination and finding is an interactive negotiation 
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between 'hard' evidence, rules-bound procedure and the "culturally relative and value 
laden”' 'stock of knowledge' endemic to all material reasoning.
42
 
 
In recognition of the complexity of fact determination and finding both history and the 
law authorise the truths of their investigations on the less than deterministic outcome of 
“probability”. Even the higher standard in criminal cases of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
infers a level of proof below that of absolute certainty, while the institutional safeguards 
of appeal are a visible reminder that legal investigations and findings can be wrong or at 
least unjust.
43
 Therefore, in both history and the law, it is acknowledged that the 
processing of inquiry is more likely to determine what ‘probably happened’ rather than 
what ‘actually happened’.
44
 And yet, however probable, both disciplines are surrounded 
by a deterministic language (evidence, fact, proof, rigour, standards, truth) that conveys 
a correctness of method and outcome. Therefore, however amended, the authority of 
'empiricist-analytical' (modernist) method and outputs of both history and the law 
'pervades the postmodern era'.
45
 Consequently, as found in chapter one, despite the 
revision of naïve theories of correspondence, objectivity and transcendental adjudication, 
historians defer to “practical realist” positions, while in law, despite consistent critique, 
William Twining identifies the persistence of ‘evidence scholarship’.
46
  
 
Both disciplines are similarly awarded wider utility beyond the acquisition of material 
(realist) knowledge. As indicated in chapter one, history is one of the primary mechanisms 
through which Western society explains itself to itself, while the law is the key site of 
dispute resolution, legislative enforcement and justice.
47
 However, although the rendering 
of justice is a formal duty assigned to the law, historians have been equally dedicated to 
its realisation on behalf of specific victims. Although contested, historians of mass 
atrocity have insisted that the securing of justice, ‘for those who have been silenced’, is 
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central to history's purpose.
48
 The securing of justice is likewise cited as central to the 
combined efforts of history and the law in 'key' perpetrator trials, as well as Holocaust 
denial and ‘cosmopolitan’ trials.
49
 Integral to all are didactic objectives that extend notions 
of justice beyond the accused and relevant victims to the securing of collective memory 
and the historical record.
50
 Extra-historical and extra-legal considerations are therefore 
actively sought and endorsed through these trials and with the complicity of both 
disciplines. Despite warnings of a 'show trial', most participants insist that didactic 
objectives do not detract from the core purpose of resolving guilt or innocence in a 
procedurally fair manner.
51
  
 
Both history and the law are also viewed as sites and tools of power. As indicated in 
chapter one, history is a central component of national curricula and tasked with ‘cultural 
guardianship', while the control and influence of the law permeates all social phenomena 
and relations.
52
 In democratic states both disciplines similarly assert a position of 
autonomy from the governing authority. Indeed, their public legitimacy is based on their 
demonstration of political (and state) independence. In theory, the law ‘constitutes and 
constrains political power’, while history seeks to distinguish and dismantle partisan-
based myths and propaganda (chapter one).
53
 Yet, the autonomy of both disciplines has 
been similarly contested.
54
 As shown in chapter one, history has long been critiqued as 
one of the key mechanisms charged with the acquisition of truths compliant with 
dominant interests, while the law is viewed as the guardian of specific desires, principles 
and citizens.
55
 In fact, according to John Adams and Roger Brownsword, 'the whole point 
of having legislative assemblies seems to be to enable one group (the ruling political 
party) to translate its sectional interests into a legal form'.
56
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In theory, therefore, the compatibilities of craft appear to support the methodological 
validity of collaborative investigation through the history-law interface. Yet, a long-
standing 'consensus of critique' contradicts this conclusion. Situated within identified 
'schools of thought', a growing number of voices have warned that bringing historical 
inquiry into the courtroom subverts both history ('the law and society movement') and the 
law ('legal liberalism') precisely because they are discrete disciplines.
57
 Contradictions of 
practice are subsequently identified at all sites of acclaimed symbiosis and begin with the 
case-specific form integral to Anglo-American law. Most notably, in contrast to historical 
inquiry outside of the courtroom: 'Much of what happens in a trial depends on the kind of 
case it is and, more specifically, on the nature of the charges'.
58
 Outlined in the 
'indictment', the charges determine the disputed 'facts in issue' (principal facts) long 
before the case comes to court and thereafter govern the content, operation and reach of 
any trial, including the remit of historical inquiry. Crucially, the requirement to do justice 
to the accused forecloses any attempt to widen historical inquiry beyond its case-specific 
remit.
59
 Consequently, the ‘scope of analysis is narrowed, the imagination is constrained, 
and the curiosity, curtailed’.
60
  
 
The admission of evidence is also limited to its case-specific content, while deference to 
the indictment leads the advocate to 'cherry-pick' evidence regardless of the historical 
context or record.
61
 In turn, historical context is only of interest if it impinges on questions 
of guilt or innocence.
62
 As noted by David Cesarani: ‘In a court of law context and 
circumstances are the least important evidence … but in history … [they] matter a great 
deal’.
63
 Once admitted into court the cross-examination and adjudication of evidence is 
likewise restricted.
64
 What counts as probative for the 'triers of fact', whether judge or 
jury, is ‘case-specific evidence’, in contrast to the historian's investigation of ‘any 
evidence deemed necessary for creating as truthful as possible a narrative of when, how 
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and why something happened’.
65
 Ultimately, the case-specific form of Anglo-American 
law threatens to not only confine and control the process of historical inquiry, but to 
contradict and/or distort the findings of established historiography. 
 
In contrast to historical inquiry, Anglo-American law is also essentially adversarial in 
both content and form.
66
 Adversary inherently pits one side against the other, with the 
'triers of fact' as not only adjudicators but designated referees.
67
 Consequently, the 
courtroom, unlike more familiar forms of historical debate and presentation, is a place of 
'struggle … for control over information which the jury [or Judge] would use to come to 
its verdict'.
68
 Crucially, and contrary to both historical inquiry and the law's accredited 
function, adversary means that the main objective of its participants is not to find out what 
actually, really or even probably happened. In amongst terminology citing the primacy of 
establishing or raising sufficient doubt over the 'burden of proof', the goal for both parties 
is to win their case.
69
 Hence, the law 'is not interested in truth per se; truth has merely an 
instrumental value for the adjudication of guilt and innocence'.
70
 It is therefore not 
surprising that "hard-nosed" practitioners claim to prioritise “winning, not justice”, 
“proof, not truth”, although the two may not be mutually exclusive.
71
  
 
Most notably, the adversarial form utilises cross-examination as not only a tool of 
investigative rigour but as a means of undermining the credibility of oppositional 
accounts. Thus, in amongst the extraction of relevant facts, a ‘good deal of successful 
cross-examination depends on making the witness, including any experts, look 
ridiculous’.
72
 Furthermore, cross-examination may be cited by both history and the law as 
integral to the securing of evidential proof (and therefore certainty) and yet adversary 
infuses its process in the courtroom with persistent doubt. Rather ironically, it is a system 
that seeks evidential clarity and corroboration and yet presupposes, and endlessly implies, 
evidential fallibility and falsity, regardless of any previous sanction of credibility or fact. 
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Every witness is under suspicion and remains so throughout their testimony. Every 'fact 
in issue' has to be proven anew. And no form of evidence is exempt, including the 
historian.  
 
Consequently, once on the stand, historians will be involved in an adversarial contest that 
s/he neither frames nor controls. They will be ‘hostage' to the court's line of questioning 
and open to deliberate attack and ridicule by legal opponents.
73
 Historians may also be 
pitted against each other in support of oppositional accounts. These accounts will then be 
presented as 'incontrovertible evidence', in direct contradiction to the regular revision of 
historical conclusions.
74
 It is also likely, in such cases, that opposing historians will 
effectively nullify the evidence of the other.
 75
 Also, once on the stand, historians will 
have no control over the consequences of their testimony, which could be both distorted 
and utilised in favour of the opposing side.
76
 Furthermore, when faced with conflicting 
testimony, a jury is forced to make judgements of credibility alongside the more deductive 
reasoning of evidential weight. And: ‘Psychologists tell us that juries decide more by 
weighing the plausibility of competing stories than by careful analysis of the evidence’.
77
  
 
Adversary in cross-examination also promotes performance and tactic. Consequently, for 
the successful advocate, skills of oration, persuasion, impression, innuendo and the 
seduction of jurors are paramount.
78
 Therefore, in contrast to the training of historians, 
advocacy literature promotes the use of body language and eye contact, making a good 
impression, brevity, rhetorical devices and manipulative and diversionary tactics over 
‘rational argument’.
79
 It is therefore not surprising that "hard-nosed" practitioners claim 
to prioritise “persuasion, not reason”, “experience, not logic”, “Art not Science”, 
“feel[ing], not analysis” as desired skills.
80
 As Twining suggested, many of the techniques 
equated with the effective advocate are contrary to university values of knowledge 
production 'per se'.
81
 Conversely, the performance and tactic of legal cross-examination 
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demands more from the witness, and expert, than relevant evidence. In amongst the 
necessity of recall it likewise requires such character traits as vigilance, proficiency and 
resilience. Arguably the ability of the witness to perform under and withstand cross-
examination is almost as important as the evidence s/he holds. It has therefore been 
suggested that the performance of the witness is more likely to convince a jury of 
probative weight than the facts articulated, regardless of certain rules or tests 
(consistency, corroboration) being applied.
82
 And, in such a subjective exercise, there is 
no guarantee that evidential accountability and perceived credibility will coincide.  
 
But it is in the normative infrastructure of Anglo-American law that disciplinary 
inconsistencies are most evident. As shown above, both disciplines foreground 
conventions and rules as legitimate norms of their craft. However, in the case of Anglo-
American law, they do not operate as mere principle but are statutory in form and 
prescriptive in content. Acting as a hierarchical network of 'primary' and 'secondary' rules, 
they do not only govern legal procedure, relationships and standards of verification but 
confer the very 'essence of law'.
83
 Any breach by its practitioners is not merely sanctioned 
through peer criticism or pressure but constitutes a criminal offence. As already stated, a 
distinctive set of rules prescribe the entire operation of materiality (evidence and proof).
84
 
Hence, from the pre-trial and ‘evidential stage’ of a case, to the trial itself and post-trial 
stages, specific rules determine the 'facts in issue', which party carries the 'burden of 
proof,' the form and range of evidence accepted as both relevant (or irrelevant) and 
admissible (or inadmissible) and 'what questions are or are not put to witnesses …’.
85
 A 
formal question-answer format further confines and re-organises witness testimony, while 
no ‘leading questions’ can be posed.
86
 As already acknowledged, there is no obligation 
on either party to represent any evidence in context, and, most notably, any failure by the 
witness to disclose relevant facts or truths is permissible.
87
 Therefore, the oath ‘to tell the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ does not punish those who withhold part 
of the truth unless its omission impacts on the truth of what has already been said.
88
 As 
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shown in chapter one, this prescriptive confinement of inquiry is anathema to the history 
discipline. 
 
A further set of ‘exclusionary rules’ specifically disallow evidence thought to be 
prejudicial to the defendant.
89
 At the risk of over-simplification: 
 
 … the broad governing principle underlying the English law of evidence can 
be stated in no more than nine words: all relevant evidence is admissible, 
subject to the exceptions.
90
 
 
Arguably the most well-known exclusionary concept is 'hearsay', with the relevant rules 
traditionally preventing the submission of any evidence other than first-hand oral or 
written evidence, based on the premise that what others may or may not have said or 
witnessed cannot be directly challenged for reliability.
91
 Crucially, since inherently 
removed from first-hand experience and observation, all history is ruled as 'hearsay'. 
Although exempted by a further set of rules (see below), the exclusionary rules could, in 
theory, prohibit evidence and testimony being submitted however relevant to the 
historian’s expertise or the established historiography.  
 
An additional set of rules govern the entire process of fact determination and finding; 
from the concept and categorisation of 'facts', to their relevancy and probative value and 
weight. Indeed, a specific set of rules determine and govern the weeding-out of relevant 
facts (and subsequently evidence) well before the case gets to court. Once at trial a 
hierarchy of facts is further prescribed, which range from the ‘facts in issue’ (‘principal 
facts’) to ‘relevant facts’ or ‘evidentiary facts’ (that relate to the 'facts in issue'), 
‘collateral' or 'subordinate' facts (relating to the competence and credibility of a witness) 
and 'preliminary' facts (to be proven before the admissibility of evidence relating to the 
'facts in issue' or 'evidentiary facts').
92
 All categories are open to further classification in 
accordance with substantive law (civil or criminal), while yet more rules govern standards 
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of authenticity, competence and credibility.
93
 Specific rules also determine the degree to 
which the facts have to be proven. As already observed, a hierarchy of proof exists 
between ‘on the balance of probability’ (civil), and, in contrast to history, the more 
stringent test of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (criminal).
94
 Fact determination is, therefore, 
a more complex process in law, with its rules capable of further confining, relegating and 
reorganising any historical facts legally investigated or verified. This is why David Fraser 
asks: 'Can justice be served by a legal system which creates facts unrecognizable to the 
historian?'
95
  
 
The adjudication of legal fact finding is likewise not only prescriptive in content but 
unique in form. Although equivalent in function to the historian as 'triers of fact', the judge 
and jury are distinctive in their separation from the processes of fact determination, while 
specific rules govern the process of judicial arbitration and ground decisions in case law. 
Although negating the crucial role of judicial discretion, especially in complex (‘hard’) 
cases, this body of law exists to either ‘bind’ or act as a ‘persuasive force’ in future 
decision-making.
96
 Any evolved findings confer authority as new 'precedent' and are 
added to existing case law. The reaching of historical consensus, and the impact of revised 
findings on future historical research, may act as a form of 'historian-made' precedent but 
the concept and practice of 'binding' is contrary to its craft and findings. Furthermore, 
what happens to the credibility of the historical record if a court and jury finds, and then 
officially records, facts contradictory to established historiography? 
 
Of specific relevance to the historian as expert witness, the rules of Anglo-American law 
not only confine and govern both historical evidence and testimony, but inherently 
challenge and diminish the authority, knowledge and reputation of her/his craft. Potential 
threats to both discipline and expert begin long before the case comes to court. In contrast 
to the acclaimed non-partisanship of the historian (chapter one), and despite the legal 
demands that s/he ‘owes a duty to the court which he [sic] must discharge notwithstanding 
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the interest of the party calling him’, experts tend to be allocated to one side or the other.
97
 
This allocation could lead to accusations of a “hired gun syndrome”, in which bias is 
implied, while the label of “law-office history” denotes awareness that historical evidence 
could be organised in support of a particular position.
98
 And yet, rather paradoxically, 
even when allocated to one side or the other, the historian can be legally omitted from the 
preliminary stages of the relevant historical investigation; in other words, the very stages 
that involve the requisite assembly, analysis and critique of documents analogous to 
historical inquiry. 
99
 Instead, historians take to the stand at the very moment when the 
judicial process is furthest removed from their practice and when legal rhetoric is 
dominant.
100
  
 
Once in court, rules governing the legal qualification of the historian as an expert witness 
threatens to diminish the authority of the profession. In Anglo-American law there is no 
requirement that expert witnesses should be professionally trained.
101
 Therefore, 
experience and a proven track record of research can qualify in law as expertise.
102
 
Consequently, under the relevant conventions, Holocaust deniers could be legally 
qualified to act as historical experts on the same grounds as established historians (chapter 
three). Conversely, a reputed historian may not necessarily qualify as an expert in the 
eyes of the law. However, even if qualified, the evidential authority and weight of 
historian testimony is inherently 'downgraded'.
103
 As already noted, the rules of evidence 
categorise historical evidence as 'hearsay', but they also categorise expert testimony as 
'opinion', and both are legally inadmissible.
104
 According to Anglo-American law 
'hearsay' relates to second-hand evidence that cannot be directly proven, while opinion is 
not accepted as fact but as inference drawn from facts. Although exempted from the 
'hearsay' rules by a further set of rules, historian testimony is intentionally confined within 
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strict parameters as well as being diminished in value.
105
 Both evidence and opinion are 
also accompanied by the indeterminate language of 'assumed', 'circumstantial', 
'hypothetical' or 'inferential', since their content cannot be accepted as true.
106
 Diminution 
of authority and expertise is then further asserted at the stage of adjudication, when 
historical fact finding is trusted to a judge or jury that do not tend to be historians in either 
expertise or by profession. Neither judges nor juries must qualify as historical experts and 
yet they are tasked, and somehow imbued, with an ability to adjudicate over competing 
historical interpretations and narratives. Therefore, implicit in Anglo-American law, is 
that anyone can be a historian. 
 
Conversely, although the law, like history, categorises a hierarchy of evidential form 
(ranging from oral testimony and documentation to ‘things’, as well as principal types of 
evidence) there are no rules in the Anglo-American genre governing the weight attached 
to their relevancy or probative force.
107
 According to Twining an attempt at devising a 
‘Best Evidence Rule’ has not been widely accepted.
 108
 
 
Thus we have no principle that written evidence is to be given greater weight 
than testimonial evidence. We have no principle that testimonial evidence is 
to be given greater weight than circumstantial evidence. Nor is there any 
general principle of law that states that some kinds of witnesses are more 
credible than others. Generally speaking, the weighing of evidence is left to 
the logic and common sense of the trier of fact in the particular circumstances 
of the case.
109
 
 
There are also few rules prescribing the volume of evidence required to prove an 
argument or fact. The main exception relates to corroboration, which, akin to historical 
inquiry, demands that the testimony of a witness must be supported by at least one other 
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witness or by circumstantial evidence.
110
 However, examples of mandatory corroboration 
are few and exceptional.
111
 Thus, contrary to historical inquiry, there is no formal rule 
requiring corroboration of eyewitness testimony, despite its evidence being universally 
recognised in law as subjective and therefore unreliable.
112
  
 
Beyond its normative system the law, of course, has a unique purpose. History may 
collaborate with the law in the rendering of justice for specific past crimes but it is not its 
defining objective. Moreover, the essential purpose of the law is 'judgement'.
113
 Basically, 
the law infuses all forms of judgement, be they moral or political.
114
 Not all historians 
agree with Evans that the application of judgement is ‘not only far from central to the 
historian’s enterprise but also … entirely alien to it’.
115
 However, even those historians 
with a clear and intentional moral objective do not identify judgement as their central 
purpose.
116
 Most notably, even when historians designate blame to their subjects, or 
condemn opposing interpretations, any judgements of 'innocence' or 'guilt' are not 
accompanied by powers of coercion, reprimand and sentence beyond the review process. 
Infamously, the law is the infrastructure and instrument of formal punishment, including 
the loss of personal freedom, and, in some states, of life itself. Furthermore, the law and 
history are certainly politically instrumental, with their proclaimed autonomy and 
independence from dominant interests similarly contested.
117
 However, although both 
disciplines have been accused of reaffirming hegemonic power blocs, the law, as the main 
site through which 'power is exercised’, is, unlike history, a formal pillar of democratic 
(state) authority.
 118
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A theoretical overview of the prevailing history and Anglo-American legal genres 
therefore confirms that contradictions of objective and practice are evident across all areas 
of assumed symbiosis of craft. Furthermore, the possible threats to historical inquiry, as 
a result of these contradictions, would appear to be insurmountable given the nature and 
reach of the distinctions identified. It is also clear that the history-law relationship is not 
a partnership of disciplinary equals when collaborating in the courtroom. As shown, the 
law is the dominant ‘partner’ and not only determines and governs historical inquiry, both 
prior to and once brought to trial, but inherently diminishes the value and weight of its 
evidence and the reputation and status of its experts. In theory, therefore, the history-law 
relationship appears to be a flawed and inherently 'dysfunctional' methodology of both 
historical inquiry in general and disciplinary collaboration in particular. However, since 
this conclusion appears to contradict the long history of disciplinary collaboration, it is 
useful to transfer the investigation of the history-law relationship away from theoretical 
appraisal to practical application. No-where is disciplinary collaboration between history 
and the law more visible than in Holocaust-related trials. Indeed, the Holocaust has been 
consistently ‘brought to trial’ since 1945, with both historians and jurists 'inextricably 
intertwined’ in not only the prosecution of its perpetrators and deniers but the recovery 
of its memory, protection of its record and authorisation of its facts and truths.
119
 Implicit 
in the long history of Holocaust litigation cases is that history and Anglo-American law 
have not only forged a ‘unique relationship' over its inquiry, but that generic distinctions, 
and any flaws, have been effectively negotiated, and surmounted, in order to 'do justice' 
to its past and histories as well as its victims.
120
  
 
A body of literature attests to a record of acclaimed disciplinary reciprocity in Holocaust-
related trials. Since the International Military Tribunal (IMT) (1945-1946), historical 
background and explanation has been legally authorised as essential to the prosecution 
process.
121
 Consequently, collaboration has been variously formalised through the 
allocation of teams of historians to individual legal offices involved in specific trials, but 
also as part of an 'epistemic community' (Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMTs), non-
partisan commissions (US litigation cases), and more permanent investigative bodies 
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(such as the 'Office of Special Investigation’ (OSI) in the United States and 'War Crimes 
Units' developed in Australia, Canada and the UK).
122
 In exchange for legally admissible 
evidence, as well as expert opinion, historians have acquired vast fonts of historical 
resource.
123
 Indeed, as Patricia Heberer and Jürgen Matthäus note, the volume of material 
amassed by Holocaust-related trials is beyond the ability of any scholar to either read or 
comprehend.
124
 New archives have been opened-up to historians, that, in turn, have 
provided important insights and produced new historical narratives.
125
 According to 
Lawrence Douglas, important histories of the Holocaust could not have been written 
without the documentary material accumulated by the law.
126
 This material has then 
comprised an invaluable archive for historians long after the trials have ended.
127
 More 
recently, participation in the courtroom has helped historians to clarify and construct a 
solid evidential baseline 'that serves as a bulwark against the historical revisionism, denial 
and outright lies about the past … '.
128
 And in all courtrooms, legal rigour and the high 
standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' has ‘challenged historians to live up to the highest 
standards of their profession’.
129
  
 
In turn, historian accounts and explanations have provided order to disparate evidence, 
without which past crimes would have been incomprehensible.
130
 But, most notably, the 
extraordinary crimes of the Holocaust have forced the law to be innovative in its creation 
of new concepts of criminality (crimes against humanity and genocide) and legal 
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culpability (beyond the individual to the criminalisation of specific organisations and 
principles of collective guilt and conspiracy).
131
 As Douglas highlighted, the newly 
constructed concept of ‘genocide’ first gained legal recognition in the IMT indictment 
and then gained 'greater currency' in the NMTs.
132
 Likewise, the foregrounding of the 
survivor voice at the Adolf Eichmann trial, as both the driver and foundational evidence 
of the Holocaust, transformed the process of 'bearing witness'.
133
 The subsequent 
‘revolutionary transformation of the victim’ was, according to Shoshana Felman, a ‘major 
contribution not only to Jews but to history, to law, to culture – to humanity at large’.
134
 
It also changed the role of the defence lawyer. As Heberer and Matthäus recognised, in 
the NMTs (1946 to 1949) and subsequent trials, defence cases increasingly looked to 
criticise extra-legal influences on the trials, political expediency and attempts to set the 
historical record straight.
135
 Infamously, the IMT was the first international tribunal.
136
 
According to Douglas, 'it would be no exaggeration to claim that international criminal 
law was an invention of the IMT … '.
137
 Similarly Thomas Buergenthal claims that it was 
the scale of Nazi atrocities that led to a 'dramatic legal and conceptual transformation' of 
law that 'internationalised human rights and humanised international law'.
138
 
Consequently, a 'jurisprudence of atrocity' has developed that has advanced the capacity, 
infrastructure, reach and reputation of international law.
139
  
 
Yet, a 'consensus of critique' has specifically warned of the risks involved when bringing 
the Holocaust to trial. This critique combines to identify an undermining of 'due process', 
the inadequacy of ordinary law to deal with the extraordinary crimes of the Holocaust, 
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extra-historical and extra-legal drivers and (mis)appropriation of its evidence and record, 
and the production of 'cooked' histories.
140
 A body of literature subsequently discloses that 
since the IMT the rules of law have been moderated, and at times manipulated, across 
Holocaust-related trials.
141
 Indicative is the selective labelling of criminality at both the 
IMT and NMTs, in which the law visibly discriminated against certain acts of atrocity.
142
 
Both the IMT and NMTs also admitted evidentially weak, and even irrelevant, evidence, 
regardless of its lack of probative value or weight.
143
 Despite its seminal reputation, 
breaches in 'due process' were likewise identified at the Eichmann trial in 1961. In 
particular, the evidentiary rules on 'hearsay' were relaxed, which, according to the law, 
violates the rights of the accused (chapter three).
144
 Notoriously, at the first trial of John 
Demjanjuk (1986-1988) the law allowed and sanctioned the probative value of faked 
evidence, while, according to David Hirsh, ‘the Israeli legal system was ready to 
subordinate entirely the requirements of a fair trial to the requirements of restaging 
national drama’.
 145
 As a witness at the trial for the defence later wrote, he knew of “no 
other case in which so many deviations from procedures internationally accepted as 
desirable occurred”.
146
 But they had the wrong man.
147
  
 
Conversely, a range of critics indicate that, despite evidence of legal flexibility and 
innovation, ordinary criminal law remains inadequate when faced with the extraordinary 
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crimes of the Holocaust.
148
 Or, as Felman posed: ‘How … can a crime that is historically 
unprecedented be litigated, understood, and judged in a discipline of precedents’?
149
 In 
contrast to the creation of a new law in Israel in 1950 (chapter three), aimed specifically 
at prosecuting crimes against 'the Jewish People', other legal jurisdictions have attempted 
to either incorporate 'crimes against humanity' into domestic criminal law (France, 
Germany, UK) or to equate genocide with conventional homicide (Canada, UK).
150
 In 
turn, the confinement of acts of genocide, as common-law murder, has both diminished 
and domesticated their scope and horror.
151
 Indicative is the trial of Andrei Sawoniuk 
(UK), in which the charge of four counts of murder, two of which did not make it to jury, 
not only confined evidential proof of his perpetration to the specific charges but added to 
the impression that it was 'an ordinary Old Bailey trial'.
152
 Indeed, it was the function of 
the court to extract the individual charges against Sawoniuk from the huge machinery of 
mass atrocity.
153
 Infamously, in then West Germany, 'crimes against humanity' and 'war 
crimes' were incorporated into the ‘Penal Code’, which not only equated mass crimes 
with individual cases of conventional murder, but distinguished between the role of 
'perpetrator' and 'accomplice'.
154
 To indict someone as a 'perpetrator' the prosecution had 
to prove that they had been motivated by the highly subjective standards of "blood-lust" 
or "base-motives".
155
 Failure to prove such standards of culpability led to a history of 
lenient sentencing, as indicted perpetrators were downgraded to the minor category of 
accomplice.
156
 These standards of culpability also failed to incorporate the complexity, 
reach and type of perpetrator.
157
 Furthermore, the ‘Penal Code’ prohibited retroactive 
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prosecution, and thus the paradox, in thousands of trials held in then West Germany, of 
Nazi norms and regulations being used to indict Nazi crimes.
158
 As consciousness of the 
Holocaust was raised in the 1980s in Canada, France and the UK, debates surrounding 
the incorporation of 'crimes against humanity' (France, Canada) or 'war crimes' (UK) into 
domestic law, and then on the 'fairness' and legality of the trials themselves, further 
diminished and distorted the extraordinary crimes of the Holocaust.
159
 The debates were 
also infused by antisemitism (couched in both political and theological narratives) and 
notions of the Holocaust and Jews as the “Other”.
160
  
 
Ordinary law has also been criticised as inadequate when faced with the eyewitness 
evidence of Holocaust survivors.
161
 For some, the legal binding of past evidence is 
nowhere more visible and paradoxical than in the case of survivor testimony.
162
 Although 
the law allows survivors to tell and re-tell the truth of their experiences a range of trials 
have purposively repressed their testimony ‘in the name of precision and judicial fair 
play’, while in the United States, according to Wendie Ellen Schneider, the standards 
applied by the courts to assess survivor accounts have been ‘contradictory or irrational’.
163
 
More specifically, in contrast to Israeli criminal law, which was not only deliberately 
extended to accommodate the crimes of the Holocaust but was explicitly 'victim-driven' 
(chapter three), a number of 'procedurally ordinary' trials have intentionally controlled, 
derided and officially rejected survivor testimony as 'hearsay' (chapter three).
164
 As Hirsh 
lamented, in such cases:  
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Cross-examination is Primo Levi’s nightmare come to life. An educated, 
intelligent, articulate person is paid by the state, in the interests of the Nazi 
killer, to act the part of the friend who refuses to hear.
165
 
 
Thus, rather paradoxically, given its role in the securing of survivor justice, the law, in 
many Holocaust-related trials, has placed greater esteem on perpetrator documentation 
than on the accounts of the victims.
166
 Richard Carter-White has specifically accused the 
law's 'uncompromising criteria of evidentiality and plausibility’ of repeating the tactics 
of negationists by reaffirming their scepticism of the survivor voice, 'albeit for 
diametrically opposed reasons’.
167
 Likewise paradoxically, while the Eichmann trial was 
seminal because of its didactic foregrounding of the survivor voice (chapter three), 
Douglas claims that the misidentification of Demjanjuk in another Israeli courtroom, 
although 'far from straightforward', 'represented the collapse of the paradigm'.
168
 
 
Ordinary criminal law has likewise been identified as inadequate at the stage of 
punishment. Since the IMT it has been argued that the law is 'simply not equipped to deal 
… with a guilt that is beyond crime'.
169
 As Gideon Hausner more specifically stated, when 
seeking the death penalty for Eichmann in 1961, the fact that under the law the same 
punishment would be meted out for the murder of one human being as it would for the 
murder of 'ten or a hundred or a million', bears witness to there being no adequate 
retribution 'which fits the enormity of the crime'.
170
 John K. Roth agrees that the 
punishment of those guilty of mass murder is not equal to complete justice.
171
 Fraser 
likewise acknowledges the same limitations plaguing international tribunals and the 
‘International Criminal Court’ (ICC).
172
 Although the didactic role of Holocaust-related, 
and other 'atrocity trials', has been identified as a form of extended retributive redress (see 
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above), others have argued that they have little impact on public (and political) 
consciousness.
173
  
 
Conversely, and arguably more controversially, David Fraser insists that the Holocaust 
does not pose challenges to the law because of its extraordinary crimes but because of its 
legal normality and basis, with barriers to judicial redress of these crimes inherent in the 
law itself.
174
 Consequently, one of the most paradoxical distortions of Holocaust 
historiography is the branding of the Nazi regime as criminal and the Holocaust as 
illegal.
175
 First demarcated in these terms by the IMT, and dutifully repeated by successive 
trials, the Nazi state may have been criminal but this conclusion is an ethical or political 
decision and not an epistemological fact.
176
 As Fraser points out, Nazi law defined, 
differentiated and persecuted the Jews long before Auschwitz, and constructed an 'entire 
jurisprudence' of how and why being a Jew was an offense against public order.
177
 Most 
specifically, the infamous 'Nuremberg Laws' were the legalisation of extermination.
178
 
The 'law-ful' authority of both the government and the Holocaust was also the result of 
the active participation of an army of lawyers and judges and implemented across all 
levels of judicial bureaucracies.
179
 In turn, this army of 'ordinary men' were willing to act 
in the 'exclusion, enslavement, spoliation and death of millions of their fellow human 
beings'.
180
  
 
Yet, this valuable lesson of the Holocaust has not pierced the judicial consciousness 
precisely because it has been declared as "not law".
181
 Instead, 'mutually reinforcing 
discourses' of both the Holocaust and the law have been sanctioned in which a particular 
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version of law after Auschwitz persists.
182
 This version consigns law in Nazi Germany as 
somehow ruptured, in contradiction of its continuity of both legal text and practice and 
its embodiment of concepts grounded in Western culture and law.
183
 It also ignores the 
long history of persecution in which the law, variously exercised, has been utilised to 
define, expel, incriminate and murder Jews (and other minorities) across Europe.
184
 More 
specifically, the ‘Nuremberg Laws’ were not the first judicial attempts at controlling and 
criminalising personal relationships between Jewish and other defined citizens in 
accordance with discriminatory concepts of ‘miscegenation’.
185
 For some the continuity 
(and progression) of legal persecution extends from the medieval past to the present-day, 
with its most visible (and modern) manifestation being the Holocaust.
186
 Conversely, 
David Nirenberg argues that the implied consistency of persecution ignores the 
contingency of Jewish experience and practise across Europe as well as the impact of 
individual agency, local contexts and varying discourses of blame.
187
 It likewise 
minimises ‘the interdependence of violence and tolerance’ accompanying Jewish lives 
and policy across Europe.
188
 Yet, despite the complexity of Jewish persecution ‘by the 
civilized means of the law’, Fraser contends that the 'mutually reinforcing discourses' 
specifically surrounding the illegality and rupture of the Holocaust are likely to continue 
to dominate, if not historiography, certainly judicial consciousness and training, since the 
law cannot pardon itself, it cannot confess to itself, but merely try to forget itself.
189
  
 
Critics also identify Holocaust litigation cases as comprising a history of political utility, 
with both disciplines intentionally 'co-opted' for extra-historical and extra-legal ends.
190
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Most notably, the interests and relations of the Allied powers played-out at the IMT; a 
case, according to Fraser, in which the “politics” of Nuremberg competed with the “law” 
of Nuremberg.
191
 Similarly, it is noted that the NMTs were informed by post-war 'policies 
of democratization, denazification, demilitarization, and decartelization'.
192
 Likewise, 
attempts at war crimes prosecutions in Canada were restricted by a discursive matrix of 
national identity, and in France by objectives of selective redress and collective memory, 
while the interests and politics of the 'Cold War' both confined and defined a range of 
perpetrator trials held in East and West Germany, Britain and the United States.
193
  
 
More recently, Rousso has observed that historians have not only been transformed into 
“advocates”, as coached by either the prosecution or defence, but as agents of national 
debate and restitution.
194
 Although identified as genuine attempts by the state to redress 
past crimes of atrocity, he is wary of the subsequent transfer of ownership of historical 
knowledge to not only the courts but to politicians.
195
 And, once assigned to serve "the 
good cause", or even the "vengeance of the nations":
196
  
 
the more pressure there may be on the historian to provide a certain "right" 
answer, and the more likely it is that anything deviating from the public's 
expectations may well be ignored or even rejected.
197
  
 
Consequently, historians have been 'forced into the service of moral and legal forms of 
judgment … [that] do violence to the subtleties and nuances of the historian’s search for 
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truth'.
198
 Accordingly, it is recognised that the Holocaust as a past event has been variously 
manipulated through a multiplicity of discourses that 'owes more to politics than to law' 
and more to politics and the law than to the historical record.
199
 Ultimately, state 
intervention in history is viewed as ‘double-edged’.
200
 As law professor Alan M. 
Dershowitz insisted, ‘he does not want a government telling him the Holocaust has 
happened because he does not want to have a government telling him that the Holocaust 
has not happened’.
201
  
 
However, foremost in the 'consensus of critique' is the accusation that the law cannot 'do 
justice' to the complexities of the Holocaust.
202
 A range of legal explanations are 
proffered, but historians, like their jurist counterparts, site the major barrier as disciplinary 
incompatibility.
203
 It is inevitable that the case-specific form of Anglo-American law will 
produce partial historiographies of the Holocaust. But, combined with its adversarial 
practice, it has also produced flawed, and at times empirically inaccurate, facts and 
narratives of its genocide. Perpetrator trials, in particular, have been found guilty of both 
relegating the Holocaust to 'background noise' and distorting its 'multifaceted past'.
204
 
Thus, despite its ground-breaking reputation, the genocide of European Jewry was 
marginalised at the IMT, within an Allied focus on 'crimes against peace' and 'war crimes'. 
The IMT remains a seminal trial, and yet it misrepresented the crimes of the Nazi regime, 
marginalised the racial basis of its legal order, misunderstood the complexity of 
perpetrator behaviour and type and diminished Jewish suffering.
205
 Furthermore, 
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Nuremberg was 'the birthplace of intentionalism’, an explanatory model later held 
responsible for distorting and limiting investigations of the Holocaust for decades.
206
 In 
turn, a prominent ‘Nuremberg historiography’ has been accused of over-informing 
Holocaust scholarship since 1945, and, although modified, still disproportionately 
informs historian approaches to the Holocaust.
207
 Subsequently, the IMT has been 
criticised for 'straight-jacketing' both history and justice.
208
  
 
Similarly, the following NMTs produced and authorised dominant narratives of 
totalitarianism as primary explanation and defence, genocide as exclusively the murder 
of the European Jews, the 'clean hands' of the Wehrmacht, the monolithic nature and 
primacy of the SS as the perpetrator group, and the exculpation of the German 
population.
209
 Yet, despite historian input, all narratives were later acknowledged as 
flawed.
210
 Decades later, in trials in France, contentious narratives were authorised that 
distorted the roles of both the Vichy government and 'the Resistance'.
211
 More recently, 
litigation cases in the United States, against the use of 'involuntary labour' by Siemens 
and other German companies during the Nazi regime, failed to distinguish between the 
'forced labour' of nationals from the occupied countries and the 'slave labour' of Jews 
from the concentration camps.
212
 As Stephen Whinston finds, in the Siemens case, the 
concluding narrative that Jews had been used as war-related labour, rather than worked 
to death as part of a deliberate policy of extermination, remains on the legal record.
213
 
Equally disturbing, as its education and memorialisation penetrated both official and 
public consciousness in the UK, English case-law has transformed 'the Holocaust' into a 
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stock-phrase that is now uttered 'without awareness' and in cases that have nothing to do 
with its crimes.
214
  
 
As already noted, Holocaust-related trials have also been found guilty of failing to do 
justice to the complexities of perpetration, and, most critically, to the experiences and 
voices of survivors. Given the inevitable focus on individuals (in accordance with the 
law's rules and functions), but also on 'key' perpetrators, the law has masked the 
complexity, magnitude and reach of perpetration.
215
 Moreover, in attempts to rouse public 
indignation, the portrayal of perpetrators as 'sadists and reprobates', 'abnormal', 'inhuman' 
and the criminal outsider, under-estimated the diversity of motive and type.
216
 Indicative 
was the 'Auschwitz trial' in West Germany (1963-65), which produced a distorted 
narrative of 'vicious sadists', while the complex machinery of mass murder was 
diminished.
217
 According to Devin O. Pendas, the concluding historical account was a 
form of injustice 'at the level of historical consciousness'.
218
 In particular, a dominant 
intentionalist focus on a 'monocausal “patho-ideological”' explanation ignored the 
behaviour, complicity and crimes epitomised by the so-called 'desk perpetrators'.
219
 
Although this crucial omission was highlighted by the Eichmann trial, the Prosecution in 
Israel still reinforced the then 'fashionable understanding' of this key Nazi perpetrator as 
'depraved' and ‘more of a monster … than he was’ (chapter three).
220
  
                                                 
214
 Herman, '‘The Holocaust’ In English Case Law’, pp430, 444. 
215
 Wittmann, ‘Indicting Auschwitz?', p531; Bloxham, ‘From Streicher to Sawoniuk' in Stone (ed.), The 
Historiography of the Holocaust, pp398, 415; Haberer, ‘History and Justice', p493; Pendas, The Frankfurt 
Auschwitz Trial, pp292-294, 301, 304; Heberer and Matthäus, ‘Introduction’, in Heberer and Matthäus 
(eds.), Atrocities on Trial, ppxv-xvii; Marrus, 'The Nuremberg Doctors' Trial’, in Ibid, pp103-122; Hilary 
Earl, ‘A Judge, A Prosecutor, And A Mass Murderer: Courtroom Dynamics in the SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial', 
in Bankier and Michman (eds.), Holocaust and Justice, pp47-67; Stoll, 'Hitler's Unwilling Executioners?', 
in Ibid, pp165-166, 188-193; Wilson, Writing History, pp3-4; Bilsky, 'The Judge and the Historian', p131. 
216
 Wittmann, ‘Indicting Auschwitz?', p512; Bloxham, ‘From Streicher to Sawoniuk' in Stone (ed.), The 
Historiography of the Holocaust, p415; Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, p292. Jan Erik Schulte, 
'The SS As "The Alibi Of A Nation"?: Narrative Continuities From the Nuremberg Trials To The 1960s', 
in Priemel and Stiller (eds.), Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, pp146-147. Haberer, ‘History 
and Justice', pp493-494. This portrayal was also reinforced in the prevailing historiography. See as 
examples, Gerald Reitlinger, Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 
(London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1953); Joseph Tenenbaum, Race and Reich: The Story of an Epoch (New 
York: Twayne Publishers, 1956); Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (a banal/demonic dichotomy).  
217
  Wittmann, ‘Indicting Auschwitz?', pp512-515. Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, p294. 
218
 Ibid, p298. 
219
 Haberer, ‘History and Justice', pp493-494, 497. Bloxham, ‘From Streicher to Sawoniuk' in Stone (ed.), 
The Historiography of the Holocaust, pp404-405; Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, p2. Defined as 
'a bureaucratic administrator who commits genocide with the stroke of a pen', Wilson, Writing History, 
ppix, 3. 
220
 David Cesarani, Eichmann: His Life and Crimes (London: Vintage, 2005), p3. Landsman, ‘The 
Eichmann Case', p81. 
88 
 
In addition to the law’s relegation of personal memoir as unreliable (see above), the IMT, 
NMTs (with the exception of the 'Doctor's Trial') and thousands of successor trials 
infamously ignored the survivor voice.
221
 However, even when redressed, narratives of 
survivors and victims have been abstracted, flawed and misleading. Although celebrated 
for its 'victim driven' strategy, the Eichmann trial has been found guilty of distorting 
narratives of both resistance and survival (chapter three), while, in general, survivor 
testimonies have been assembled into idealised and stable narratives that are not only 
"historically inappropriate" but contradicted by testimony itself.
222
 Furthermore, as 
already noted, a series of 'procedurally ordinary' trials have intentionally confined, 
challenged and derided survivor account and credibility (chapter three), while English 
case-law has been specifically accused by Didi Herman of 'racialising' Jews as 'alien'.
223
 
Consequently, although Annette Wieviorka has warned of a contemporary privileging of 
unreflective survivor testimony, and, notwithstanding the lessons of misidentification at 
the first Demjanjuk trial (1986-1988), many more voices berate the law's inability to 
represent the complexity of survival as well as value its 'experiential' truths.
224
  
 
And yet, despite the reach of these critiques, Rousso has identified a growing 
judicialisation of the Holocaust, and other past atrocities, since the 1990s and fears that 
the law is replacing "the tribunal of history".
225
 Schneider has likewise witnessed an 
increasing “turn to history” in American jurisprudence, despite the law having no 
standards of history-making.
226
 Richard Evans has further identified the development of 
a terminology surrounding the history of the Second World War that is more legal than 
historical in origin.
227
 And, similar to the concerns of Dershowitz, he fears that: ‘Once the 
law starts dictating what may and what may not be said about the past, who knows where 
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the process of interference with history and historians may end?’
228
 Critics have also 
cautioned against consistently bringing the Holocaust to trial. Rousso has specifically 
warned of the danger of raising doubts in the minds of the public over histories they 
thought had been settled.
229
 Michael Marrus is likewise wary of the impact of contrasting 
narratives on the public's trust in the reliability of historical knowledge, while Holocaust 
denial trials have been specifically accused of not only raising confused messages of its 
certainty but of risking a debate that ‘mainstream Holocaust historians can never win’ 
(chapter three).
230
  
 
Comparative and critical analysis of a body of literature relating to Holocaust-related 
trials therefore appears to reaffirm that, regardless of examples of disciplinary reciprocity, 
the history-law relationship is a flawed and dysfunctional methodology in practice as well 
as in theory. Yet, opinion remains contested between those forewarning of an “unholy 
alliance”, amounting to ‘a subversion of justice and a debasement of history’, and those 
citing trials as ‘paradigmatic’ in their attempt to both grapple with the horror of the 
Holocaust and uphold justice. Likewise, critiques of political utility and misuse are 
tempered by support for the law's role in forcing nation states and populations, as well as 
individual perpetrators, to deal with the crimes of its atrocity.
231
 Opinion also contrasts 
between those warning of 'impoverished' and 'cooked' histories, and those celebrating the 
production of ‘a distinctive form of authoritative narrative’, important insights and some 
didactic successes.
232
 Furthermore, as repeatedly noted, despite evidence of a flawed and 
dysfunctional methodology, there is no formal opposition by either discipline to future 
collaboration in cases involving historical inquiry. In contradicting the findings above, a 
number of historians may have refused to act as legal witnesses, either as a direct result 
of previous experience (Raul Hilberg) or in opposition to the process in general (Rousso), 
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but many others appear to be ‘voting … with their feet and regularly entering the 
courtroom’.
233
 In turn, individual historians and jurists may agree that in the consistent 
seeking of justice for the past in the present: "At a certain point, one has to say: 'That's 
enough!'".
234
 But they likewise query if it is possible to leave history out of the courtroom 
when the law is being asked to judge on historical events.
235
 As Evans points out, if 
historians refused to participate, what other scholar is equipped ‘to offer expert opinion 
in a legal action that turns on the research and writing of history itself?’
236
 Likewise, in 
cases of mass atrocity, is Deborah Lipstadt correct to assert that: “It is our 
responsibility”?
237
 Moreover, Douglas has argued that historians will play an ever greater 
role in future Holocaust-related trials. As eyewitnesses diminish in number, and the focus 
of prosecution transfers to different forms of perpetrator, he argues that the courts will 
need the expertise of historians to provide not only historical background and explanation 
but evidence of collaborative guilt.
238
 Therefore, despite the inherent flaws of 
methodology, the collaboration of history and the law is destined to proceed in cases 
where historical scholarship is legally relevant.
239
 A re-evaluation of the history-law 
relationship is therefore pertinent, to not only address methodological omissions in the 
existing critical research, but to inform future disciplinary collaboration in the courtroom. 
The next chapter begins the intended re-evaluation of this relationship by profiling the 
four Holocaust-related trials selected to act as its research context.   
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Chapter Three: Holocaust-Related Trials: A Comparative 
Base of Disciplinary Collaboration 
 
In changing the focus from a general overview to more specific Holocaust-related trials, 
this chapter introduces and profiles the criminal cases of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and 
Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the civil case instigated by David Irving (2000).
1
 In the 
case of Zündel the two trials of 1985 and 1988 are included in the research since they are 
inextricably linked. The chapter first establishes their comparative credentials. Through 
both primary and secondary research, it demonstrates that, in addition to being sited in 
different countries and decades, the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials were framed by 
different backgrounds and contexts, as well as substantive law. They were also governed 
by different legal statutes, indictments, standards of proof and 'triers of fact'. Once in 
court, they foregrounded discrete foundations of evidence and variously ‘cooked’ the 
record of the Holocaust.
2
 The chapter also demonstrates that, although successful in their 
respective objectives, the trials have been awarded different reputations in terms of their 
didactic impact and success. Consequently, the chapter concludes that the Eichmann, 
Zündel and Irving trials provide an appropriate canvas pertinent to comparative research 
of the history-law relationship.  
 
As further background and context the chapter also identifies the contribution that each 
trial makes to the existing 'consensus of critique' outlined in chapter two. Although all 
four trials join the long history of successful litigation related to the Holocaust, it finds a 
familiar record of breaches of 'due process', especially in the Eichmann trial, the 
limitations of ordinary law when faced with historical evidence and opinion, especially 
in the Zündel trials, and extra-historical and extra-legal interests impacting on all four 
courtrooms. The chapter also finds the reconstruction of distorted and partial narratives 
that, however grand in reach, could not 'do justice' to the historical complexities of the 
Holocaust.
3
 Through the daily recorded transcripts of each trial, the chapter specifically 
identifies a record of practice integral to Anglo-American law that not only ‘cooked’ but 
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masked the facts and record of the Holocaust in the legal form. The chapter concludes 
that the existing 'consensus of critique', warning of the limitations of the law as a method 
of historical inquiry, is further corroborated by the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials. 
But, contrary to conventional wisdom berating the legal cases in Canada, this critique is 
as relevant to the Eichmann and Irving trials as it is to the Zündel trials.  
 
 
The background, premise and outcome of the criminal trials of Adolf Eichmann (1961) 
and Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the civil case instigated by David Irving (2000) are 
already familiar within a body of secondary literature.
4
 However, in order to demonstrate 
their comparative credentials, it is necessary to identify and repeat many of its findings, 
while a close reading of the daily recorded transcripts of each trial adds knowledge to its 
research. From both literature and transcripts it is obvious that disparities begin with the 
backgrounds of the main characters. It is common knowledge that Eichmann was a 
recognised perpetrator of the Holocaust, while both Irving and Zündel were known 
advocates of its denial.
5
 These deniers were further connected, since Irving had not only 
appeared as an expert witness on behalf of Zündel's defence in 1988, but sited his rejection 
of foundational facts of the Holocaust to evidence presented at this trial.
6
 However, 
despite a shared past and record, these deniers differed in profile and repute. In contrast 
to Zündel, who had been officially cited "as one of the world's biggest purveyors of Nazi 
propaganda", Irving's body of work was known to an audience of established academics 
and reviewers and published by reputable companies.
7
 Likewise, although both similarly 
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engaged with antisemitic and right-wing groupings, an extensive bibliography, and 
expertise in the history of the Second World War and the ‘Third Reich’, had specifically 
awarded Irving with the contentious reputation of being 'the most assiduous and persistent 
of researchers', a one-man school of history', alongside charges of being 'a hanger on at 
Hitler's court' and holding 'repugnant' views.
8
 Given his renowned expertise, Irving had 
also been identified as ‘one of the most dangerous spokespersons for Holocaust denial', 
indeed 'the denier's best shot'.
9
  
 
Infamously, both Eichmann and Zündel had eluded prosecution until forced into court. 
They were also both criminal cases. As a registered war criminal, Eichmann was finally 
located in Buenos Aires in 1957, 'collected' by Mossad on the evening of 11 May 1960, 
and flown to Israel nine days later (20 May 1960) to be interrogated and to await trial.
10
 
As a known purveyor of Nazi literature, Zündel was finally brought to trial in Canada in 
1985, for disseminating “false news”, after previous attempts at halting his propagation 
of antisemitic/Holocaust denial tracts had proven unsuccessful.
11
 In contrast, Irving 
initiated a civil case, and more specifically a libel case, that forced Deborah Lipstadt 
(author) and Penguin Books (publisher) into court in the UK in 2000, to defend the truth 
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of charges written and published that he was a Holocaust denier, a neo-fascist and a 
falsifier of history.
12
  
 
In common with all legal cases, the trials were not simply ‘blank pages’ on which the 
charges had been ‘inscribed in an “objective” fashion’.
13
 Held in different countries, they 
were not only framed by discrete national contexts and objectives but typically made 
compromises with the history and politics of their respective hosts. Arguably, extra-
historical and extra-legal drivers were most obvious in the case of Eichmann, whose trial, 
in the then new state of Israel, was visibly motivated by 'national pedagogy'.
14
 In a context 
of Israeli nation-building, the intention was to expose not only the criminality of 
Eichmann but ‘the entirety of the Holocaust whether it involved Eichmann or not’.
15
 
Moreover, its criminal law was not only deliberately extended to accommodate the crimes 
of the Holocaust, but explicitly conformed ‘to the needs of the community of victims, 
potential victims and survivors'.
16
 The intended grand narrative was likewise ‘victim-
driven’, and aimed at not only redressing previous omissions of the survivor voice 
(chapter two) but alerting domestic and world audiences to the weight of Jewish 
suffering.
17
 In a further political sub-text, the over-representation of active Zionists or 
combatants amongst the witnesses aimed to support 'the moral reassertion of the Jewish 
people', and the ‘logical inference ... that Israel was the embodiment of the enduring spirit 
of that nucleus of resisters'.
18
 
 
The trials of Zündel (1985, 1988) and the civil case instigated by Irving (2000) were  
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indicative of a transfer of official focus away from the crimes of perpetration to 
safeguarding the historical record.
19
 Although more subtle in their extra-historical and 
extra-legal objectives, these trials reflected the “growing assault” of Holocaust denial, 
within national contexts in which awareness of the mass murder of European Jewry had 
moved from the margins into official and public consciousness, and subsequent academic 
and state attempts to rebut its lies and unmask its political agenda.
20
 As specifically argued 
by the Crown at Zündel's trial in 1985: 
 
for the memory of those who perished, the anguish of those who survived, the 
enlightenment of those to come, the attempted falsification of the truth of that 
tragic era must not be allowed to go unchallenged.
21
 
 
In Canada legislative attempts to challenge Holocaust denial were channelled through 
regulations aiming to protect minority communities against discrimination.
22
 Relevant 
sections were added to its ‘Criminal Code’ (1970), including those aimed at prohibiting 
speech that 'wilfully promotes hatred' (s.319), while the little-known clause of section 177 
(s.177), banning the spread of false literature 'likely to cause injury or mischief to a public 
interest', was retained.
23
 S.177 also allowed private actions. Those trying to bring Zündel 
to court had finally resorted to such an action in 1983, until the case was handed over to 
the Crown in 1984.
24
 In contrast, Lipstadt had been one of many academics who had 
refused to engage with Holocaust deniers, since entering into debate would award 
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legitimacy to their pseudo-scholarship.
25
 But, once forced into court, a team of historians 
and jurists intended to rebut and unmask the falsity of both Irving as an assumed historian 
and Holocaust denial as ‘a legitimate school of thought’.
26
 In the wake of Lipstadt’s 
critique of an ‘intellectual climate’ responsible for fostering Holocaust denial (chapter 
one) it is suggested that the Defence team also intended to reassert ‘the Western rationalist 
tradition’ of professional (empiricist-analytical) history.
27
 Subsequently the strategy of 
unmasking also aimed to extend to the conventions and rules of the historian’s craft. 
 
Each trial was also governed by discrete legal statutes. Eichmann was indicted under the 
'Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law' (5710-1950), which had been a specific 
legislative response by the Israeli Knesset to acclaimed limitations of ordinary criminal 
law.
28
 As well as adding the specific category of 'crimes against the Jewish People', this 
law empowered its courts to judge and punish individuals and acts taking place before the 
existence of the State of Israel, and outside its present boundaries, ‘which wronged 
persons who were not residents of the State of Israel’.
29
 It also allowed Israel to prosecute 
individuals who had already been brought to trial elsewhere, ‘if the full severity of the 
punishment had not been meted out to them’.
30
 It was both 'retroactive' and 
‘extraterritorial’ (usually forbidden in criminal law), but the Prosecution, led by Gideon 
Hausner, insisted that both its authority and reach were necessary responses to the 
extraordinary crimes committed.
31
  
 
As already noted, Zündel was charged, in both 1985 and 1988, under s.177 of the 
Canadian ‘Criminal Code’, which determined that:  
 
Everyone who wilfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he [sic] knows 
is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public 
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interest is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two 
years.
32
 
 
Since relatively obscure there were few precedents guiding the jurists.
33
 The regulations 
were also vague.
34
 In the absence of an explicit crime of Holocaust denial the law ‘either 
require[d] the prosecution to establish the falsity of the defendant’s position or allow[ed] 
the defendant to raise truth as a defence’.
35
 Thus, despite the Prosecutions’ insistence that 
the Holocaust was not on trial, focus on its facticity was inevitable.
36
 Moreover, the 
inclusion of such ambiguous terms as “false news”, “injury or mischief”, “intolerance” 
and “the public interest” allowed Zündel's lawyer, Douglas Christie, to distract the court 
with challenges to their interpretation.
37
 S.177 was ultimately presented by Christie as a 
breach of the enshrined right to freedom of speech, and, when extended to historical 
inquiry, an infringement on ‘freedom to research, freedom to think, freedom to 
communicate and freedom to disbelieve’.
38
 Although Christie had manipulated its 
meaning, the competence (1985) and relevance (1988) of s.177 were consistent features 
of Zündel’s defence.
39
 Its applicability and constitutionality were likewise consistent 
features of Zündels’ appeals.
40
 Although Christies’ arguments were rejected by the 
respective district and appeal judges’, s.177 was finally repealed as unconstitutional by 
Canada’s Supreme Court in 1992.
41
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In contrast, Irving turned to England's civil law, and more specifically the 'Defamation 
Act 1952’, in his writ of libel against both Lipstadt and Penguin Books.
42
 The charged 
passages in Lipstadt's book, 'Denying the Holocaust', were first published in the United 
States in 1993, but it was after the book’s publication in the UK in 1994 that Irving sought 
to bring his case to court. The rules governing defamation in England infamously assume 
that the applicant (Irving) has been maligned until those accused can prove that what they 
have said or written is true. Hence, any defamatory words ‘are presumed … to be untrue’ 
until proven otherwise.
43
 This assumption shifts the 'burden of proof' onto those accused 
(Lipstadt and Penguin Books), although designated as defendants. The reverse is the case 
in the United States, where the rules underpinning the legal definition of libel actively 
discourage defamation cases being brought to court.
44
 Commonly viewed as 
advantageous to the applicant, it is not surprising that critics view Irving's delay, and then 
recourse to English libel law, as a deliberate strategy to "stack the cards" in his favour.
45
  
 
The trials were further confined and governed by diverse indictments. In Israel Eichmann 
was charged with four essential crimes: 'crimes against the Jewish People'; 'crimes against 
humanity'; 'war crimes'; and 'membership of a hostile organisation'.
46
 More specifically, 
an indictment of 15 counts charged him with active participation in a catalogue of atrocity 
across Germany and all areas of German influence and occupation between 1939 and 
1945, 'with the intention of destroying the Jewish People'.
47
 Indeed, as a ranked official 
in one of the foundational bureaucracies of persecution and genocide, the Reich Security 
Main Office (RSHA), and more specifically as head of the ‘Gestapo’ section tasked with 
"Jewish Affairs" (IVB4), Eichmann was charged as both the 'executive arm' of the 'Final 
Solution of the Jewish Question' and a leader of its slaughter.
48
  
 
As mentioned above, Zündel was not formally accused of Holocaust denial but charged 
with the intentional publication and propagation of its lies. The focus was on one specific 
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publication, 'Did Six Million Really Die?' (DSMRD), with Zündel indicted in both 1985 
and 1988: 
 
that you did, in or about the year 1981 … in the judicial district of York, … 
publish a statement or tale, namely, “Did Six Million Really Die?”, that you 
know is false and that is likely to cause mischief to the public interest in social 
and racial intolerance, contrary to the Criminal Code.
49
 
 
In 1985, the presiding Judge, Hugh R. Locke, informed the court that the Prosecution, led 
by Pearson Griffiths, was not obliged to prove the falsity of each and every portion of the 
statements made in DSMRD, only that ‘the essential elements of each are false’.
50
 
Likewise, the Crown was not liable to prove that unrest had in fact occurred because of 
its publication, but that it could have been likely or probable.
51
 In contrast, Irving was 
officially recorded as a Holocaust denier alongside other categories of contention arising 
from his writ of libel.
52
 At a 'Hearing', held well before the trial (15 September 1998), it 
was agreed that, as one of five integrated areas of dispute, Irving’s denial of the Holocaust 
would focus on his obsession with Adolf Hitler and subsequent manipulation of the 
historical record.
53
 As the Defence, led by Richard Rampton, argued, driven by his 
obsession, Irving had ‘prostitute[d] his reputation as a serious historian (spurious though 
it can now be seen to have been) … ’ 'in order to put Hitler in a more favourable light 
...’.
54
 With his motives manifest in the right-wing, neo-Nazi audiences and company he 
addresses and consorts, Irving 'is not an historian at all but a falsifier of history. To put it 
bluntly, he is a liar'.
55
  
 
The trials were likewise governed by different standards of proof; the more stringent 
standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' in the criminal cases of Eichmann and Zündel, and 
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the more adaptable 'on the balance of probability’ in the civil case utilised by Irving.
56
 
The greater flexibility accorded in civil law is even more notable in English libel cases 
since:  
 
It is not incumbent on the defendants to prove the truth of every detail of the 
defamatory words published … [rather] it is the substantial truth … As it is 
sometimes expressed, what must be proved is the truth of the sting of the 
defamatory charges made.
57
  
 
Furthermore: 
 
justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not 
proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the 
[claimant’s] reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges.
58
  
 
However, there are cases in which the accusations are deemed so serious that ‘a higher 
standard of proof’ can be requested by the court.
59
 The Judge, Charles Gray, agreed that 
Irving’s application for the presentation of a higher standard of evidence was 
commensurate with the seriousness of the charge against his integrity as a historian.
60
  
 
The trials also relied on different 'triers of fact'; a team of Judges in the case of Eichmann, 
an individual Judge in the case of Irving and two distinct sets of juries in the Zündel trials. 
In the Eichmann trial it was unusual that representatives from both district and supreme 
courts comprised the panel of Judges. However, an amendment to the '1950 Law' insisted 
that in both retrospective and potential death penalty cases any panel of Judges must be 
chaired by a Supreme Court justice (Moshe Landau).
61
 In the trial instigated by Irving 
both parties agreed that the complexity of case required the expertise of a Judge.
62
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Arguably, Irving may have come to regret this decision, given Gray's public 
condemnation and exposé of both his method and motive in his 'Judgement'. As Richard 
Evans later conceded: 
 
A jury might have proved susceptible to his bluster, to his rhetoric and his 
self-advertisement, or found itself as much at sea in the welter of historical 
argument and counter-argument as the vast majority of the journalists did.
63
 
 
In Canada the complexity of case did not deter either Zündel or Christie in their request 
for a jury in both 1985 and 1988. Rather, they utilised the impanelling process to publicly 
propagate antisemitic concepts of Jewish bias and distrust. Christie insisted, in his 1985 
‘challenge for cause’, that ‘certain groups in society would find it very difficult to be 
objective because it involves them’.
64
 More specifically, since disputes between the 
‘Jewish Defence League’ and Zündel were on-going, Christie requested that no member 
of that organisation be allowed to sit on the jury.
65
 He likewise requested that a range of 
questions should be posed to all potential jurors, aiming 'to find a jury that didn’t have … 
a deep-seated hatred or prejudice against either of the parties … '.
66
 Although Christie's 
‘challenge’ was rejected by Locke, who, inter alia, found the questions proposed to be 
offensive, a panel of judges found on appeal that the original questions may have been 
unacceptable but Locke should have advised Christie to reframe them in accordance with 
legal guidelines.
67
 In light of this serious error, 'the appellant was deprived of his right to 
have a jury selected according to law, whose impartiality or appearance of impartiality 
could not be impugned'.
68
 This finding was fundamental to the ordering of a retrial.
69
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Once in court the trials differed in their application of legal process. As noted in chapter 
two, in the Eichmann trial the rules of evidence were intentionally relaxed to allow ‘the 
submission of a wider range of evidence than normally available in a court controlled by 
Anglo-American rules’.
70
 More specifically, 'hearsay' was ruled admissible, despite its 
prescriptive exclusion in Anglo-American law, and probative, despite its legally 
designated limitations of value and weight (chapter two). Grounded in the ‘1950 Law’, 
section 15 (S.15) stated: 
 
In a trial against an offence under this Law, the Court shall be able to deviate 
from the rules of evidence, if it is satisfied that this will facilitate the 
ascertainment of the truth and the just disposition of the case.
71
 
 
In practice its clauses lifted the common law ban on not only verbal but documented 
‘hearsay’, and likewise allowed written rather than oral testimony to be submitted by 
witnesses that remained alive, but, for various reasons, could not attend Israeli courts.
72
 
As Hausner pointed out, a similar relaxing of evidentiary rules had been allowed by other 
courts adjudicating over comparable cases and was laid down as precedent by the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT).
73
 S.15 was regularly invoked by the Prosecution, 
and, in the majority of cases, supported by judicial ruling.
74
 It specifically liberated the 
experiential evidence of survivor witnesses and allowed the submission of evidence 
wholly unrelated to Eichmann.
75
 However, it would be misleading to equate its common 
employment with a lack of juridical attention or deliberation. Rather, its invocation 
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triggered a complexity of legal debate, and, in a few cases, requests were rejected.
76
 As 
admonished by Judge Landau during one such debate, ‘I suggest that our rules of evidence 
not be forgotten completely’.
77
  
 
In contrast, the Zündel trials were ‘procedurally ordinary’, and followed the conventional 
practices of criminal law in which the rules of evidence were not only stringently applied 
but purposefully exploited by the Defence.
78
 In particular, the 'hearsay' rules were 
regularly invoked by Christie in both trials in attempts to curtail the admissibility of key 
prosecution evidence.
79
 In 1985 Christie specifically exploited these rules to attack the 
credibility and probative value of eyewitnesses. Consequently, survivor testimony was 
not only closely monitored by legal protocol but halted and removed from the trial record 
if breaching its rules.
80
 Yet, integral to the Zündel trials was the exception to the 'hearsay' 
rules allowing the admissibility of historians as expert evidence and opinion.
81
 In contrast 
to both the Eichmann and Irving trials, the ‘best evidence’ of original documentation was 
largely absent from the Toronto courtrooms.
82
 Substantial in volume, and held in archives 
outside Canada, the relevant primary source material was deemed to be inaccessible to 
the court.
83
 But Canadian law allowed this evidence to be substituted through secondary 
testimony, so long as the witness had both accessed the relevant material and met the 
criteria of expert.
84
 According to this criteria, the expert did not have to be academically 
or professionally trained, so long as s/he could prove that the knowledge held was beyond 
“the ken of the average layman” and of sufficient competence to aid the jury in their 
finding of the 'truth'.
85
 Although Christie challenged the probative value of both history 
and historians, as part of a wider critique of their epistemic credibility, Locke ruled in 
1985 that although ‘the dividing line’ between ‘hearsay’ and history is not ‘entirely clear’: 
‘Expertise in the field of history is just as much a field of expertise as that of pure 
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science’.
86
 However, as similarly concluded by Judge Ronald Thomas in 1988, since 
much of the material referenced and/or submitted would ordinarily qualify as 'hearsay' it 
was not admissible for the truth of its contents.
87
  
 
In London, although largely 'procedurally ordinary', Judge Gray was transparent in his 
relaxation of procedure in favour of Irving.
88
 In particular, Irving was able to present a 
case of conspiracy by his “traditional enemies” that, ‘in the ordinary run of litigation, the 
rules of evidence would have prevented him advancing ... ’.
89
 Irving had also submitted a 
written statement at the closing stage of the trial that not only covered issues irrelevant to 
the case but exceeded the established evidence.
90
 Gray had allowed ‘latitude’ because the 
Defence team had made ‘the unexpected decision’ not to call Lipstadt as evidence, and 
subsequent cross-examination by Irving, despite her responsibility for the allegations at 
the centre of the litigation.
91
 Although the Defence was ‘perfectly entitled to adopt this 
tactic … it did place Irving … at a disadvantage’.
92
 But Gray had been especially lenient 
because Irving had represented himself.
93
 Rampton also indicated in his closing statement 
that the objections of the Defence to this leniency would have been more rigorous if it 
had been a trial by jury.
94
  
 
However, in contrast to the Zündel trials, the legal admissibility of history and historians 
was not a subject for discussion in the London courtroom. There was no qualifying 
process determining the expertise of the relevant witnesses: Christopher Browning, 
Richard Evans, Peter Longerich and Robert Jan van Pelt. As Gray noted, they were 
historians ‘of the greatest distinction’ and ‘outstanding in his field’.
95
 Rather, at the 
beginning of their expert reports, written on behalf of the Defence, curriculum-vitae 
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attested to their eligibility and signed oaths verified their independence.
96
 Once in court 
the reports were admitted as 'evidence in chief', with declarations testifying to the 
accuracy of their statements of fact and fairness of opinion unchallenged by Gray.
97
 
Unlike Christie, Irving did not dispute the legitimacy of processing historical inquiry 
through the medium of the law, or the academic credentials of the Defence’s selected 
experts.
98
 Of course Irving categorised himself as a historian and subpoenaed others to 
testify in court to his scholarly contribution and repute.
99
  
 
Once in court the trials also utilised different foundations of evidence. In Israel, the 
Prosecution team submitted a vast reservoir of primary documentation (1,434 items). The 
Defence team also submitted primary source material, but its volume was negligible in 
comparison (109 items).
100
 Rather, its leading counsel, Robert Servatius, intended to ‘rely 
upon the documents produced by the Prosecution itself’ and promised a ‘proper 
illumination’ of its evidence.
101
 Perpetrator testimony, and specifically Eichmann, was 
also foundational evidence for both Hausner and Servatius. Hausner accepted that there 
were obvious limitations to the value of perpetrator testimony, given that its evidence had 
been taken 'in the shadow of the gallows'.
102
 But he insisted that any self-interested claims 
did not underestimate its probative value and weight.
103
 The testimony of perpetrators still 
alive, but unwilling to attend the court in Israel (because of the threat of arrest for war 
crimes), was taken through overseas commission, with the balance between self-interest 
and probative weight similarly negotiated.
104
  
 
But, as is commonly acknowledged, what marked the Eichmann trial as seminal was the 
primacy of survivor testimony.
105
 As already established, the foregrounding of this 
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testimony aimed to restore the voices of both victims and survivors to the grand narrative 
of the Holocaust. Although politically strategic, it also intentionally directed the 
narrative.
106
 Crucially, it not only marked a shift away from historiographical reliance, 
and primacy of value placed, on the ‘paper work of the perpetrators’ to ‘flesh-and-blood’ 
representation, but, according to Shoshana Felman, reversed ‘the long tradition of 
traumatization of the Jew by means of law’, allowed the victims to own and write their 
own history and produced, ‘unwittingly … a canonical or sacred narrative’ of the 
genocidal crime.
107
  
 
The Judges acknowledged that survivor testimony had been the main source of evidence 
in specific chapters of the genocide and of notable value and weight in others.
108
 Yet the 
vast majority of witnesses had had no contact with Eichmann during their ordeal and 
therefore could not testify to his specific crimes as charged. Hausner argued that since the 
indictment covered the murder of millions of Jews so any witness with relevant evidence, 
however geographically removed from Eichmann at the time, had probative value and 
weight.
109
 The Judges agreed.
110
 As already noted, the rules of evidence had been relaxed 
to allow the submission of experiential evidence (S.15), while, and likewise contrary to 
the rules governing testimony, both its probative value and weight was revered as not 
only ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ but infallible.
111
 As concluded by the Judges: ‘They spoke 
simply, and the seal of truth was on their words’.
112
  
 
As indicated in chapter two, survivor testimony was also submitted by the Crown as 
foundational evidence in the 1985 Zündel trial. But the revered authority and status 
sanctioned in Israel was not only absent in Canada but purposely challenged and 
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derided.
113
 Likewise, contrary to its evidential privileging in 1961, the probative value and 
weight of the survivor voice was now equated with the testimony of all other witnesses, 
including Holocaust deniers.
114
 As stated by Locke in 1985: 'It is submitted to you that 
merely because survivors have testified that they are survivors does not make their 
evidence credible'.
115
 It is hardly surprising that survivors were unwilling to have their 
testimony similarly berated in 1988 and it was subsequently absent from the retrial.
116
 
Documentation was likewise foundational evidence in both 1985 and 1988, but, in 
contrast to both the Eichmann and Irving trials, the volume of contemporaneous material 
submitted was minimal.
117
 Conversely, a significant proportion of secondary material was 
submitted but not for the truth of its contents.
118
  
 
As shown above, substituting for primary source material for both the Crown and Defence 
was historian testimony, acting as evidence by proxy. In fact, these two trials visibly 
represented the transition of evidential weight from the survivor witness in 1961 to the 
expertise of the historian. It is common knowledge that the historians selected by the 
prosecution teams were Raul Hilberg in 1985 and Christopher Browning in 1988.
119
 But 
the rules also qualified the 'expertise' of known Holocaust deniers, in the main Robert 
Faurisson (1985, 1988) and David Irving (1988), as equally competent and relevant to 
those of Hilberg and Browning. In fact, in 1985, Christie specifically requested that 
Faurisson was accepted as an expert on the Holocaust ‘in the same way that Dr Hilberg 
was’.
120
 Locke agreed.
121
 In 1988 Irving was similarly qualified as a ‘prominent’ 
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historian’, regardless of Thomas’ reminder to the jury that he had profited from writings 
absolving Hitler.
 122
  
 
However, most distinctive to the Zündel trials was the attempt by the Crown in both 1985 
and 1988 to have specific facts about the Holocaust judicially noticed as both notorious 
and proven beyond doubt.
123
 The relevant rule states that:  
 
Courts will take judicial notice of what is considered by reasonable men [sic] 
of that time and place to be indisputable either by resort to common 
knowledge or to sources of indisputable accuracy easily accessible to men.
124
 
 
Once within the field of judicial notice the relevant facts are accepted by the law as true 
and binding for the duration of the case, exempt from the usual rules of evidence and 
proof and closed to rebuttal.
125
 In 1985 Griffiths petitioned for judicial notice at two stages 
in the trial (at the end of the Crown’s and then Defence’s evidential submission) and 
claimed that two specific facts met the relevant criteria: (1) ‘that millions of Jews were 
annihilated from 1933 to 1945 because of the deliberate policies of Nazi Germany’ and 
(2) ‘the means of annihilation included mass shootings, starvation, privation and 
gassing’.
126
 Griffiths insisted that these facts were generic in content, and, as the law 
demanded, left the vast range of those disputed open to the jury process.
127
 Repeating 
arguments over the instability of historical conclusions, Christie insisted that judicial 
notice would prejudice Zündel’s case.
 128
 Locke agreed.
129
 In his first ruling he accepted 
that from the point of history, ‘there exists wide and highly regarded opinion that the 
Holocaust did occur’, but conceded that, from the point of law, judicial notice of the facts 
requested would place barriers to Zündel’s right to a ‘full answer and defence’.
130
 In his 
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second ruling, Locke accepted that, again from a point of law, judicial notice of these 
facts would shift the 'burden of proof' to the Defence.
131
 In both cases he concluded: 
 
It is with no little regret that, for these reasons, I decline to give effect to the 
motion which I now dismiss.
132
  
 
In 1988 the Crown once again petitioned for judicial notice, but, after the lessons of 1985, 
adapted the relevant facts to the more generic claim that, 'during the Second World War 
the National Socialist regime of Adolf Hitler pursued a policy which had as its goal the 
extermination of the Jews of Europe'.
133
 After similar arguments posed by both the Crown 
and Defence, Thomas ruled that the Holocaust, as defined, was so notorious that it was 
indisputable among ‘reasonable people’ and on this ground alone he would take judicial 
notice of its fact.
134
 However, he removed the reference to ‘policy’, claiming that it was 
not essential to the fact of the Holocaust.
135
 The jury was duly informed and instructed 
that, since indisputable, the Crown’s 'burden of proof' did not include the fact that: 'The 
Holocaust is the mass murder and extermination of Jews by the Nazi regime during the 
Second World War’.
136
 
 
In London historians also acted as the main form of evidence on behalf of the Defence. 
They likewise stood as evidence by proxy on behalf of the survivor voice. As confirmed 
by Lipstadt: 'To have called survivors would have suggested we needed "witnesses of 
fact" … to prove there was a Holocaust'.
137
 Moreover, and arguably forewarned by the 
Zündel case, the defence team 'did not consider it ethical to subject survivors to cross-
examination by a man whose primary objective … was their humiliation'.
138
 But, 
according to Robert Kahn, their absence also allowed the Defence to ‘dispense with 
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emotionally compelling but often unpredictable’ testimony.
139
 As already noted, although 
the relevant historians were open to examination in court, a distinctive feature of this trial 
was the admissibility of historical treatise in the form of written reports and submitted by 
the Defence as its 'evidence-in-chief'.
140
 These reports 'ran to a total of more than two 
thousand pages' and were accompanied by a 'massive' volume of documentation in 
support of the opinions and statements of fact presented.
141
 Similar to the Zündel trials, 
this evidence was not admitted for the truth of its contents, but opened to cross-
examination by Irving. Likewise, the totality of evidence was not necessarily submitted 
for cross-examination or accepted by Gray.
142
  
 
Another distinctive feature of the London courtroom was the formal reaffirmation of 
established historiographical method. Subsequently, in defence of Lipstadt’s exposé of 
Irving as a discredited historian, Richard Evans was tasked with assessing Irving’s body 
of work against the ‘accepted and legitimate methods of historical research, exposition 
and interpretation … ’.
143
 Evans verified that these ‘methods’ rested on ‘thorough, 
transparent and unbiased investigation of the primary sources’, comparative 
reconstruction, ‘reasonably objective’ interpretation and footnotes acting as both 
reference and verification, with any differences of opinion 'generally confined within the 
limits set by the evidence'.
144
 In other words, these 'canons of scholarly research’ related 
to the conventions and rules of the 'empiricist-analytical' genre (chapter one) and were 
reaffirmed by all four historian experts throughout their testimony.
145
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It is inevitable that these vagaries of legal content, form, method and objective explicitly 
filtered and shaped the Holocaust both presented and authorised. Subsequently, a 
diversity of historiographical account, finding and record distinguishes each trial. 
Arguably, most familiar is the content and reach of the grand narrative presented in Israel 
by Hausner. More specifically, this designated 'spokesman … of six million accusers' 
presented a 'criminal conspiracy of thousands' that, once officially instructed in 1941, 
constituted a history of planned slaughter in which no wing of the Nazi party, department 
of the German state, or country of German influence or occupation had been immune.
146
 
A litany of evidence (including Eichmann) documented and testified to the wide-spread 
collusion and uniformity of its perpetration.
147
 Yet, despite the narrative extending beyond 
Eichmann, the legal focus on his agency foregrounded specific bureaucracies (RHSA, 
Department IV, Central Offices for Emigration, the SS, SD and Gestapo,), events 
(Madagascar, Nisko, the Wannsee Conference)
,
 geographies (Hungary, Lublin, Minsk, 
Riga, Theresienstadt, Warsaw), official groupings (Specialist Officers for Jewish Affairs 
and German Legations) and personnel (Reinhard Heydrich, Heinrich Himmler, Heinrich 
Müller, Rudolf Höss, Rolf Günther, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Eberhard von Thadden, Dieter 
Wisliceny).  
 
Intentionally driven by its victims it was also a narrative in which cruelty, death and 
suffering was all-pervasive. If anyone in the courtroom, or wider public audience, had 
been in any doubt of the degree of inhumanity charged by the Prosecution, on the stand 
was Max Burger as representative witness to the brutality of the Nisko transports, Henryk 
Ross as witness to the merciless conditions in the Lódz ghetto, Frieda Masia as witness 
to the deportations to 'the East' and public hangings, Abba Kovner as representative 
witness to the murder of 40,000 Jews in the forests of Ponary, Shmuel Horowitz as 
witness to the shooting of thousands of Jews in the Szeparowce forest (East Galicia), 
Mordechai Ansbacher as witness to the horror of Theresienstadt, Dr Theodor Löwenstein 
Lavi as witness to the ‘grave of the Jews’ at Transnistria (Romania), Dov Freiberg as 
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witness to the gassings at Sobibor and Michael Podchlewnik, Ya’akov Wiernik and 
Yehiel Dinur as representative witnesses to the killing sites of Chelmno, Treblinka and 
Auschwitz-Birkenau.
148
 There were no surviving witnesses to the mass murders in the 
Belzec extermination camp.
149
 As the Judges found, it was a catalogue of suffering so 
‘beyond human understanding’ that they doubted the ability of the court ‘to give it 
adequate expression’.
150
 Yet, in the face of such atrocity, it was also a narrative of Jewish 
resilience.
151
 On the stand witnesses testified that Jews had fought to survive, had been 
defiant, had actively resisted and revolted.
152
 As Rivka Kuper insisted: 
 
I point this out because the role of the revolt in this story of the Holocaust is 
a relatively small one, but the effort that was made by those who rebelled was 
above anything imaginable.
153
 
 
Others had escaped from camps, execution sites, marches, transports, shootings and even 
burial.
154
 And throughout the genocide Jewish aid, culture, education, organisation and 
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negotiation had persevered.
155
 Although irrelevant to Eichmann’s crimes, the Judges 
authorised the emphasis placed on these ‘inconceivable feats of heroism’.
156
 
 
Within the grand narrative of atrocity Eichmann was presented as consciously and 
ideologically driven to the role of 'genocidaire', indeed the “one hand” directing the 
slaughter.
157
 Moreover, he had engaged in slaughter 'with a clear mind … believing it was 
the right thing to do …'.
158
 When Eichmann was found guilty as indicted, Hausner’s grand 
narrative of the 'Final Solution', and its 'principal offender', was wholly sanctioned by 
both district and Supreme Courts.
159
 
 
As already noted, in the discrete contexts in Canada in 1985 and 1988 the law was not 
explicitly summoned to reconstruct a narrative of the Holocaust but utilised to rebut and 
unmask a narrative of denial.
160
 Although confined to the content of DSMRD, its rejection 
of a systematic policy of extermination, intentional death camps 'in the East', the use of 
gas chambers as killing apparatus, and the total murder of six million Jews is common 
denier treatise.
161
 Likewise, its overall presentation of the Holocaust as an ‘imaginary 
slaughter’ invented by Jews after the Second World War to collect huge reparations from 
Germany, is common denier charge.
162
 Proving its 'false news', therefore, acted as a 
rebuttal of not only DSMRD but the genus of Holocaust denial. Moreover, in s.177’s 
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demand for proof of Zündel’s knowledge of the falsity of DSMRD, and subsequent wilful 
publication (as well as injury to the public interest due to its content), the required 
unmasking of his background and motives acted as an exposé of wider denier stratagem. 
Consequently, despite the Crown’s insistence that the Holocaust was not on trial, the 
rejection of key established facts in DSMRD guaranteed an extensive investigation into 
its evidential accuracy, accountability and record in both 1985 and 1988.
163
  
 
More specifically, inaccuracies, or simply lies, found in specific chapters of DSMRD 
focused attention on the absence of a ‘Hitler order’ (as synonymous with the absence of 
an official plan of extermination), the 'Gerstein statement' (as fallacious perpetrator 
testimony), the Nuremberg trials (as sites of forced confession and torture), the shootings 
by the Einsatzgruppen (as ‘a massive fabrication’), the Warsaw ghetto (as a ‘newly-
discovered’ death camp in amongst an ‘endless list’ being produced), Anne Frank’s diary 
(as faked testimony), conditions in the camps (as unexceptional until nearing the end of 
the war), and the Red Cross (as official recognition of conditions as well as the absence 
of death camps).
164
 But foregrounded in both trials was the use of gas chambers and 
crematoria in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Despite being rarely mentioned in DSMRD (chapter 
six) Christie insisted that there was nothing more relevant to the case of the Defence than 
to prove that gas chambers did not exist, and without gas chambers it would have been 
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impossible to murder six million Jews.
165
 Consequently, Holocaust historiography in both 
1985 and 1988 focused on the architecture of gassing facilities, the physics of cremation, 
the chemistry of Zyklon-B and the biology of human absorption of poisonous gas (chapter 
six).
166
  
 
It is common knowledge that Christie’s narrative of denial failed to convince two teams 
of jurors. Although jury deliberations and fact finding are withheld from public scrutiny 
and verification (chapter two), the guilty verdicts against Zündel signified the falsity of 
DSMRD and intrinsically the falsity of the genus of Holocaust denial. Through Thomas’ 
judicial notice in 1988, the background fact of the Holocaust as ‘the mass murder and 
extermination of Jews by the Nazi regime during the Second World War’ was officially 
ruled as beyond doubt.
167
 As Thomas insisted, whether intentional or functionally 
evolving, debates among ‘reasonable people’ were over the ‘how’ of the Holocaust not 
whether it had taken place.
168
 
 
In London in 2000 a similar strategy of rebuttal focused on selected false/misrepresented 
statements and treatise, but across a compilation of Irving's published work rather than a 
single denier tract.
169
 However, as already noted, a comparable strategy of unmasking was 
not only directed at the political affiliation and motives driving Holocaust denial but 
extended to Irving’s methodology. In contrast to his Canadian counterparts, Rampton 
provided a definition of a Holocaust denier at the very beginning of the trial:  
 
By this I mean that he denies that the Nazis planned and carried out the 
systematic murder of millions of Jews, in particular, though by no means 
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exclusively, by the use of homicidal gas chambers, and in particular, though 
by no means exclusively, at Auschwitz in Southern Poland.
170
 
 
In mirroring the genus of Holocaust denial premised in DSMRD, rebuttal guaranteed the 
investigation of an extensive but familiar historiography of an evolving genocidal regime 
(chapter four) in which Auschwitz-Birkenau was once again foregrounded as a site of 
extermination. Moreover, it was agreed by both parties that Auschwitz should constitute 
a discrete category.
171
 Consequently, as in Canada, Holocaust historiography was again 
disproportionately focused on the architecture of gassing facilities, the physics of 
cremation, the chemistry of Zyklon-B and the biology of human absorption of poisonous 
gas.
172
 However, in a case determined by falsehoods/misrepresentations specific to 
Irving's published work, distinct events and evidence were also foregrounded. In 
particular, and unique to the Irving case, was the focus on Adolf Hitler's continued 
leadership of the 'Final Solution'. Marginalised in the Eichmann trial, and largely masked 
by the focus on a written ‘Hitler order’ in the Zündel trials, Irving’s acclaimed ‘obsession’ 
brought Hitler’s authority over all stages of extermination policy to the forefront of 
evidential and historiographical scrutiny.
173
 Likewise, in contrast to both the Eichmann 
and Zündel trials, Holocaust historiography was disproportionately focused on specific 
transports of German Jews from Berlin in 1941, and their murder on arrival in Riga, the 
number of French Jews killed, the accuracy of Marie Vaillant-Couturier’s testimony at 
the IMT, meetings held between Hitler and Hungary's Regent, Miklos Horthy (16-17 
April 1943), Allied propaganda and the translation of camouflage language.
174
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Mirroring its defeat in Canada, the genus of denial was rejected along with the evidence 
and narrative of its ‘best shot’. In his refutation of Irving’s account, Gray ruled that a 
‘convergence of evidence’ supported established historiography, and, in contrast to key 
omissions in the background fact judicially noticed in Canada, acknowledged the 
common definition of the Holocaust as:
175
  
 
the attempt by Nazi Germany, led by Hitler, to exterminate the Jewish 
population in Europe, which attempt succeeded to the extent of murdering 
between 5 and 6 million Jews in a variety of ways, including mass gassings 
in camps built for the purpose.
176
 
 
Gray likewise defined a denier as someone who repudiated this background fact and 
found that there was no doubt that Irving was ‘an active Holocaust denier ... anti-semitic 
and racist and ... associates with right wing extremists who promote neo-Nazism’.
177
 
Although there is no legal precedent in Anglo-American law defining the 'objective 
historian', Gray had based his findings from the perspective of the ‘conscientious’ 
‘dispassionate’, ‘fair-minded’ and ‘objective’ historian, and subsequently found that 
Irving had ‘for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented 
and manipulated historical evidence’.
178
 For the same ideological reasons, his 'errors' 
converged 'to exonerate Hitler and to reflect Irving's partisanship for the Nazi leader’.
179
 
Although there is no legal precedent in Anglo-American law defining the standards of 
historical scholarship, Gray agreed with Evans' conclusions that Irving’s methodology 
‘fell far short of the standard to be expected of a conscientious historian’.
180
 The Defence 
team had substantially proven its case, and thus ‘the defence of justification succeeds’.
181
 
More discretely, in Gray’s endorsement and application of Evans’ ‘canons of scholarly 
research’, the Defence team had also succeeded in not only achieving legal sanction of 
                                                 
175
 This ‘convergence’ was confirmed throughout Gray’s 'Judgement'. See for example, Ibid, (TB) T2, 
'Judgement', paras. 5.111-5.122, 5.123-5.150, 6.10-6.22, 6.23-6.38, 6.73-6.105, 7.15-8.24. 
176
 Ibid, para. 8.3 and taken from (TB) B1, 'Witness Report of Richard Evans', section 3.1. 
177
 Ibid, (TB) T2, 'Judgement', paras. 8.3, 13.167. 
178
 Ibid, paras. 7.5, 13.24, 13.29, 13.41, 13.51, 13.55, 13.76, 13.77, 13.80, 13.83, 13.84, 13.87, 13.91, 
13.126, 13.151, 13.167. The lack of precedent is observed by Wendie Ellen Schneider, ‘Past Imperfect’, 
Yale Law Journal, 110:8 (2001), pp1531, 1539.  
179
 HRIRH, (TB) T2, 'Judgement', para. 13.142. 
180
 Ibid, para. 13.51. Once again, the lack of precedent is observed by Schneider, ‘Past Imperfect’, pp1531, 
1539. 
181
 HRIRH, (TB) T2, 'Judgement', para. 13.168. 
118 
the 'empiricist-analytical' genre of historiography but presenting it as the uncontested 
method of the historian's craft.
182
  
 
Although all four courtrooms authorised and reaffirmed the facts of both specific 
historiographies of the Holocaust and its overall genocide, the diversities of case 
continued post-trial in their acclaimed outcomes and reputations. The Eichmann trial was, 
and continues to be, celebrated as a ‘triumph of didactic legality … [that] … transformed 
the destruction of the European Jews into the emblematic event of the twentieth 
century’.
183
 Indeed, it has long been credited with creating "the Holocaust".
184
 Conversely, 
conventional wisdom records the Zündel trials as a contradiction of their didactic aims.
185
 
According to Lawrence Douglas, both trials demonstrated ‘the perils of relying on legal 
dramaturgy as a means of buttressing the integrity of history’.
186
 More specifically, in the 
safeguarding of its own rules, these trials were prime examples of how the law often fails 
to do justice to the very history it has been enlisted to protect.
187
 In contrast, the London 
trial has been designated as a disciplinary and didactic success. As reported in the 'Daily 
Telegraph': ‘The Irving case has done for the new century what the Nuremberg tribunals 
or the Eichmann trial did for earlier generations’.
188
 According to David Hirsh, it produced 
a newly authoritative narrative that reaffirmed academic historiography.
189
 D.D. 
Guttenplan concluded that the facts of the Holocaust were now 'safer, while its 
'Judgement' was heralded by Evans as not only a victory over Irving and the narrative of 
denial, but ‘a victory for history, for historical truth and historical scholarship’.
190
 It was 
also a victory for historians and confirmed that the Holocaust was safe in their hands. But, 
of specific interest to the history discipline, its authorisation of established (empiricist) 
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craft was specifically celebrated as ‘a triumph … over the “extraordinary” 
“irresponsibility” of postmodernism’.
191
  
 
The focus on the diversities of the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials therefore confirms 
their applicability to comparative research of the history-law relationship in practice. At 
face value, they all join the history and record of successful litigation cases involving the 
Holocaust. Therefore, despite the identified challenges to its evidence, narratives and 
intended lessons, the implication is that each courtroom acted as an appropriate method 
of historical inquiry. However, as already indicated in chapter two, a body of secondary 
literature challenges this conclusion. A close reading of the daily recorded transcripts of 
the four trials likewise identifies a range of limitations of history-making integral to each 
legal form. Prior to the intended original research of the history-law relationship, it is 
therefore pertinent to examine the contribution each of the four trials have made to the 
existing 'consensus of critique'.  
 
As noted in chapter two, and despite its notoriety, critics have long identified legal flaws 
in the Eichmann trial. More specifically, in addition to the relaxing of the ‘hearsay’ rules 
(see above), Hausner was allowed to reconstruct a grand narrative of murderous events 
in which Eichmann ‘had little or nothing to do’, submit witness testimony, ‘much of it 
irrelevant to the criminal activities of the defendant’, and integrate "into the procedural 
framework ... matters that do not directly belong in the trial”.
192
 Further breaches of ‘due 
process’ included the suspected monitoring of the communication lines of Defence and 
foreign observers, obstructing the Defence from calling its own or cross-examining 
specific prosecution witnesses, and preventing Servatius from interviewing Eichmann in 
private, until a threat to resign as Defence counsel forced the government to 
“backtrack”.
193
  
 
It has already been acknowledged that extra-historical and extra-legal interests directed 
and governed the trial (see above). Driven by ‘national pedagogy’ many have commented 
on the political (mis)appropriation of the trial and especially the role of the then Prime 
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Minister Ben-Gurion.
194
 It was the conscious decision of both Ben-Gurion and Hausner 
that the grand narrative of Jewish suffering would be brought to trial even if it took 
precedence over legal formalities.
195
 Both also agreed that the prevailing criticisms of the 
Judenräte would be absent from this narrative.
196
 Ben-Gurion also utilised the media to 
give the trial and its message national prominence, vetted Hausner’s opening address and 
'commented liberally on it'.
197
 In turn, Hausner reported on the trial directly to Cabinet 
meetings.
198
 Party politics also played a role in witness selection.
199
 Arendt subsequently 
accused Ben-Gurion of orchestrating a ‘show’ that intended to not only educate and 
embarrass the “nations of the world” but one that justified the establishment of a Jewish 
state that could ‘hit back’.
200
 She likewise branded Hausner as ‘a government-appointed 
agent’.
201
 In the face of such overt political drivers, Stephen Landsman suggests that it 
was only through the diligence of the Judges, and particularly Presiding Judge Landau, 
that justice was seen to have prevailed in the Israeli courtroom.
202
  
 
Critics have likewise identified the limitations of the trials’ historiographical 
compositions and findings. It is noted that, however grand the intended narrative, the 
Eichmann trial neglected the distinctiveness of the Holocaust, confined its interpretation 
to an intentionalist lens, and reconstructed an account of Jewish resistance and survival 
that was not only misleading but silenced alternative experiences and ignored the role of 
Jewish complicity (however ‘grey’).
203
 It also reconstructed misleading and partial 
accounts of the complexity of perpetration, with Hausner, as shown in chapter two, 
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reinforcing the then 'fashionable understanding' of Nazi perpetrators as 'depraved 
criminals', while casting Eichmann as ‘more of a monster and more in control of the 
killing machinery than he was’.
204
 As Ruth Bettina Birn argued, 'the major problem' in the 
trial was 'the discrepancy between Eichmann's real role and the exaggerated image created 
by Hausner'.
205
 In effect, Hausner was not interested 'in the real Eichmann'.
206
 Hausner 
also ignored facts already found by prosecutors in Germany.
207
 Thus, by 1961, a level of 
historical knowledge existed that could have more accurately informed the Prosecution 
in Israel, but there was 'no sign that Hausner was much inclined to overcome the weakness 
of his case'.
208
 Beyond the courtroom the misleading narratives continued, with Eichmann 
largely reconstructed through the lens of Hannah Arendt as 'the epitome of the totalitarian 
man'; a depiction which 'helped to shape the way in which generations of historians and 
thinkers conceptualized the Third Reich'.
209
 In turn it is argued that her account of the 
proceedings ‘has come to overshadow its subject’.
210
  
 
But perhaps most controversially, critics have also identified flaws in its fêted victim-
driven narrative. As already mentioned, at the legal level it was neither pertinent to the 
witnessing of Eichmann’s crimes nor essential to the Prosecution’s case.
211
 However, 
since largely unfettered, this narrative was not only prejudicial to Eichmann but 
'hamstrung' his counsel.
212
 As confirmed by the transcripts, once admitted as evidence, 
Servatius rarely challenged or questioned the Prosecution's witnesses.
213
 In court he 
justified his approach as ‘respect for their suffering’, but, arguably, once faced with this 
suffering it is more likely that he did not want to ‘anger the court or provoke even greater 
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sympathy for them'.
214
 Crucially, as highlighted by Arendt, the submission of testimony 
that had no direct link to Eichmann established “the right of the witness to be 
irrelevant”.
215
 Conversely, however seminal in its restoration of the survivor voice, the 
expectation and process of 'bearing witness' was not without cost. Several witnesses were 
emotionally traumatised both prior to and during their testimony.
216
 Most visible was the 
fainting of Yehiel Dinur (a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau) and the halting of his 
evidence.
217
 Likewise, however evidentially privileged, others assumed their credibility 
was under scrutiny.
218
 Thus, in contrast to the attention placed on the law’s inability to 'do 
justice' to the experiential evidence of the survivor voice (chapter two), Birn has 
challenged the assumed empowerment of those who testified at the trial, while Landsman 
agrees that the impact of testifying continues to be neither adequately considered nor 
explicitly recognised.
219
 Beyond the Eichmann trial, the adoption of Hausner's ‘victim-
driven’ model in successive perpetrator trials has not only shifted attention away from the 
criminal activities of the accused, but has yielded protracted investigations as well as 
flawed and questionable results.
220
 Yet, the so-called 'Eichmann strategy', continues to 
'seduce prosecutors'.
221
 Thus, despite its invaluable contribution to the "human story of 
the Jewish victims' suffering", the Eichmann legacy is contested.
222
 
 
In contrast, the critiques of the Zündel trials have never been challenged. Despite 
reaffirming the falsity of denier treatise no commentator has disputed Douglas’ 
conclusion that Canadian court procedures and rules impeded a historical reckoning with 
the Holocaust.
223
 As indicated above, although successful in finally bringing both Zündel 
and denier treatise to trial, s.177 allowed Christie to focus attention on the facticity of the 
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Holocaust from the outset, while denier strategy and tactic largely reduced its 
complexities to mechanistic narratives of gassing and incineration capacity and utility at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. In contrast to the Eichmann trial there were no breaches of ‘due 
process’. Rather, the rigid application of legal protocol, and especially the 'hearsay' rules, 
not only challenged but intentionally confined, and even rejected, the evidence of the 
Holocaust. Indeed the 'hearsay' rule acted as the Defence's "controlling trope".
224
 Even 
when exempted from its protocol, the admission of established historian evidence and 
testimony was not only restricted but its value and weight was inherently diminished. As 
recognised in chapter two, historical expertise was explicitly downgraded to second-hand 
'opinion' rather than first-hand fact, and therefore viewed as a weaker form of evidence, 
while the qualifying rules legitimated the opinion of Holocaust deniers ‘along the same 
lines’ as established historians.
225
  
 
Most notably, and contrary to its intention, the request for judicial notice of the central 
facts of the Holocaust allowed its authority to be further challenged and undermined. 
Despite Locke’s insistence to the contrary, the rejection of judicial notice in 1985 implied 
doubt over its reputable facts, and, however regretful, ‘seriously upset the didactic ends 
of the trial’.
226
 Conversely, it provided ‘a major propaganda victory for the deniers’.
227
 
Although rectified in 1988, the facts judicially noticed in the retrial reduced the 
complexity of the Holocaust to mere background definition. Furthermore, the specific 
removal of the reference to policy may have been legally relevant (as pertinent to the 
'facts in issue') but Thomas’ claim that it was not essential to the fact of the Holocaust 
was simply wrong.  
 
Explicit blame has long been apportioned to Christie for ‘desecrating’ both experiential 
and historical evidence.
228
 But, arguably, this was his function as defence counsel. Blame 
has likewise been assigned to the Crown, especially in the 1985 trial, in which the primacy 
of rebuttal placed an inevitable focus on the Holocaust instead of Zündel.
229
 Griffiths has 
also been specifically blamed for failing to petition for judicial notice at the very 
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beginning of the 1985 trial.
230
 Yet, the actual staging of the petition was immaterial.
231
 
Rather, it was the selected facts themselves that were at fault in a case in which those 
petitioned for notice were central to those 'in issue'. It is suggested that Griffiths especially 
erred when raising judicial notice a second time. The legal justifications for the first ruling 
had not changed and therefore rejection a second time was inevitable. At the retrial in 
1988 the strategy of rebuttal was retained by Pearson, but it was accompanied by a greater 
emphasis on unmasking Zündel's political agenda.
232
 According to Kahn, the shift in 
emphasis resulted in a less controversial trial ‘but also one that was less effective as a 
statement against Holocaust denial’.
233
  
 
Outside the courtroom blame has also been apportioned to the media. In 1985, amid a 
glare of press attention, newspapers reported the points made in court, 'however false or 
ludicrous', and often without correction.
234
 Headlines created the public perception of 
controversy and doubt, while providing 'an air of legitimacy to Holocaust denial’.
235
 
According to Alan Davies, disbelief in the Holocaust 'was portrayed as a perfectly 
reasonable position', with every discrepancy, however irrelevant or trite, aired as a 
'revisionist' victory.
236
 Some Jewish commentators also viewed the media attention 
awarded to Zündel as 'an obscenity'.
237
 Yet others, including key prosecution witness 
Rudolf Vrba, were undaunted since: "It's inevitable that any crook gets publicity when 
justice catches up to him. That's the price of freedom".
238
 In 1988 public reporting of the 
trial was initially banned by Thomas, but media attention never reached the heights of 
interest shown in 1985.
239
 Although publicity to Holocaust denial was subsequently 
curtailed, Leonidas Hill argues that the suppression of news of the trial left interested 
citizens 'uninformed about a matter of public and educational interest to a democratic 
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society'.
240
 Despite the furore surrounding the media coverage, the overall impact of the 
trials on public interest and knowledge has been difficult to calculate.
241
 Although a broad 
section of Jewish representatives supported the trial, and welcomed its verdict, many 
Canadians suspected the price of conviction had been '"too high"'.
242
  
 
In contrast to both the Eichmann and Zündel trials criticism of the Irving trial has been 
rather muted. Yet, notwithstanding its celebrated victories, the trial was not without its 
flaws or risks. Most notably, despite Rampton’s insistence that the Holocaust was not on 
trial, legal process, as in Canada, blurred the intended focus on Irving and threatened to 
confuse the public audience.
243
 Many commentators assumed that not only the Holocaust 
but 'History' itself was on trial, or perhaps they were witnessing the site of a new 
'Historikerstreit'.
244
 Also, as in Canada, historiographical focus and dispute in London was 
guided by and submerged within a ‘miasma of denial’.
245
 Consequently, over a period of 
32 days the genus of Holocaust denial was played out, yet again, to a world-wide 
audience.
246
 Irving subsequently forced established historians to justify both their 
competence and craft, and, through hostile cross-examination of their expert reports, 
controlled the content and discussion of their testimony within 'a fog of uncertainty'.
247
 
Outside the courtroom, media headlines reported claims made by Irving denying 
established facts of the Holocaust, and gave voice to those arguing that 're-examining the 
claims behind the genocide will be no bad thing', or those decrying its privileged status 
in 'modern public memory'.
248
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Civil law also threatened to award credibility to both Irving and his treatise. Mirroring its 
criminal counterpart, the court not only admitted both denier account and Irving's 'chain 
of documents' but awarded them with equal probative value (however lacking in probative 
weight once cross-examined). Likewise, despite his outright condemnation of Irving’s 
method and narrative of denial, Gray awarded authority to Irving's expertise; identifying 
his knowledge of the military history of the Second World War as ‘unparalleled’ and 
Evans' negative assessment as 'too sweeping'.
249
 Although forced to testify on behalf of 
Irving, Professor Donald Watt similarly accorded him a degree of authenticity when 
publicly claiming:  
 
I have a very strong feeling that there are other senior historical figures, 
including some to whom I owed a great deal of my own career, whose work 
would not stand up, or not all of whose work would stand up, to this kind of 
examination.
250
 
 
Some observers were 'impressed' by Irving's performance.
251
 Thus, while also forced to 
testify on behalf of Irving, the military historian, Sir John Keegan reported: 
 
He is a large, strong, handsome man, excellently dressed, with the appearance 
of a leading QC. He performs well as a QC also, asking, in a firm but 
courteous voice, precise questions which demonstrate his detailed knowledge 
of an enormous body of material.
252
 
 
Moreover, while the 'Judgement' found that a ‘convergence of evidence’ reaffirmed the 
facts of established Holocaust historiography, Gray was ‘sympathetic’ to Irving’s claim 
of a lack of contemporaneous documentation relating to the foundational subjects of gas 
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chambers as killing centres.
253
 He also agreed that documentary evidence implicating 
Hitler in the systematic shooting of Jews was 'sparse'.
254
 Gray likewise found that Irving 
had made ‘valid comments’ about the unreliability of various accounts provided by both 
survivors and camp officials.
255
 Although common limitations of the historian's craft, 
these conclusions threatened to infer doubt amongst a public that ‘had supposed that the 
evidence of mass extermination of Jews in the gas chambers at Auschwitz was 
compelling’.
256
  
 
More generally, despite analysis of the pre-trial documentation indicating that Irving 
could not win, there were no guarantees that this 'just' case would inevitably prevail.
257
 As 
Lipstadt later admitted, the Defence team recognised that ‘because of the vagaries of the 
British libel system, we might lose even though the facts were on our side’.
258
 Likewise, 
there is no guarantee that the 'fog of uncertainty' deliberately devised by deniers will be 
inevitably exposed. Gray, for example, raised the possibility of Irving being 'honestly 
anti-Semitic and honestly extremist' in the closing stages of the trial, which implied that 
he had not understood, or been convinced by, Rampton's linking of antisemitism and 
Holocaust denial.
259
 As Kahn observed, whether rebuttal, unmasking, or both, looking to 
litigation as a means of combating Holocaust denial is inherently problematic.
260
 It not 
only exposes Holocaust historiography to the lies of its politics, but forces historians to 
engage with ‘an opponent who is free to change factual positions as the situation 
warrants’.
261
 It therefore risks an exchange that ‘mainstream Holocaust historians can 
never win’.
262
 As long cautioned by Lipstadt, it also threatens to award a degree of 
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legitimacy to the narrative of denial, with the very act of engagement implying its claims 
are simply another point of view.
263
 The Zündel trials may serve as exemplars of this 
critique but the Irving trial presented similar opportunities and threats. And, regardless of 
their legal and public defeats, it is evident that neither Irving nor Zündel have been 
silenced, while the false claims constituting Holocaust denial continue to be propagated.
264
  
 
Notwithstanding the flaws indicated in these familiar critiques, engagement with the daily 
recorded transcripts specifically reveal that, whether relaxed or procedurally ordinary, it 
is legal process itself that posed the biggest threats to both the established facts and 
narratives of the Holocaust, as well as any intended lessons. Manifest in legal submissions 
from the outset, to consistent wrangling over evidential admissibility, the adversarial 
cross-examination of witnesses, and, in the cases of both Eichmann and Zündel, regular 
recourse to judicial ruling, the Holocaust was not only variously ‘cooked’ but masked and 
submerged in the vagaries of the legal form. Most notably, the Eichmann trial audiences 
were not only inundated with the submission of 1,434 pieces of documentary evidence, 
but had to attend to, and comprehend, an accompanying dialogue of explanation, dispute 
and ruling.
265
 Indicative was the convoluted debate over the admissibility of the 'Sassen 
Document'.
266
 Comprising photocopies of transcripts of 67 tapes of conversations, held 
between Eichmann and Willem Sassen in Buenos Aires over a period of 4 months in 1956 
to 1957, this one item of documentary evidence confronted the audience with not only 
opposing accounts over the accuracy of its content but discussions on evidence of a direct 
statement rather than 'hearsay', the organisation and transfer of the recordings to 
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transcript, the relevance of Eichmann's hand-written and typed corrections, and the 
admissibility of unsigned statements prior to indictment.
267
 Likewise, convoluted debates 
surrounded the admissibility of a range of documentation relating to Dieter Wisliceny's 
statements (Eichmann's deputy), when imprisoned in Bratislava (1946), and testimony to 
the IMT (November 1945), as well as accompanying affidavits by Smith W. Brookhart 
(USA official at the IMT) as authentication.
268
 In amongst confusion over the exact 
document being referred to in the ensuing debates, the court audience had to contend with 
disputes over Wisliceny's credibility as a witness, the 'self interest' motives of those 'in 
the shadow of execution', hostile opinion, perpetrator collusion in drawing up 'a common 
line of defence', and the admissibility of shortened versions of statements, written 
opinions and those expressed retrospectively.
269
 Even when documentary overload was 
intentionally 'relieved' by survivor testimony, the re-telling of personal experience was 
not only harrowing in content but also added to the density of evidential procedure.
270
 
Consequently, Hausner was regularly reminded to ‘brief the witnesses before they come 
to testify’ in order to ‘prune any superfluous detail’.
271
  
 
Similarly, in the Zündel trials, audiences were subjected to consistent wrangling over the 
admissibility of a range of evidence, however minimal in comparison. Indicative was the 
Crown’s request in 1985 to submit a film and narrative on the 'Nazi Concentration 
Camps'. This one item of evidence forced audiences to follow, and comprehend, 
arguments on not only the relevance of its content but the probative value of edited 
material, added and anonymous narration, photographic representation, transcripts 
sanctioned at the IMT, the concepts of impartiality and prejudicial, and the accessibility, 
archiving and criteria of a public document.
272
 Likewise, the Prosecution's submission of 
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a copy of a bulletin by the ‘International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) forced 
audiences to grapple with debates surrounding various sections of the 'Evidence Act', 
relevant precedents relating to the admission of 'hearsay', 'defective' and 'reasonable' 
submission notices, the definitional provisions of a 'record', the credibility of editorial 
comment, 'inculpatory/exculpatory sentences', and repeated arguments over anonymous 
authorship, 'competent and compellable' authentification (Rene de Grace) and records 
made, disseminated and stored in the 'usual and ordinary course of business'.
273
 In both 
1985 and 1988 the volume of primary source material may have been a fraction of the 
items submitted in the Israeli courtroom, but, during cross-examination of a range of 
expert witnesses, audiences were inundated with the contested interpretation of evidence 
referred to by proxy as well as a corpus of secondary literature, drawings, maps and 
photographs of gas chambers, crematoria and various camps, specifically Auschwitz-
Birkenau.
274
  
 
Protracted debate in the London courtroom, over the content, context, language and 
translation of a ‘massive’ range of documentation, was equally ‘stupefying’ to both 
audience and reader.
275
 Indicative were debates that raged back and forth on Hitler’s 
authorisation of ‘Kristallnacht’, the interpretation of ‘Judentransport’, Irving’s deliberate 
mistranslation of ‘haben’ as ‘Juden’, the role of Hitler in the mass shootings of Berlin 
Jews on arrival in Riga in 1941, the date and meaning of the reference to Hitler wanting 
‘the solution of the Jewish problem postponed until after the war is over’, and proof that 
Hitler had been sent, and had read, the reports of the Einsatzgruppen’s mass shootings of 
Jews in 1942.
276
 Irving’s consistent dispute over the translation of camouflage language 
                                                 
273
 Submitted as evidence that this bulletin had not verified DSMRD's lower figures of Jewish victims as 
claimed in DSDRD. Ibid, Vol. IX, pp1934-1947, 1951-1967. For the ruling and further submissions see, 
Ibid, pp1968-1994. 
274
 Ibid, 'Index of Exhibits'. ZT 1988, 'Exhibits Index'. 
275
 Noted by Gray in his 'Judgement', HRIRH, (TB) T2, para. 4.11 and reported by one journalist as a 'barrier 
to historical truth', Cal McCrystal, 'Court 73 Comes to Auschwitz', Evening Standard, 11 February 2000. 
Evans, Telling Lies About Hitler, p197. 
276
 'Kristallnacht': Heydrich’s order 1.20a.m. 10 November 1938, HRIRH, Day 12, pp96-97, 109-113, 
116-120, 129; Day 13, pp24-30, 44-45; Day 22, pp21-22; Day 23, pp228-232; Rudolf Hess’ office message 
2.56a.m. 10 November 1938, Day 12, pp108, 124-128, 140; Day 13, pp46-48, 53, 55; Day 21, pp87-97; 
Day 23, pp227-228, 233; Eberstein’s telex 2.10a.m. 10 November 1938, Day 12, pp114-115, 123-124; Day 
13, p55; Day 21, pp82-85, 97-102; Goebbels’ diary entries, 10 November 1938, Day 12, pp79-85, 103-104; 
Day 13, pp30-35; Day 21, pp102-104; and 1 November 1938, Day 13, pp36-43, 49-51; Nazi Party Tribunal 
Report, 13 February 1939, Day 12, pp86-89, 136-140; Day 13, pp58-70, 21, pp104-114; Day 23, p228. 
'Judentransport': Himmlers’ log, 30 November 1941, Day 1, pp90-94; Day 2, pp288-291; Day 3, pp29-
50, 57, 81-79, 115-127; Day 4, pp122-132; Day 16, pp111, 113-119; Day 21, pp183-185, 188-190; Day 22, 
pp41-42, 53-64; Day 26, pp28-31. 'Haben/Juden': Himmlers’ log 1 December 1941, Day 1, pp164-165; 
Day 2, pp283-287; Day 3, pp53-56; Day 16, pp107-109; Day 21, pp192-193; Day 22, pp64-78, 93-101; 
Day 23, pp234-235; Day 24, pp138-139; Day 26, p101. Riga shootings: The ‘Bruns report’, Day 1, pp36-
131 
also forced audiences in London to grapple with German grammar (including the 
subjunctive) and idiom.
277
 As reported by Neal Ascherson: 
 
We spend hours on the timing of a scribbled Himmler phone-note about how 
a transport of Berlin Jews should be treated in Riga, on a bugged conversation 
between captured SS men in London about whether somebody said he had an 
order from Hitler to kill Latvian Jews, on the meanings of words such as 
Vernichtung (destruction) or Judentum (Jewry).
278
 
 
Furthermore, as in the Zündel trials, the focus on homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-
Birkenau also forced audiences to grapple with not only historical data and event but 
architecture, biology, chemistry, engineering, physics and toxicology.
279
  
 
Comprehension and facticity was further obscured by the adversarial form, or, as 
identified by Locke in 1985, the ‘unarmed combat and contest’ of cross-examination.
280
 
With the exception of Servatius’ passive approach to survivor testimony in Israel, the 
tactics of adversary (chapter two) were visibly evident in all four trials. Consequently, 
admissions and concessions were determined and established but painstakingly extracted. 
Indicative was Hausner’s cross-examination of Eichmann, during which he struggled to 
clarify a range of charges, far less extort admissions of guilt over, for example, 
Eichmann's role in the plundering of Jewish assets, 'Kristallnacht', Jewish affairs in the 
RSHA, the extermination camps and the initiation and supply of gas as a method of mass 
murder.
281
 As the Judges found: 
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We saw him again and again winding his way under the impact of cross-
examination, retreating from complete to partial denial, and only when left no 
alternative, to admission … .
282
  
 
In turn, Eichmann was at varying times confused, elusive and verbose.
283
 He sought to 
avoid certain lines of questioning, on such as the intention of the ‘Madagascar Plan’, his 
knowledge of the use of gas, and his representatives in Hungary, or reverted to a lack or 
no memory of his role in such as the murder of children from Lidice (Czechoslovakia) or 
the so-called 'Kistarcsa transport' (Hungary).
284
 At other times Eichmann's explanations 
were unconvincing or contradictory. Indicative was his consistent claim that Jews from 
the Reich had been excluded from Operations Units’ shootings, despite accepting that the 
Hitler order had applied to all Jews.
285
 He also consistently claimed that his office had had 
no jurisdiction in the 'Generalgouvernement', despite a document from the ‘Political 
Department’ in Auschwitz clearly stating the opposite.
286
 Eichmann was also inconsistent. 
Indicative was his approach to the reliability of documentary evidence; at times defending 
its integrity at other times keen to highlight its fallibility.
287
 Thus, assertions of its veracity, 
since ‘the documents are telling the truth, the documents confirm that which I have just 
said’, were juxtaposed with the berating of their authority, since forged, fragmentary, 
misleading, mistaken, selected for purpose, or the result of ‘bureaucratic sloppiness’.
288
  
 
In the Zündel trials adversary was most visible in Christie’s questioning of both expert 
and survivor witnesses. As already noted, the deference of Servatius in 1961 was starkly 
replaced in 1985 by an advocate with no respect for the 'suffering' of survivors.
289
 
Consequently, witnesses were forced repeatedly to defend their testimony (and 
credibility) against typical denier charges of gassing as ‘hearsay’, the alternative purposes 
of fumigation, death through typhus, the absence of smoke and flames from identified 
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crematoria, the cruelty of Jews in the camps, and exaggerated numbers of Jews 
murdered.
290
 One survivor, of both concentration and extermination camps, Dennis 
Urstein, was crudely coerced to name 20 of the 154 family members ‘killed by the 
Nazis’.
291
 But Christie was arguably most hostile in his cross-examination of Rudolf 
Vrba.
292
 As an eyewitness of ‘great interest’ to the Crown, and therefore to the Defence, 
Christie’s contempt was evident from his opening question of, ‘will you say it’s true that 
you have told stories about Auschwitz’, to his demand towards the end of cross-
examination that Vrba produce ‘evidence of one single body of a person who is gassed, 
who was never registered ... ’.
293
 Vrba was a match for Christie, but the ensuing 
antagonistic struggle was tortuous to follow and brought rebuke from the Judges.
294
 
Christie was equally adversarial in his cross-examination of the prosecutions’ expert 
witnesses.
295
 From his initial rejection of Hilberg as a trained historian, to the equating of 
his ‘exterminationist’ opinion with that of Faurisson’s ‘revisionist’ history, Christie’s 
continued 'assault' was partly blamed by Hilberg when refusing to attend the retrial to be 
faced with:
296
 
 
every attempt to entrap me by pointing to any seeming contradictions, 
however trivial the subject might be, between my earlier testimony and an 
answer I might give in 1988.
297
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In London exchanges between Rampton and Irving were regularly antagonistic, but, 
arguably, the most visible display of adversary emerged between Irving and Evans.
298
 
From the very outset, Evans refused to face Irving during cross-examination.
299
 He also 
consistently demanded that he was given copies of the documents or extracts from his 
report referenced by Irving prior to any response, since he did not trust Irving's account.
300
 
But the process of fact determination was made especially confusing and frustrating by 
Irving’s evasionary tactics. In particular, Irving consistently denied that he had 
deliberately mistranslated a range of foundational documentation, that the Einsatzgruppen 
reports, detailing the numbers of Jews shot, were proof of a ‘systematic policy’ of mass 
shooting, that architectural blueprints proved the building of gas chambers and not air-
raid shelters, that the methodology of the ‘Leuchter Report’ (chapter six) was 
fundamentally flawed, and that the camps of ‘Operation Reinhard’ (Belzec, Sobibor, 
Treblinka) had been purposely built for extermination, regardless of both evidence to the 
contrary and any previous concessions made.
301
 Indicative of Irving's approach was this 
single exchange with Rampton:   
 
Rampton: If in August 1941 at the time that the Einsatzgruppen were just 
starting their work there is an order in place that the Fuhrer [sic] is to be 
supplied with regular reports of their work, it is not at all surprising that by 
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December 1942 that system is still in place and these reports are still coming 
in, is it? 
 
Irving: I disagree. Suppose in August 1941 you ask for a plumber to come 
and fix a sink, and finally in December 1942 a firm of plumbers contacts you 
and says, "here is an estimate for fixing your sink", it does not necessarily 
mean there is any connection between them.
302
 
 
Likewise indicative, after consistently revising his position on Hitler's awareness of a 
report on the murder of 363,000 Jews by the Einsatzgruppen, dated 29 December 1942, 
Irving was ordered by Gray, in contravention of legal protocol, to present his views in 
writing to the court.
 303
 Gray subsequently noted that Irving's written views differed 'very, 
very substantially' from those he had adopted in cross-examination.
304
 Irving was equally 
evasive when faced with conclusive evidence (including video footage) that he had 
addressed right-wing and ‘extremist’ meetings and rallies, that his reference to ‘traditional 
enemies’ related overwhelmingly to Jewish individuals and organisations and that he was 
a Holocaust denier.
305
 Irving also consistently repeated the same arguments and posed the 
same questions regardless of their previous debate and deliberation, thus forcing Gray to 
regularly insist he ‘move on’.
306
 As Gray concluded, Irving had manifested 'a 
determination to adhere to his preferred version of history, even if the evidence does not 
support it’.
307
  
 
Comprehension of the Holocaust was further masked by convoluted and protracted legal 
debate throughout the trials of Eichmann and Zündel.
308
 From initial challenges by both 
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Defence teams to the very legality of their respective trials, a wide range of issues and 
subjects continued to necessitate judicial debate, discretion and ruling. Thus, in Israel, 
after an attempt by Servatius to have the court ruled incompetent to try Eichmann, the 
non-legal audience had to contend with a raft of terminology that included 'statutes', 
'precedents', 'hearsay', 'retroactive application', 'extraterritorial jurisdiction', 'Acts of 
State', 'criminal conspiracy', and 'superior orders'.
309
 As already mentioned, audiences 
were also confronted with judicial debate and rulings on over one hundred evidential 
items and subjects.
310
 In Canada judicial dispute was largely conducted in the absence of 
the juries, and was therefore arguably more disruptive to these 'triers of fact' than 
confusing to their deliberations. But, from the very beginning, a wider non-legal audience 
had to contend with protracted debate over Christie's challenge to the legality of ‘s.177’, 
submissions made on media and jury prejudice, oppositional arguments and precedents 
on the admissibility of a range of evidence, the qualification of historians, and application 
of 'judicial notice', as well as the legalise of 's.177', 'challenge of cause', 'Charter 
argument', 'public interest', 'full answer and defence' and 'facts and opinions'.
311
 Although 
legal debate is obviously integral to a court of law, its regular intrusion into the Eichmann 
and Zündel trials served to both interrupt the evidential process and further confuse both 
audiences and reader.  
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Consequently, despite the best efforts of the jurists involved, the transcripts show that the 
facts and record of the Holocaust were effectively consumed in an evidential struggle that 
may have been rigorous in method but was convoluted, frustrating, impenetrable, and 
often inconclusive in form. Paradoxically, in all four trials, there was also too much 
evidence, whether referenced or submitted, while the mechanics of evidential submission 
and cross-examination consigned the facts of the Holocaust to consistent dispute, 
disparagement, distortion, and, in the cases of Zündel and Irving, denial. The oral 
summing-up by both parties at the end of each trial is intended to clarify as well as 
summarise each case and its evidential accountability.
312
 The danger is that by the time 
the trials reached this point in the proceedings they had lost their intended audiences, both 
figuratively and literally.  
 
Analysis of both primary and secondary sources focusing on the Eichmann, Zündel and 
Irving trials therefore reaffirms, not only their comparative credentials, but the findings 
of the existing 'consensus of critique' outlined in chapter two. The overview of all four 
trials specifically finds a familiar record of legal breaches of 'due process', especially in 
the Eichmann trial, the limitations of ordinary law when faced with historical evidence 
and opinion, especially in the 'procedurally ordinary' Zündel trials, and extra-historical 
and extra-legal influences impacting on all four courtrooms. It also finds that, since 
disciplined and governed by discrete 'facts in issue', historiographical, as well as legal, 
focus was both confined and distorted in accordance with the case-specific form of each 
trial. Adversarial practice likewise ensured that the evidential accountability of the 
Holocaust was not only rigorously cross-examined but repeatedly challenged, and, in the 
later trials, repeatedly derided and denied. Subsequently, facts were established but 
painstakingly extracted. Although meeting the standards of legal proof, the narratives 
authorised were inevitably 'cooked' in accordance with the demands of each case, and, 
however grand in content and reach, could not 'do justice' to the complexities of the 
Holocaust. 
 
Through a close reading of the daily transcripts, the chapter explicitly finds a record of 
practice integral to the law, that not only variously ‘cooked’ the record of the Holocaust, 
but masked and submerged its evidence and facts in the vagaries of the legal form. This 
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form, regardless of its context, objective, or relaxing of its rules, effectively lost, as well 
as threatened, the lessons and record of the Holocaust the trials intended to communicate 
and protect. Regardless of its official defeat, the trials involving the strategy and tactics 
of Holocaust denial were especially confusing and threatening since inferring intentional 
and persistent doubt. Whether through rebuttal, unmasking, or both, the intended ‘fog of 
uncertainty’ propagated by deniers is awarded a public audience when brought to trial, 
while comprehension of the ensuing debates cannot be controlled.
313
 It is therefore 
concluded that, when viewed through the lens of the existing 'consensus of critique', the 
warnings related to the history-law relationship are corroborated by the Eichmann, Zündel 
and Irving trials. But, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not only the Zündel trials 
that have left 'an uncertain legacy'.
314
  
 
Despite this conclusion, the existing 'consensus of critique' remains contested and 
disciplinary collaboration continues unabated (chapter two). Based on the persistent trust 
of both historians and jurists, in what has been shown to be an inherently flawed 
methodology, a re-examination of the history-law relationship is appropriate. Based on 
the expected continuation of disciplinary collaboration in future Holocaust-related trials, 
despite the far-reaching critique of both its methods and outputs, a re-examination of the 
history-law relationship is also opportune. The next chapters (four to seven) seek this re-
examination by focusing attention on the very basic criteria of historical inquiry, the 
transference of the past traces into accountable and ‘truth-full’ knowledge of (empiricist) 
or representations as (narrativist) ‘the past’, in this case of or as the Holocaust (chapter 
one). Consequently, in redressing methodological omissions in the existing ‘consensus of 
critique’ (introduction), chapters four to seven focus on the collaborative reconstruction 
of historiographies both integral to the Holocaust and investigated across the discrete 
discursive (present-centric) contexts of the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials, and 
evaluate both the methods and outputs of the history-law relationship through the 
demands of the prevailing ('empiricist-analytical') and contested ('narrativist-linguistic') 
genres of 'good history' (chapter one).  
 
As indicated above, the content and reach of the Holocaust investigated at the Eichmann, 
Zündel and Irving trials was extensive. However, four subjects were common to each 
courtroom: the evolution of extermination policy (chapter four); the Einsatzgruppen mass 
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shootings 1941-1942 (chapter five); homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau 
(chapter six); and the total number of Jewish victims (chapter seven). Organised 
thematically, and with the processing and findings of historiographical reconstruction 
necessarily extracted from the legal form (introduction), these four subjects comprise the 
primary sites of the intended re-examination of the history-law relationship in practice.
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Chapter Four: The Evolution of Extermination Policy 
 
How and why state persecution of Germany's Jewish citizens after 1933 transgressed into 
the intended genocide of European-wide Jewry has always been and remains a key feature 
of Holocaust historiography. The evolution and leadership of its systematic policy was 
also integral to the criminal trials of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and Ernst Zündel (1985, 
1988) and the libel case instigated by David Irving (2000), but for very different legal 
(and extra-legal) reasons. Comparative reconstruction of this historiography identifies the 
diversity of accounts of extermination policy presented at each trial in accordance with 
the 'facts in issue'. In so doing it records the transfer of attention away from those 
responsible (Eichmann) to the reaffirmation of its facts. It also records the transition of 
focus from the unquestioned, but marginalised, leadership of Adolf Hitler in 1961 to the 
reassertion of his authority and continued complicity by the 1980s. It likewise records the 
evolution of explanation from top-down intention (1961) to a more convoluted system of 
decision-making, however centrally authorised (1985, 1988, 2000).  
 
Comparative reconstruction also identifies an evidential base capable of supporting the 
historiographical and legal demands of each case. However, and despite comprising an 
extensive volume of perpetrator testimony, contemporaneous documentation and 
historian opinion and report, a recognised ambiguity of evidence was reaffirmed in the 
later trials, especially in 2000. In what would have been anathema to the Israeli case, 
courtroom and public audience in 1961, the 'circumstantial' foundations of extermination 
policy were found to be most obvious when relating to the key facts of Hitler's continued 
authority over policies escalating the mass shootings of the Einsatzgruppen in ‘the East’ 
and the use of gas as an alternative method of genocide.
1
  
 
Revisions of interpretation, fact and narrative were established across all four trials as a 
result of case-specific demands, but also as a result of the evolution of historiographical 
research and debate since 1961 and therefore the mirroring of the shift from ‘intention’ 
to ‘function’. However, the revisions were minimal, and, with the exception of the 
elevation of Eichmann's authority and the narrative of intention found in 1961, they were 
not incompatible. Rather, between 1961 and 2000, a generic record of the evolution of 
extermination policy similarly informed the narratives reconstructed across all four trials. 
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It was also a record of policy that remains familiar in present-day Holocaust 
historiography.  
 
Comparative reconstruction makes it clear that the narratives of extermination policy 
subsequently authorised at each trial were 'cooked' in accordance with the focus on 
Eichmann in 1961, a 'Hitler order' in 1985 and 1988 and the continuing authority and 
command of Hitler in 2000. But, it is also made clear that the narratives were both 
empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content. Likewise clear, is that, although the 
consistency of fact and record of extermination policy established across the four trials 
implied the dominance of past evidential constraint, comparative reconstruction reveals 
the primacy of preconceived and prefigured narratives in all four courtrooms that 
determined and governed the relevant past traces.  
 
 
The evolution of a policy of systematic extermination of European Jewry during the 
‘Third Reich’ was not a discrete subject of scrutiny in the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 
1961. But nor was it in doubt. Rather, its realisation was explicit in the indictment of not 
only a defined perpetrator, but a ranked government and party official in the ‘Gestapo’ 
tasked with central instruction over 'Jewish Affairs' (IVB4).
2
 Indeed, the overriding legal 
purpose of the trial was to verify Eichmann's agency and status in the bureaucratic 
infrastructure responsible for authorising and governing the 'Final Solution of the Jewish 
Question', with the grand narrative presented by the Prosecution essentially a 
reconstruction of its policy from 1933.
3
 Furthermore, neither the Prosecution nor the 
Defence doubted that Adolf Hitler had initiated its murderous order, or commanded, 
governed and intended its evolution from persecution to slaughter.
4
  
 
In stark contrast, since critical to denier stratagem (chapter three), extermination policy 
was an explicit feature of historiographical focus and investigation in both the Ernst 
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 Noting 'the implementation of a plan known by its title “The Final Solution of the Jewish Question”' in 
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Zündel trials and the libel case instigated by David Irving.
5
 Despite a long-established 
historiography attesting to the contrary, the Crown in Canada (1985 and 1988) and the 
Defence team in London (2000) had to rebut the charge both published (Zündel) and 
written (Irving) that the 'Final Solution' had not been official policy authorised or co-
ordinated from Berlin.
6
 Rather, as stated in the denier treatise of 'Did Six Million Really 
Die?' (DSMRD) published by Zündel, the "allegation … of official German policy … is 
a brazen lie propagated by Zionists in order to collect money from Germany by way of 
compensation".
7
  
 
Likewise, in both Canada and London, Hitler's authorisation and leadership of any 
murderous outcomes involving Europe's Jews was not only contested but wholly rejected. 
More specifically, in the Zündel trials, the absence of a written 'Hitler Order' (authorising 
mass murder) was synonymous with the absence of deliberate policy.
8
 As summed up by 
Zündel's defence lawyer, Douglas Christie, in 1985: 'Our position is, there was no order, 
there existed no order, there existed no plan, there existed no budget … ', while Irving 
contended in 2000:
 9
 
 
I would say that certainly at a lower level a system emerged and that it was 
systemized somewhere in the hierarchy ... [but] the Defendants will find it 
very difficult to suggest that it was a Third Reich decision. In other words an 
Adolf Hitler decision ... .
10
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Irving further claimed that Hitler had been ignorant of the murderous intention and 
perpetration of others (in particular Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich) until 
October 1943, at which time he:
11
 
 
had no excuse for not knowing ... because he then came into very close 
proximity with a large number of people who had been briefed in the most 
nauseating detail by Himmler himself as to what he was doing.
12
 
 
Subsequently, the historiographical focus on extermination policy differed at each trial. 
In Israel the central role of Eichmann placed disproportionate attention on the 
bureaucracies and chains of command in which he had operated, specific duties he had 
carried out, countries he had been sited, and cases of decision-making he had noticeably 
shaped. Hence, distinctively dominant was not only Eichmann's leadership of 'Jewish 
Affairs', and his base in the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), but the development 
and organisation of emigration, the 'Nisko' and 'Madagascar' territorial 'solutions', the role 
of the Foreign Ministry, internecine struggles over control of the 'Jewish Question' in the 
'Generalgouvernement', the organisation and transportation of Jews to the extermination 
camps, the administration of Theresienstadt, the provision of skeletons for experimental 
research, Eichmann's 'Special Operations Unit' in Hungary, the 'Kistarcsa' transport 
(Hungary) and 'Goods for Blood' mission.
13
 Specific clauses in the indictment likewise 
introduced a range of policy-making unique to the trial that focused attention on specific 
decisions governing the forced displacement of over 500,000 Polish and 14,000 Slovene 
civilians, the deportation and murder of 93 children from Lidice (then in Czechoslovakia) 
and 'agreed' measures of sterilisation.
14
  
 
                                                 
11
 Posing the same argument at Zündel's trial in 1988, ZT 1988, Vol. XXXVI, p10418. 
12
 HRIRH, Day 5, pp180-181. 
13
 'RSHA': AET, Vol. V, pp2123-2183. Emigration: through ‘Central Offices for Jewish Emigration’ in 
Vienna, Prague and Berlin, Vol. IV, pp1587-1593, 1610, 1692-1701; Vol. V, pp2114, 2116-2119.  
Nisko/Madagascar: Ibid, pp2120-2121, 2122-2123. Foreign Ministry: Ibid, pp2113-2204. 
'Generalgouvernement': Ibid, pp2156-2158. Extermination camps: Ibid, pp2120-2206. 
'Theresienstadt': Vol. II, pp790-817; Vol. V, p2125. Skeletons: Vol. III, pp1317-1321; Vol. V, pp2171-
2172. Hungary: Vol. III, pp928-1132; Vol. V, pp2140-2146. 'Kistarcsa': Vol. I, pp73-74, 109; Vol. III, 
pp947-949, 953-959, 962-963, 964-965, 988, 989, 1115, 1120-1121; Vol. V, pp2016-2017, 2141-2142, 
2145. 'Goods for Blood': Vol. III, pp1020-1024, 1033-1040, 1042, 1070-1075; Vol. V, pp2143-2144. 
14
 Counts 4, 9, 10, 12, Ibid, Vol. I, pp5, 6-7. Polish civilians: Vol. II, pp563-567; Vol. V, pp2121, 2190-
2192. Slovene civilians: Vol. II, pp883-900; Vol. V, pp2135-2136, 2192-2193. Lidice: Vol. II, pp900-905; 
Vol. V, pp2193-2194, 2206. Sterilisation: Vol. I, pp321-322; Vol. III, pp1321-1322; Vol. V, pp2169-2171. 
144 
Implicit, if not always explicit, was that decision-making in all areas had originated in 
Berlin.
15
 However, although the leadership of Hitler was formally recognised, it was also 
marginalised in a narrative that foregrounded Eichmann as not only a principal offender, 
but, according to the Prosecution, 'the one who planned, initiated and organized, who 
instructed others to spill this ocean of blood, and to use all the means of murder, theft and 
torture'.
16
 As noted by Defence lawyer, Robert Servatius, the explicit conclusion was that 
Eichmann 'rather than Hitler, Himmler or Goering was the great culprit'.
17
  
 
Conversely, in the Zündel trials, specific statements (1988) and the overall denier treatise 
of DSMRD (1985, 1988) reinstated historiographical focus on Hitler's leadership, but 
disproportionately framed its investigation of policy through disputes over the existence, 
form (written or verbal) and necessity of a specific 'Hitler Order'.
18
 Christie also 
deliberately exploited contemporaneous debates over the 'intentional' or 'functional' 
evolution of extermination policy, and its official language, to emphasise disciplinary and 
evidential fallibility 'on when and how decisions were taken'.
19
 Similarly, in London, 
distinct statements selected from Irving's published work, and overall denier treatise, also 
focused attention disproportionately on Hitler's leadership.
20
 However, in a repeat of 
Irving's failed testimony at Zündel's 1988 trial, emphasising not only the absence of a 
specific 'Fuhrer [sic] Liquidierung' but any further evidence relating to Hitler's 
involvement in extermination policy, rebuttal was more discretely focused on Hitler's 
authority over both its initiation and evolving command.
21
 More specifically, distinct 
statements under scrutiny focused attention on Hitler's awareness and instruction of the 
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mass shootings in 'the East' and the 'gassing programme'.
22
 Likewise discretely, given 
Irving's novel claim that once in power Hitler had 'lost interest in anti-semitism', the 
Defence focused attention on Hitler's background and public statements.
23
 Also, 
somewhat distinctively, the Defence emphasised the huge scale of the extermination 
programme (and required resources at a time of war), with its leading counsel, Richard 
Rampton, concluding that it was:  
 
wholly inconceivable that during the whole three and a half years for which 
the killing lasted, Himmler could, or indeed would, have concealed from 
Hitler the enormous, systematic operation that he was directing.
24
 
 
Discrete data-streams were subsequently foregrounded in support of the varying accounts 
presented and differed in both content and form. In Israel the main source of evidence 
was eyewitness testimony. However, while survivor testimony had provided foundational 
evidence of the murderous consequences of extermination policy, it was perpetrator 
testimony, and foremost Eichmann, that provided proof of its official decision-making 
and governance. More specifically, in addition to Eichmann's direct confirmation of the 
initiation, progression and reach of extermination policy, Dieter Wisliceny (Eichmann's 
deputy) had reaffirmed Heydrich's delegation of policy (to Eichmann) 'within the 
framework of the RSHA', Otto Ohlendorf (Head of Einsatzgruppe D) had testified to both 
the central command and organisation of the Einsatzgruppen, Walter Blume 
(Einsatzgruppe B) had attested to Eichmann's attendance at a meeting of their initial 
instruction as killing units on the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union, Oswald Pohl 
(Economic-Administrative Head Office) had verified the dual purpose of 'Aktion 
Reinhard' (extermination and plunder), Kurt Gerstein (SS Director for Disinfectant) and 
Rudolf Höss (Commandant of Auschwitz) had offered unique insight into the negotiation 
and supply of gas and gassing vans to the extermination camps (as well as implicating 
IVB4 and Eichmann) and Paul Blobel (Einsatzgruppe C) had identified the order (from 
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Himmler), in the autumn of 1942, to 'remove the traces' of Einsatzgruppen slaughter (also 
implicating IVB4).
25
  
 
Documentation was also a key form of evidence in 1961. Hundreds of items were 
subsequently authorised by the Judges as comprising an overall catalogue of official 
instruction, implementation and report that both explicitly and implicitly constituted a 
wide-spread policy of extermination.
26
 Foregrounded as proof of policy initiation, but also 
Eichmann's knowledge and complicity, was Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, on 30 
January 1939, as evidence of his intention to exterminate European Jewry 'as soon as he 
laid hands on them', a letter drafted by Eichmann, signed by Heydrich, and dated 21 
December 1939, designating central responsibility to Eichmann for the evacuations of 
Jews to the 'Generalgouvernement', an order signed by General von Brauchitsch, and 
dated 2 May 1941, as evidence of military compliance in RSHA plans to 'round up and 
execute Soviet Commissars and all the Jews' in the Eastern Occupied Territories, various 
Einsatzgruppen reports, as proof of not only the mass shootings of Jews from the end of 
June 1941 but Eichmann's knowledge that after this date any activity relating to 
deportation would lead to extermination, Hermann Göring's letter of appointment to 
Heydrich, dated 31 July 1941, as evidence of the initiation of all necessary preparations 
for the 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question', and a letter from Eichmann to the Foreign 
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Ministry, dated 28 August 1941, noting the halting of emigration because the 'Final 
Solution of the Jewish Question' is now in its “preparatory stage”.
27
  
 
Foregrounded as evidence of its further command and evolution, but also Eichmann’s 
continued complicity, was the so-called 'Brown File', dated 10 January 1942, as 'decisive 
proof' of not only centralised policy but Eichmann's and Heydrich's demand for more 
severe treatment against the Jews,
,
 extracts from Hans Frank's diary (Governor General 
of the 'Generalgouvernement'), as evidence of central (and therefore Eichmann's) control 
over extermination in the 'Generalgouvernement', the 'Wannsee Protocol' of 20 January 
1942, as verification of wider bureaucratic complicity in mass murder and Eichmann’s 
position as its authorised Referent within the RSHA, letters delivered by Eichmann to 
Odilo Globocnik (Head of 'Aktion Reinhard') in the winter of 1941/1942, as proof of 
continued central (and Eichmann's) control over the 'slaughter in the camps in the East' 
and a report by Globocnik to Himmler, dated 4 November 1943, indicating the completion 
of the 'Reinhardt Operation', including a final report on 18 January 1944 totalling the 
income generated from its intended plunder of Jewish property.
28
  
 
The absence of a documented 'Hitler order', initiating a policy of extermination, was of 
no concern or necessity to either party in 1961. Rather, Hitler's authority and intention 
was not only presumed from the very beginning but referenced in a range of selected 
documentation and testimony and confirmed by Eichmann.
29
 Eichmann also repeatedly 
acknowledged that there had been an order. However, contrary to the Prosecution's claim 
that Eichmann 'had in his possession a written document containing Hitler’s order for the 
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extermination of the Jews,' he continued to insist that it had been in the form of a verbal 
instruction.
30
 
 
In Canada, the Crown in 1985 requested judicial notice of the notorious fact that ‘millions 
of Jews were annihilated from 1933 to 1945 because of the deliberate policies of Nazi 
Germany’, and in 1988 that 'during the Second World War the National Socialist regime 
of Adolf Hitler pursued a policy which had as its goal the extermination of the Jews of 
Europe'.
31
 As shown in chapter three, these similar facts were rejected for notice in 1985 
and amended in 1988 on legal grounds.
32
 Rather paradoxically, given its centrality to the 
case, Judge Thomas deliberately removed the reference to 'policy' from the amended fact 
noticed in 1988, claiming that it was not necessary to the facts of the Holocaust (chapter 
three).
33
 In place of judicial notice the main form of evidence was the historian expertise 
of Raul Hilberg in 1985 and Christopher Browning in 1988.
34
 Documentation was 
referenced in both 1985 and 1988 in support of Hilberg's and Browning's testimonies. 
But, in contrast to the Eichmann trial, only a few items were legally submitted. Rather, as 
reiterated in chapter three, these experts were qualified to act as evidence by proxy.  
 
Foregrounded from Hilberg's extensive testimony in 1985 was his claim that a verbal 
directive, instigated by Hitler, had authorised the 'extermination of the Jews' from early 
1941 in preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union.
35
 More specifically, Hilberg 
opined that there had been two Hitler orders: (1) tasking mobile killing units with the 
murder of Jews in Russia and (2) initiating the wholesale murder of European Jewry in 
killing centres.
36
 But, in opposition to those citing premeditation, he sourced the 
subsequent evolution and implementation of policy in "an incredible meeting of minds, a 
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consensus, a mind reading by a far-flung bureaucracy".
37
 In 1988, although concurring 
that 'phase 1 in the plan … took place in 1941', and that phase 2 had been 'the deportation 
of the Jews from various parts of Europe to the extermination camps in Poland', Browning 
disputed Hilberg's implied autonomy of decision-making, or the minimising of Hitler's 
involvement once the transition to systematic extermination had been authorised.
38
 
Rather, 'initiatives and signals coming from Hitler ... were understood by those under him, 
namely Himmler and his deputy, Heydrich, to be orders'.
39
  
 
A range of evidence was referenced by both historians in support of these and other 
opinions relating to extermination policy.
40
 Those specifically foregrounded by Judges 
Locke and Thomas included the eyewitness testimony of Wilhelm Hoettl (SS officer in 
Department VI, RSHA) in 1985 and Eichmann in 1988, as evidence of a verbal 'Hitler 
order' to these and other ranked officials (for example, Heydrich), Eichmann's memoirs 
and testimony again in 1988, as evidence that this key perpetrator had never denied the 
central organisation of extermination, while survivor testimony in 1985 proved the 
similarity (and therefore policy) of the killing process across the camps.
41
 Foregrounded 
from the contemporaneous documentation referenced, and/or submitted, in both trials 
(although minimal) was the 'Luther memorandum' of 21 August 1942 (1985), as evidence 
of a summary of policy beginning in 1939, various Einsatzgruppen reports (1985, 1988), 
as evidence of 'phase one' of the policy by mass shooting, and a direct challenge to the 
DSMRD claim that proof of policy was limited to the “worthless” Wisliceny statement 
(1988), extracts from Hans Frank's diary, as proof that the killing of millions of Jews had 
been 'Nazi Policy' (1985), with 'the order' coming from 'higher authorities' (1988), the 
'Wannsee Protocol' of 20 January 1942 (1988), as evidence that the plan to exterminate 
the Jews 'had taken form, and was communicated to the ministerial bureaucracy through 
their State Secretaries in Berlin', and Himmler's Posen speeches on 4 October 1943 (1985, 
1988), as official acknowledgement that: "We are exterminating the Jews", and on 6 
                                                 
37
 According to Hilberg's testimony in 1985 and read-out in 1988, ZT 1988, Vol. XXXVI, p10433. 
38
 Ibid, pp10428, 10432-10433. 
39
 Ibid, p10433. 
40
 Including 'hundreds of documents' according to Hilberg, ZT 1985, Vol. XXI, p92. 
41
 Hoettl: Dated 25 November 1945, Ibid, p103. Eichmann: ZT 1988, Vol. XXXVI, pp10429-10430; Vol. 
XIV, pp3232-3233. Survivor Testimony: ZT 1985, Arnold Friedman, Vol. XXI, pp69-80; Ignatz Fulop, 
Ibid, pp84-89; Rudolf Vrba, Ibid, pp109-127; Chester Tomaszewski, Ibid, pp127-135; Henry Leader, Ibid, 
pp135-138. 
150 
October 1943 (1985), as proof that extermination had been deliberate and intended to 
include women and children.
42
  
 
In London the main form of evidence was again historian expertise and through the oral 
and written testimonies of Christopher Browning and Peter Longerich.
43
 However, in 
contrast to the Zündel trials, a huge volume of documentation was submitted in support 
of their opinions and reports. More specifically, foregrounded as proof of centralised 
command and the escalation of extermination policy, was the Wehrmacht guidelines of 
19 May 1941, as evidence of official orders for "ruthless, energetic and drastic measures" 
to be taken against specific categories of Soviet Jews, Heydrich's order to the 
Einsatzgruppen, dated 2 July 1941, as further evidence of central instruction over the 
discriminate shooting of Jews, various Einsatzgruppen reports, as proof that these units 
had followed orders from Berlin, 'Stahlecker's report', dated 15 October 1941, as evidence 
of "basic orders" instructing 'the most complete means possible' in solving the 'Jewish 
Question, correspondence between Dr Erhard Wetzel (Head of Jewish Affairs in the 
Eastern Occupied Territories), Alfred Rosenberg (Reichsminister for the Occupied 
Eastern Territories) and Hinrich Lohse (Reichskomissar for the Ostland) in October 1941, 
as proof of official instruction on gassing apparatus in Riga, and the intention that Jews 
unfit for work be "removed" accordingly, a further exchange of letters between Rosenberg 
and Lohse, dated 15 November and 18 December 1941, as evidence that not even 
economic considerations would deter the intended 'Final Solution', the 'Wannsee 
Protocol', of 20 January 1942, as proof of an important milestone at which a ministerial 
bureaucracy, under the leadership of Heydrich, prepared the implementation of a 
European-wide 'Final Solution', and Himmler's speech to SS leaders on 4 October, 1943, 
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as conclusive evidence of official direction over 'the widespread killing operations in 
which the SS had been engaged'.
44
 
 
Foregrounded as specific proof of Hitler's authority and continued complicity in 
extermination policy, was Heinrich Müller's (Head of the Gestapo) instruction to the 
Einsatzgruppen, dated 1 August 1941, as evidence that Hitler was to be kept informed of 
their "work" in the East, Hans Frank's diary entry of 16 December 1941, as evidence that 
Hitler had directed the policy of liquidation, at that stage "presaging the extermination of 
Jews by gassing", specific diary entries of Joseph Goebbels, as proof of Hitler's relentless 
pursuit of the 'Final Solution', a range of Himmler's correspondence, diaries, memoranda 
and other writings, as evidence of regular meetings with Hitler regarding Jewish matters, 
extracts from a number of 'Table Talks', as further evidence of Hitler's continued 
antisemitism and input into "absolute extermination", the 'Bruns report' of 25 April 1945, 
as proof that Hitler had ordered the shooting of German Jews in Riga, as well as Hitler's 
own words in speeches to the Reichstag.
45
 As Rampton insisted, these documents, if 'fairly 
read by an open-minded, careful historian, plainly implicate Hitler’ in a policy of 
extermination.
46
  
 
However, while Browning and Longerich corroborated Hitler's continued antisemitic 
fervour after 1933, and concurred that extermination policy had been incremental, with 
Hitler influencing rather than micro-managing its continued evolution, they 
acknowledged (and represented) disputes over its precise dating.
47
 Although both 
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'functionalist' in perspective, Browning opined that the transition to systematic slaughter 
evolved in the fall of 1941, while Longerich implied its inclusion of all targeted Jewry 
had been determined as late as the spring/summer of 1942.
48
 But, as Browning insisted, 
the contention amongst historians was over the chronology of the 'killing programme' and 
not over the fact of its official mandate.
49
  
 
It is not surprising that discrete facts on extermination policy were subsequently 
established from the foregrounded data-streams. In Israel, since Eichmann could only be 
indicted from the stage at which he had acted in full knowledge of its order, a timeline of 
extermination policy was determined for legal (as well as historical) purposes.
50
 Three 
principal (although overlapping) stages were identified by the Judges, during which 
policy had progressed with increasing severity from persecution (1933-1939) to mass 
deportation (1939 to mid-1941) and then to mass murder (mid-1941-1945).
51
 More 
specifically, the Judges found that Hitler had intended to exterminate the Jews as early as 
January 1939 (and therefore during the first stage) and that his objective was then known 
to a small group of people.
52
 However, the policy had not yet been finalised at this stage 
and the order for implementation had not yet been given.
53
 Similarly, they agreed that 
during the second stage there had not been a 'uniform aim' behind the mass deportations, 
other than 'to get rid of the Jews by all means'.
54
 But, it was not until the invasion of the 
Soviet Union in June 1941 (triggering the third stage) that a deliberate plan of 
extermination had been devised.
55
 It was found that, close to this date, an order had been 
initiated by Hitler, officially relayed to Heydrich by Göring on 31 July 1941 and then 
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verbally communicated to Eichmann.
56
 Thereafter, all actions against Europe's Jewish 
citizens had intended their physical destruction.
57
  
 
Hitler was placed at the top of decision-making, alongside other 'initiators' who had 
guided Eichmann.
58
 However, the Judges found that Eichmann had not only been a 
'principal offender' but 'amongst those who pulled the strings'.
59
 Moreover, since 'privy to 
the extermination secret' as early as June 1941, and 'personally …  permeated' with its 
intent', Eichmann had been actively involved in all three stages of its perpetration, 
although 'with a varying degree of intensiveness'.
60
 The Judges likewise found that an 
entire state infrastructure had devised, legitimated and propagated policy:
61
  
 
But all this does not detract from the fact that the Accused's Section in the 
RSHA stood at the very centre of the Final Solution; and the guilt of the others 
does not lessen by one iota the personal guilt of the Accused.
62
  
 
In Canada in both 1985 and 1988 the findings of the respective juries on the evolution of 
extermination policy are not known (chapter three), while instruction provided by the 
Judges in their 'charge to the jury' was minimal. In 1985 Locke reminded the jury that the 
Crown's position was that: 
 
Nazi Germany …. [had] deliberately embarked upon a plan to slaughter the 
Jews of Europe. That plan was embarked upon as the Second World War 
proceeded. It became a plan when other avenues approached failed by reason 
of war.
63
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He also reminded the jury that the Crown had 'suggested that the evidence you have heard 
discloses that millions of Jews as well as others … were killed by the German S.S. on 
orders from their Nazi superiors'.
64
 This evidence had included hundreds of documents, 
including daily reports (Einsatzgruppen) detailing to 'senior German officers and office 
holders' the numbers killed.
65
 Locke also reminded the jury that Hilberg had testified to 
the camouflage of policy through language in documentation 'accepted by all who read 
them as conveying the meaning that, on their face, it would not necessarily convey'.
66
 In 
particular, “relocate” meant “to kill”, “resettle” meant “to be taken to a death camp to die 
there”, 'evacuation' meant 'to be shot … or sent to be gassed'.
67
 Locke noted that Hilberg 
had been 'cross-examined extensively' on the subject of a 'Hitler order', and had testified 
that 'an order came down from Hitler to exterminate the Jews. It was a verbal order' and 
corroborated by Hoettl.
68
 However, Hilberg had conceded that some historians questioned 
its authenticity, while controversy remained amongst others over its verbal or written 
form.
69
 Locke then instructed the jury: 
 
if you conclude that an order came down and that there was an organised Nazi 
plan to exterminate the Jews of Europe, you will have to decide for yourselves 
whether or not it is likely that such an order is put in writing.
70
  
 
He further reminded the jury that Hilberg had testified that it had been an order from 
Himmler in 1944 that 'the death camps should be dismantled', since the '“Jewish Problem” 
had been resolved'.
71
 Locke acknowledged that this order had not been produced in court, 
but, according to Hilberg, its existence had been verified by 'persons that he named who 
testified later after the war'.
72
  
 
In 1988 Thomas reminded the jury of a range of evidence both referenced and submitted 
by Browning (see above). He specifically noted that Browning, but also Hilberg in 1985, 
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had corroborated the evolution of two key phases of 'the plan' from 1941.
73
 Thomas 
likewise reminded the jury that Eichmann had testified in 1961 that 'Heydrich told him 
that there was an order of the Fuehrer that all the Jews were to be physically 
exterminated'.
74
 He further reminded the jury that 'Eichmann never denied the plan to 
exterminate. He heard it from Heydrich who attributed it to a direct order from Hitler'.
75
 
Thomas also noted that, according to Hilberg, extermination had not been premeditated, 
but that ‘thinking on this subject converged in 1941'.
76
 However, as Browning had 
insisted, Hitler had ‘incited the initiatives'.
77
 Thomas further acknowledged that the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) had judged the origin of extermination policy to be 
1941, but stated that whether the court had been correct in this conclusion was 'not of 
particular significance'.
78
 Unfortunately it is not known if any of the Judges' instructions 
were heeded by the respective juries, far less the content of any facts or narratives finally 
established or authorised on the evolution of extermination policy by these 'triers of fact'. 
 
In London Judge Gray found that 'Hitler's anti-semitism continued unabated after 1933', 
but, 'until the latter part of 1941, the solution to the Jewish question which Hitler preferred 
was their mass deportation'.
79
 He also found that policy had extended to 'successive 
programmes of shooting … and gassing Jews in large numbers', and that Hitler had been 
complicit in these more 'radical solutions'.
80
 More specifically, Gray accepted that a 
programme of mass shooting had been carried out 'from about November 1941 … which 
Hitler knew about and authorised … initially in Russia and later spreading to towns in the 
Warthegau … the General Government … and Serbia'.
81
 Gray further accepted that 'the 
deportation of the European Jews continued apace in the months and years after the 
Wannsee Conference' at the beginning of January 1942.
82
 However, the question was 
whether these deportations were a prelude to extermination and specifically gassing.
83
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Gray accepted that 'there is no reference to be found to a Hitler Befehl (Hitler order) 
authorising the extermination of Jews by gassing at the Reinhard Camps' and at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau.
84
 However, he also found that evidence submitted by Irving had not 
controverted 'the contention by the Defendants that by March 1942 the “radical solution” 
favoured by Hitler was extermination and not deportation'.
85
 Gray ultimately found that, 
'even if not wholly irrefutable', Hitler was not only aware of the gassing programme but 
he had been 'consulted and approved the extermination'.
86
 The evidence supporting this 
conclusion included the 'Wannsee Protocol', but the 'main reason' for his finding was 
incredulity that: 
 
Himmler would not have obtained the authority of Hitler for the gassing 
programme (and even more unlikely that he would have concealed it from his 
Fuhrer) [sic].
87
  
 
It is obvious that although discrete data-streams were submitted across the four trials they 
were authorised as equally probative in accordance with the demands of each legal case 
and context. However, it is also obvious that, even when shared, the evidential base was 
discretely utilised in accordance with the 'facts in issue'. Indicative was the use of Frank's 
diary in 1961 as proof of internecine struggles over control of the 'Jewish Question' in the 
'Generalgouvernement', in 1985 and 1988 as evidence of the deliberate murder of millions 
of Jews and in 2000 as evidence of both an emerging policy of extermination and Hitler's 
complicity and direction.
88
 Instructions from Hitler to General Jodl (Chief of the Army 
Leadership Staff), dated 3 March 1941, were authorised by the Judges in the Eichmann 
trial as evidence of the murderous objectives of the Einsatzgruppen, and in the Irving trial 
as evidence of Hitler's intimate involvement in an intended ideological war against 
"Jewish-Bolshevism".
89
 In 1961, the 'Luther memorandum' of 21 August 1942 was 
authorised as specific evidence of the 'Madagascar Plan', and Hitler's order of 
extermination after the invasion of the Soviet Union, while in 1985 it was foregrounded 
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by Locke as evidence of an evolution of policy since 1939.
90
 Even though Himmler's 
speech on 4 October 1943 was similarly authorised across all four courtrooms as evidence 
of an official policy of genocide, in the Eichmann trial it was also foregrounded as proof 
that officers could request to be moved from the murder process without punishment, and 
in the 1988 Zündel trial as a specific challenge to the claim in DSMRD that merely "veiled 
allusions" to genocide could be found in the existing documents.
91
 
 
It is likewise obvious that some of the 1961 findings were later revised in 1985, 1988 and 
2000. Most notably, in 1961 Eichmann was the principal offender but marginalised in the 
accounts/representations of policy reconstructed in the later trials. It is also obvious that 
the intentionalist findings, that had underpinned the three-staged evolution of policy 
found at the Eichmann trial, had been informed by the functionalist leanings of Hilberg, 
Browning and Longerich in 1985, 1988 and 2000. Subsequently, the acceptance of intent, 
as early as 1939, at the Eichmann trial had been challenged by the 1980s, while 
authorisation of a direct order of extermination by Hitler in 1961 had, by 1988 and 2000, 
translated into 'signals' or 'incitements' from Hitler.
92
 Likewise, an unquestionable 
acceptance of top-down leadership in 1961 had developed into a greater complexity and 
uncertainty of decision-making and evolution in 1985, 1988 and 2000.  
 
Similarly, revisions of evidential interpretation and status meant that the foregrounding 
of Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, on 30 January 1939, as evidence of intent prior to any 
killing in the Eichmann trial, was, by 2000, deemed probative of Hitler's antisemitic 
fervour but not as 'a programme, a blueprint to kill European Jews during the next years’.
93
 
Göring's appointment letter to Heydrich, dated 31 July 1941, was identified in 1961 as 
'one of the basic documents in the history of the extermination' and yet by 2000 it was 
merely referenced during Browning's testimony as authorisation to carry out a 'feasibility 
study' for a 'Final Solution'.
94
 The 'Wannsee Protocol' was identified in 1961 as the 'central 
                                                 
90
 Referring to a plan first initiated in 1940, aiming to deport Jews to the island of Madagascar once it had 
been relinquished to Germany as part of a future peace treaty with France, AET, Vol. V, pp2122, 2124-
2125. ZT 1985, Vol. XXI, p108. 
91
 AET, Vol. V, p2199. ZT 1989, 'Referent's Factum', p24. 
92
 According to Browning, ZT 1988, Vol. XXXVI, p10433 and HRIRH, Day 17, p123. 
93
 HRIRH, (TB) T2, 'Judgement', para. 6.7. According to Longerich it was clearly intended to 'threaten 
German Jews to leave the country as soon as possible', while provoking the Western powers into supporting 
Jewish immigration. It could also suggest that Hitler was 'actually trying to envisage what would happen in 
a case of a war', Ibid, Day 25, pp87-88. 
94
 AET, Vol. V, p2124. HRIRH, Day 17, pp145-146. 
158 
event in the history of the Final Solution', while, by 2000, although still vital evidence of 
bureaucratic complicity, it was interpreted by Browning as an 'implementation 
conference' at which no decisions were made and no indication that Hitler had been aware 
of its agenda.
95
  
 
However, with the exception of Eichmann's elevated status, and the deterministic stages 
of both intent and perpetration found in 1961, the accounts presented and facts both 
foregrounded and established were not contradictory across the four trials. Rather, a 
surprising consistency of record informing the relevant narratives of extermination policy 
emerged across all four courtrooms. This record agreed that policy had been 
ideologically-driven, and, although opinion differed over its intent or incremental 
evolution, noted its key stages of progression from cultural and economic exclusion to 
forced emigration, 'Kristallnacht' and its aftermath, forced deportations to 'the East', 
ghettoisation, mass shootings, mobile gassing vans and finally fixed gassing chambers 
and crematoria in the 'Operation Reinhard' camps and at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
96
 Although 
opinion differed over its precise dating, and the inclusion of all European Jewry, the 
initiation of a policy of extermination was similarly aligned to the invasion of the Soviet 
Union in June 1941 and the mass shooting of Soviet Jews.
97
 Key bureaucracies (RSHA) 
and personnel (Himmler, Heydrich) were equally foregrounded in amongst an all-
encompassing complicity of political, professional and state infrastructures that had been 
officially recorded at the 'Wannsee Conference' in January 1942.
98
 The terminology of the 
'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' was similarly agreed to have evolved from 
territorial intentions (such as Madagascar), until utilised as camouflage language for mass 
murder.
99
 It was likewise agreed that a catalogue of atrocity, expropriation and slave 
labour was integral to the 'Final Solution', and that no country influenced or occupied by 
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Germany had been immune.
 100
 It was further agreed that Germany had acted as the policy 
'prototype' but that local circumstances had impacted on the intended diffusion of anti-
Jewish measures across the Holocaust's European reach.
101
 It was similarly concluded that 
its murderous perpetration had ended with the mass gassing of Jews from Hungary and 
its murderous consequences had been the extermination of millions of Europe's citizens 
simply because they were identified as Jews.
102
 Despite continued research on the subject 
since 1961 this generic record of extermination policy not only reflected the content of 
prevailing scholarship but remains familiar in present-day Holocaust historiography.
103
 
 
It is therefore suggested that the most startling revision since 1961 did not relate to the 
content or interpretation of the evidential base underpinning the record of extermination 
policy, but to the legal exposé of its fallibility. In contrast to the evidential determinacy 
of policy in 1961, the later trials were forced to focus on the fragmentary nature of the 
source material. The Eichmann trial not only implied innumerable proof and record of 
policy, but the judgement portrayed certainty in the data-stream subsequently authorised. 
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In only a few instances, most specifically when aiming to prove RSHA (and thus 
Eichmann's) control over the 'Generalgouvernement', did the Judges acknowledge any 
gaps in the relevant evidence and thus the need for judicial discretion.
104
 Conversely, in 
response to deliberate denier stratagem aimed at raising doubt over the facticity of 
decision-making from Berlin, the later trials both focused on and reaffirmed the 
interpretive necessity of its evidential accuracy and accountability. As Browning 
acknowledged in 1988, he had based his conclusions on 'circumstantial evidence', and 
therefore differences of opinion were held amongst historians 'on when and how decisions 
were taken'.
105
 More specifically, when reconstructing policy of the gassing programme, 
Browning acknowledged: 
 
there is no document in existence ordering the commencement of gassing ... 
no document ordering the stopping of gassing, no document setting out the 
organizational plan or blueprint to carry out gassings, and there is no overall 
budget report on the "Final Solution" … .
106
 
 
Similarly, in 2000, Browning noted that historians were working with ‘inference’, while 
Longerich agreed that, despite access to additional archives of primary sources since 
1961, there were still areas of decision-making where 'hard evidence' was lacking.
107
 
Thus, when reconstructing Hitler's continued input into policy: 
 
it is not so easy, you do not have the daily or the weekly records of the 
conversations between Himmler and Hitler about the Holocaust. We have to 
use these bits and pieces and put it together and to come to our conclusions.
108
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Rampton likewise acknowledged that he was compiling a 'jigsaw puzzle' of evidence of 
policy, rather than presenting the single document Irving continued to demand.
109
 
Although Gray accepted the probative weight of its totality, he also acknowledged that 
the 'documentary pointers' of Hitler's complicity in key areas of extermination policy were 
'sparse'.
110
 More specifically, there was 'no explicit evidence' that Hitler had discussed the 
gassing programme with Himmler, it was not 'wholly irrefutable' that he had been 
consulted and approved of its use at the 'Reinhard Camps', and the 'documentary picture' 
implicating Hitler in the systematic mass shooting of Jews 'is a partial one'.
111
 Both the 
initial challenge and these formal conclusions would have been anathema to the Israeli 
case, courtroom and public audience in 1961. 
 
When comparing the collaborative investigation of extermination policy across the 
Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials it is clear that its reconstruction was case-specific. It 
is also clear that an available data-stream existed that both accommodated and supported 
the diversity of accounts, interpretations and facts established, regardless of the demands 
of each legal case and context. Although extensive in volume, it is arguably surprising 
that there was very little overlap of evidence across the four trials. Consequently, only 
three items were mutually foregrounded in all four courtrooms: the Einsatzgruppen 
reports, Hans Frank's diary and Heinrich Himmler's 4 October 1943 speech to SS officers 
in Posen. But, perhaps less surprising, is that, even when shared, varying explanations 
were found and supported. Revisions of interpretation, fact and narrative were also 
established across all four trials. Most obviously, the elevation of Eichmann's leadership 
at all stages of extermination policy identified in 1961 had been revised and redressed by 
the 1980s. Specific primary source material authorised as 'the basic documents in the 
history of the extermination' in 1961 were either ignored or marginalised in the later 
trials.
112
 In contrast to the clear and linear progression of policy found in 1961, a 
recognised ambiguity of both evidence and explanation surrounding its initiation, 
evolution and geographic extension was reaffirmed in 1985, 1988 and 2000. More 
specifically, in contrast to its acclaimed didactic and historical success, it was during the 
judgement at the Irving trial that the 'circumstantial' foundations of extermination policy, 
however extensive in volume, were most formally determined and verified.  
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Yet, with the exception of the elevation of Eichmann, and the determinacy and intent of 
decision-making found in 1961, it is clear that the facts and narratives authorised on 
extermination policy were not fundamentally incompatible. Furthermore, regardless of 
almost forty years of additional research and debate between 1961 and 2000, a generic 
record of the evolution of extermination policy similarly informed the narratives 
authorised across all four trials. Notably, this record mirrored the content of the 
established historiography prevailing at the time of each trial, and, with the exception of 
Eichmann's elevated authority found in 1961, remains familiar in present-day Holocaust 
scholarship. Similarly, areas of contention highlighted in the later trials, in the main the 
dating of the authorised transgression to systematic extermination, remain in dispute in 
2017.  
 
It is obvious that the narratives authorised were 'cooked' in accordance with the 'facts in 
issue'. And, despite their historiographical reach, it is likewise obvious that they did not 
‘do justice’ to the complexities of extermination policy indicated in the prevailing 
scholarship. In 1961 the legal (and political) focus on Eichmann's criminality and 'pivotal 
role' at all stages of the 'Final Solution' not only marginalised the leadership and overall 
command of Hitler but distracted attention away from the complexity of decision-making 
and perpetration beyond the chains of command relevant to Eichmann, Section IVB4 and 
the RSHA. It is likewise obvious that Hausner not only presented a case of policy through 
the then dominant intentionalist lens but that the Judges reaffirmed its competence as both 
historical explanation and fact. In the later trials, the narratives of extermination policy 
were disproportionately focused on central, and especially Hitler's, authority and 
leadership. Consequently, they reinforced narratives of top-down decision-making, 
however functionalist the interpretations. Other central characters (Himmler, Heydrich, 
Goebbels) were identified, but, in cases in which Hitler's complicity, command and even 
continued antisemitism, was under scrutiny, their role in decision-making was 
subordinated. Moreover, in response to Holocaust denier charges, disproportionate focus 
was placed on specific areas of policy-making, in particular the mass shootings of the 
Einsatzgruppen in ‘the East’ and the 'gassing programme' at the 'Operation Reinhard' and 
Auschwitz-Birkenau camps. Although central to extermination policy, this focus ignored 
or marginalised the breadth, complexity and sites of decision-making preceding and 
surrounding their command and perpetration. In the Irving trial, it likewise negated the 
evidence of a convoluted interplay of centre-periphery relations, especially focusing on 
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the escalation of the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings in the eastern occupied territories 
(chapter five), found in regional studies of those territories throughout the 1990s.
113
 
 
However, despite being 'cooked', it is likewise obvious that the authorised narratives were 
both empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content’. Yet, while the consistency of fact 
and record implied the dominance of past evidential constraint, regardless of the discrete 
demands of the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials, it is most obvious that the 
reconstruction of extermination policy in each courtroom was primarily determined 
through preconceived and prefigured narratives that 'floated free' of and governed the 
relevant past traces.  
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Chapter Five: The Einsatzgruppen Mass Shootings 1941 – 1942 
 
The Einsatzgruppen mass shootings, of predominantly Soviet Jewish civilians in the 
relevant occupied territories from June 1941 to December 1942, has always been and 
remains a central feature of Holocaust historiography. It was likewise integral to the 
criminal cases of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the libel 
case instigated by David Irving (2000), but for different legal (and extra-legal) reasons. 
All four trials identified the Einsatzgruppen as officially organised killing units, but 
variously debated and disputed their leadership, systematic policy, discriminate targeting 
of Jews, responsibility for the transition to the use of gas and the numbers of those killed. 
Comparative reconstruction of this historiography, therefore, records a diversity of 
accounts presented across the four trials in accordance with the 'facts in issue'. Given the 
focus on Eichmann in 1961, and denier challenges to both its systematic policy and Adolf 
Hitler’s authority in the later trials, it also records the evolution of historiographical focus 
from unquestioned decision-making and leadership from Berlin, including Eichmann, in 
1961, to the foregrounding of Hitler in Einsatzgruppen command by 2000. Since 
governed by the ‘facts in issue’, it likewise records a consistent focus on top-down 
initiative and command that does not ‘do justice’ to the complexities of the governance 
and perpetration of the Einsatzgruppen after June 1941.
1
 
 
Comparative reconstruction identifies and establishes an evidential base capable of 
supporting the historiographical and legal demands of each case. However, in comparison 
to the contemporaneous data-stream relevant to the evolution of extermination policy 
overall (chapter four), it was found to be fragmentary in both content and volume. From 
an acknowledged 'mixed bag … rather than a fairly rich and steady run', only one form 
of primary source material was mutually foregrounded across all four trials: the 
Einsatzgruppen reports.
2
 In turn, by 2000, this evidential source had not only supported a 
range of interpretations but had extended both its historical and legal reach and value.  
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It is not surprising that revisions of fact and interpretation relating to the Einsatzgruppen 
mass shootings were found between 1961 and 2000. And yet, with the exception of the 
elevation of Eichmann's authority found in 1961, these revisions were minimal. A generic 
record similarly framed and informed the narratives authorised at each trial. This record, 
again with the exception of Eichmann’s elevated authority found in 1961, but also the 
absence of knowledge relating to the 'regional turn' (neo-functionalist) after the 1990s, 
was not only consistent across the four trials but remains familiar in present-day 
Holocaust scholarship.  
 
Comparative reconstruction clearly shows that the narratives authorised at each trial were 
'cooked' in accordance with the focus on Eichmann in 1961, Einsatzgruppen objectives 
and intended victims in 1985 and 1988 and Hitler's continued awareness of and 
complicity in the mass shootings in 2000. It likewise shows that the narratives were 
empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content. Once again, although the consistency 
of both fact and record across the discrete discourses of the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving 
trials implied a form of past evidential constraint, it was obvious that preconceived and 
prefigured narratives had operated as the governing authority of the relevant but 
fragmentary traces. 
 
 
The identity of the Einsatzgruppen as four mobile SS units (A-D) that had followed the 
advancing German army into the territories of the Soviet Union from June 1941 was an 
accepted fact in the Adolf Eichmann, Ernst Zündel and David Irving trials.
3
 It was also 
mutually agreed that these units had engaged in the mass shootings of targeted Soviet 
civilians from this date until 1942.
4
 However, in accordance with the ‘facts-in-issue’ 
governing each trial, different accounts were presented in relation to their official orders, 
leadership, systematic escalation, the transition to the use of gas and the identity and 
numbers of those killed. At the Eichmann trial the intentional and systematic mass 
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shootings of predominantly Soviet Jews by the Einsatzgruppen after June 1941 was not a 
subject of dispute.
5
 Indeed, systematic policy was explicit in the charges relating to 
Eichmann's influence over the Einsatzgruppen. Furthermore, neither party questioned the 
central authorisation and instruction of the mass shootings, directed by Adolf Hitler, nor 
their murderous conclusion, totalling the death of hundreds of thousands of Jewish men, 
women and children.
6
 More specifically, neither party disputed that Eichmann had 
organised transports of Jews to 'the East' from the autumn of 1941, or that the method of 
killing by the Einsatzgruppen had transferred from shooting to the use of gas vans by the 
end of 1941.
7
 Rather, the focus of attention and dispute was on Eichmann's leading 
authority in what one prosecution witness described as the 'slaughter-house on wheels'.
8
 
According to the leading counsel, Gideon Hausner, Eichmann, as the executive arm of 
the SS, had been at the centre of Einsatzgruppen instruction and reporting.
9
 Since fully 
aware of the subsequent mass shootings taking place in 'the East', he had intentionally 
transported Jews from the Reich to selected killing sites.
10
 Crucially, when visiting such 
sites at Lvov and Minsk, Eichmann had initiated the transition to gas after suggesting that 
“some more elegant way must be found”.
11
 And, following an order from Heinrich 
Himmler in the autumn of 1942, Eichmann had instructed the setting-up of a special unit, 
'Kommando 1005', to remove the traces of Einsatzgruppen crimes.
12
 All of these specific 
charges were disputed by Eichmann.
13
 Hausner also intended to extend the focus on 
Eichmann to a wider narrative of the subsequent 'blood-bath'.
14
 As Hausner exclaimed in 
his opening address: 
 
How could it ever have happened?" It is almost impossible to believe that for 
many months, thousands of people daily, in cold blood, deliberately and of 
set purpose murdered multitudes of human beings with their own hands, the 
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numbers rising steadily until they totalled three-quarters of a million. It is 
difficult to accustom oneself to the idea that such beasts ever walked the face 
of this earth.
15
 
 
Dictated by the overall thesis (1985) and specific statements (1988) in 'Did Six Million 
Really Die?' (DSMRD), the Ernst Zündel trials recorded typical denier challenges to the 
established historiography and consequently focused attention on both the official 
objectives and murderous conclusions of the Einsatzgruppen. In accordance with this 
denier tract, Zündel's defence lawyer, Douglas Christie, argued that its 'operations units' 
had been set up to specifically target partisans and Communist commissars in Russia, that 
any shooting of Jews had not been systematic, and that the numbers killed had been 
exaggerated.
16
 In a repeat of denier tactic, that had equated the absence of a written 'Hitler 
order' with the absence of extermination policy (chapter four), the unavailability of a 
documented instruction directly tasking the Einsatzgruppen with "a general massacre of 
Russian Jews" was deemed synonymous with the absence of policy governing their 
actions.
17
 The transition to and use of gas as a method of killing was also a central theme 
of both Zündel trials, but more specifically related to denier focus on the extermination 
camps, especially Auschwitz-Birkenau, and fixed gas chambers (chapter six), rather than 
its use in mobile vans by the Einsatzgruppen.
18
  
 
In 2000 David Irving largely repeated the same charges in defence of claims he'd made 
in books, specific interviews and speeches.
19
 As reiterated by Judge Grey, Irving had 
insisted that 'the shooting of the Jews in the East was random, unauthorised and carried 
out by individual groups or commanders', that in the initial stages they had been 'confined 
to the intelligentsia and served a military purpose', that the 'initiative for the orders came 
                                                 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 In 1985 see the cross-examination of Robert Faurisson, ZT 1985, Vol. XII, pp2712-2716; Vol. XIII, 
pp2824-2825; and Zündel, Vol. XIX, p4331. Confirmed by Locke, Vol. XXI, pp182, 202, 205. In 1988 see 
Irving's examination by Christie, ZT 1988, Vol. XXXIII, pp9485-9486, 9492. For the relevant extracts from 
DSMRD (30-41) see Her Majesty the Queen and Ernst Zündel (424/88), Appeal (1989), 'Respondent's 
Factum', pp29-35, Ontario Court of Appeal. All proceeding references to the 1989 Appeal will be prefixed 
by ZT 1989. 
17
 ZT 1989, 'Respondent's Factum', extracts 32-33, pp30-31. 
18
 ZT 1985, Vol. XXI, pp24-25, 48, 54-55, 96, 101, 103, 104-108, 114-118, 122-124, 125-126, 131-136, 
144, 145-146, 151, 152, 170-174, 174-175, 182, 187-188, 207-208, 211, 212. ZT 1988, Vol. XXXVI, 
pp10397, 10399-10405, 10408-10412, 10413, 10420, 10422, 10427, 10430. 
19
 In Hitler's War (1977 and 1991) and Goebbels: Mastermind Of The Third Reich (1996). In Australia in 
1986, HRIRH, Day 4, pp112-115. To the Institute of Historical Review in October 1992, Ibid, Day 3, 
pp100-102, Day 4, pp112-115. 
168 
from the Nazi High Command [Military] rather than from Hitler', and that the reported 
numbers of Jews subsequently murdered were "fantasy figures".
20
 Since Irving 
specifically absolved Hitler from their order, additional attention was also placed on not 
only Hitler's authorisation but his continued complicity in Einsatzgruppen command. The 
transition to and use of gas vans by the Einsatzgruppen was acknowledged and placed 
within the 'genesis of [a] gassing programme'.
21
 However, as in the Zündel trials, a greater 
focus was placed on Auschwitz-Birkenau and its gas chambers rather than the use of gas 
vans by the Einsatzgruppen.
22
  
 
Given the discrete focus on Eichmann in 1961, it is to be expected that the evidential base 
relevant to the Einsatzgruppen shootings differentiated from those presented and 
submitted at the later trials, and did so in both content and form. In Israel the primary 
form of evidence of the subsequent 'blood bath' was survivor testimony.
23
 Consequently, 
witness after witness attested to the 'atrocities' of the 'evil design', in which Jewish 
civilians had been variously beaten, humiliated, forcibly undressed, led to pits, shot, and, 
after Himmler's order in the autumn of 1942 to remove 'all traces of slaughter', dug-up 
from mass graves and burnt.
24
 As recalled by Avraham Aviel: 'Children, women, family 
after family. Each family went up together'.
25
 Similarly, Rivka Yoselewska testified to the 
murder of her mother, father, grandmother, aunt and sisters until: 
 
my turn came … I felt them tearing my daughter away from me, I heard her 
last cry and heard how she was shot … Then he turned me around and shot. I 
fell into the pit and felt nothing.
26
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Yoselewska had survived the shooting and related 'how with the last ounce of strength 
she rose up from the grave, from amongst the corpses heaped above her'.
27
 In what was 
described by the Judges as 'amongst the most horrifying parts of all the evidence 
submitted by the Prosecution', Dr Leon Wells testified to the uncovering of the graves of 
Jews murdered and the subsequent removal, piling, and burning of the bodies, and then 
grinding of the bones and pillaging of any valuables found in the ashes.
28
 Wells had also 
testified that the relevant Unit (1005) had participated in further mass shootings before 
casting its victims, some still alive, into 'the flames'.
29
 Forced to work with this Unit, Wells 
estimated the number of bodies burnt to have been 'several hundred thousand'.
30
  
 
This testimony was not challenged by the Defence and was awarded inherent probative 
value and weight by the Judges.
31
 However, since none of the witnesses had met 
Eichmann during their ordeals, they could not testify to his specific agency in the 
slaughter. Rather, the primary form of evidence of both Eichmann's knowledge of and 
active role in the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings was perpetrator testimony and foremost 
Eichmann himself. Indeed, Eichmann corroborated survivor testimony when recalling 
that, on a visit to Minsk around September 1941, he had witnessed: 
 
Young marksmen … shooting into the pit … I can still see a woman, her arms 
behind her, and then my knees gave way, and I left the place … .
32
 
 
On his journey back to Berlin he had also witnessed 'blood spurting as if from a fountain 
out of another pit which had already been covered over'.
33
 This admission of eyewitness 
record, but also his acknowledged receipt of the daily reports of these Units from June 
1941, was accepted as not only further evidence of the horror of the mass shootings but 
confirmation that Eichmann had always known the fate of the Jews he had 'sent to the 
Operations Units commanded by Nebe and Rasch'.
34
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Additional perpetrator testimony was also foregrounded as evidence of Eichmann's direct 
role in Einsatzgruppen command. In particular, Otto Ohlendorf (Commander of 
Einsatzgruppe D) had reaffirmed (at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) the control, 
leadership and dominance of personnel from the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA).
35
 
With Eichmann's section (IVB4) based in the RSHA the crucial question then posed by 
the Judges was 'whether the line of command from [Reinhard] Heydrich and the 
commanders of the Operations Units passed through the Accused'.
36
 Perpetrator 
testimony, taken overseas, was then utilised to verify Eichmann's prominence in this 'line 
of command'.
37
 In particular, the testimony of Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski (Higher SS 
and Police Leader) was foregrounded as evidence that, if Eichmann had been receiving 
reports of the Operations Units' shootings, it would indicate the importance of his Section 
(IVB4).
38
 But it was the testimonies of Walter Blume (Einsatzgruppe B) and Gustav 
Noske (Einsatzgruppe B and RSHA) that the Judges foregrounded as probative weight of 
Eichmann's agency in the Operations Units and 'from the commencement of their 
activities'.
39
 More specifically, Blume had testified to Eichmann's participation in a 
meeting of Einsatzgruppen leaders, at which Heydrich had authorised their murderous 
intent, on the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union, while Noske had claimed that from 
the spring of 1942 reports of the Einsatzgruppen killings had been sent directly to 
Eichmann, who then summarised their content for redistribution to his "superiors".
40
  
 
Perpetrator testimony was likewise accepted as evidence of the use of gas by the 
Einsatzgruppen (Paul Blobel, Otto Ohlendorf). But it was Eichmann's own statement that 
was foregrounded as proof of his principal role in the transition from mass shootings to a 
“cleaner” and “more efficient” method of murder.
41
 Eichmann had admitted in his pre-
trial statement that he had questioned the impact of the shootings on "those men of ours" 
on his visit to Minsk, but consistently denied in court that he had initiated, far less 
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instructed, the introduction of gas into 'the East'.
42
 Perpetrator testimony was yet again 
foregrounded as evidence of Eichmann's involvement in covering up the traces of 
Einsatzgruppen crimes.
43
 In particular, the testimony of Rudolf Höss (Commandant of 
Auschwitz-Birkenau) was authorised as proof of links between Paul Blobel, ordered by 
Himmler in the autumn of 1942 to remove all traces of slaughter', and the 'Eichmann 
Service Unit' that subsequently opened up the mass graves and burnt the bodies.
44
 The 
statement of Dieter Wisliceny (Eichmann's deputy) was also foregrounded as proof that 
Blobel’s Unit was “formally placed under Eichmann”.
45
 It was noted that in his statement 
to the IMT Blobel had not mentioned Eichmann, but he had been under the direct 
command of Heinrich Müller, as had Eichmann.
46
  
 
Primary source documentation was also foregrounded by the Judges as further evidence 
of RSHA, and therefore Eichmann's, authority and command of the Einsatzgruppen. 
When organised chronologically, this documentation included an order signed by Walter 
von Brauchitsch (Commander-in-Chief of the German Army), on 2 May 1941, as proof 
of not only agreed cooperation between the Security Police (RSHA) and the military 
command in the intended occupied territories of the Soviet Union, but specific 
authorisation for the Operations Units "to take the necessary steps for the execution of 
their plans as regards the civil population"', detailed instructions from Department IV 
(Gestapo, RSHA), on 17 July 1941, as evidence that the 'prime objective' of the 
Operations Units' 'was to round up and execute Soviet Commissars and all the Jews in 
those areas', and notification from the ‘Reich Commissioner in the Ostland’ 'that the 
liquidation of the Jews is the task of the Security Police and the SD' (RSHA).
47
 Copies of 
specific Einsatzgruppen reports were likewise foregrounded as proof of the subsequent 
mass murder of Jews 'month after month across the length and breadth of the Eastern 
Occupied Territories', while yet others indicated that they had been copied and directed 
to Eichmann's section (IVB4) in the RSHA.
48
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But, the most important documentation foregrounded, in support of not only Eichmann's 
direct authority within Einsatzgruppen command but his role in its escalation to the use 
of gas, was a collection of letters and memoranda (the latter both handwritten and typed) 
drafted by Dr Erhard Wetzel (Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories) in 
October 1941 to the ‘Reich Commissioner in the East’ (Hinrich Lohse) that implicated 
Eichmann in a decision-making process seeking to import the apparatus of Viktor Brack 
(T4 programme) into 'the East'.
49
 Specific attention was placed on extracts from the 
second drafted letter in which Wetzel noted Eichmann's agreement that "there is no reason 
why those Jews who are not fit for work should not be liquidated by means of Brack's 
apparatus".
50
 Since Ohlendorf had testified to the delivery of a gas van to the Operations 
Units in the spring of 1942, this collection of documentation placed Eichmann at the 
beginning of a crucial escalation of policy that exchanged 'the system of execution by 
shooting for execution by means of gas vans'.
51
 Letters of instruction from IVB4 to 
Einsatzgruppen B and D (amongst other recipients) in March 1943, and again to the 
commander of Einsatzgruppe B in September 1943, were likewise foregrounded as 
evidence of Eichmann's involvement in Einsatzgruppen command well into 1943.
52
  
 
In the Zündel trials the main form of evidence of both the official objectives and 
murderous conclusions of the Einsatzgruppen was historian testimony. In 1985, the facts 
considered for judicial notice had included the use of 'mass shootings' as a 'means of 
annihilation', but, as shown in chapter three, this fact was ruled inadmissible by Judge 
Locke on legal grounds.
53
 Rather, and acting as evidence by proxy, Raul Hilberg testified 
to the existence of documents: 
 
 … prepared by Germans themselves reporting to senior German officers and 
office-holders that … a squad of military personnel accompanied the 
advancing Army for the purpose of killing Jewish persons and others.
54
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The daily reports of the Einsatzgruppen were especially foregrounded (but not submitted) 
as evidence of both the systematic implementation and scale of the mass shootings, in 
direct opposition to the claim in DSMRD that there was 'no statistical basis' for Hilberg's 
figure of 1.4 million Jews subsequently murdered.
55
 Hilberg testified 'that he has seen 
such documents, and that they were used at Nuremberg'.
56
 Likewise, in response to the 
claim made in DSMRD that evidence of an Einsatzgruppen order 'to liquidate all Soviet 
Jews is based only on "the worthless Wisliceny statement"', Hilberg highlighted the 
testimony of Einsatzgruppen commanders at Nuremberg and 'German military 
documents'.
57
  
 
In 1988 Christopher Browning likewise foregrounded a number of Einsatzgruppen 
reports as evidence of both official policy and phase 1 of the 'Final Solution' in 1941 by:  
 
 … squads of security police that came upon the scene after the German troops 
had advanced and … conducted open-air firing squads against the Jews; 1.4 
million Jews were their victims.
58
 
 
These reports were utilised to directly challenge claims in DSMRD that the portrayal of 
the Einsatzgruppen at Nuremberg "has been proved since to be the most enormous 
exaggeration and falsification", that evidence of a verbal Hitler order to extend the killings 
to a "general massacre" of Soviet Jews was most probably based on "the worthless 
Wisliceny statement", that the "number of casualties" had been nearer 100,000, of which 
"only a small proportion … could have been Jewish partisans and Communist 
functionaries", and, inflicted "during savage partisan warfare on the Eastern front".
59
 
However, in this trial, copies of specific Einsatzgruppen reports were formally submitted 
as evidence alongside Browning's expert testimony, that, in contrast to 1985, visibly 
outlined to the jury the discriminate targeting of Jewish civilians as well as the figures 
                                                 
55
 Ibid, pp92-93; Vol. XX, p4629. 
56
 Her Majesty the Queen and Ernst Zündel (251/85), Appeal (1987), 'Respondent's Factum', p11, Ontario 
Court of Appeal. All proceeding references to the 1987 Appeal will be prefixed by ZT 1987. 
57
 Referring to Dieter Wisliceny's statement at the International Military Tribunal (IMT), ZT 1987, 
‘Respondent's Factum’, p11. The relevant documents are not identified in either the Judge's 'Charge to the 
Jury', Vol. XXI, or by the Prosecution in the afore-mentioned 'Respondent's Factum'. 
58
 ZT 1988, Vol. XXXVI, p10428. 
59
 ZT 1989, 'Respondent's Factum', pp29, 30, 33. 
174 
and categories of those shot in only a matter of specified months.
60
 In particular, the 
'Stahlecker Report' recorded the mass shooting of 118,430 Jews by Einsatzgruppe A in 
less than 4 months, and "in accordance with basic orders received".
61
 Another report, in 
December 1942, detailed the execution of 363,211 Jews in South Russia, Ukraine and 
Bialystok in only 'four months - August to December' 1942, while yet another report 
identified 'the use of wallposters to lead the Jews to believe they were being resettled, 
when in fact they were being led to execution'.
62
  
 
Browning likewise foregrounded a report prepared by a Professor Seraphim.
63
 Contained 
within a letter from the ‘Army's Inspectorate in the Ukraine’ to the ‘High Command of 
the Armed Forces’, on 2 December 1941, this report referenced 'a planned shooting of 
Jews' conducted in public, 'with the use of the Ukrainian militia and members of the armed 
forces', in which 'masses were executed'.
64
 Seraphim's report also acknowledged the 
sacrifice of the economic war effort in the occupied territories to 'the ideological goal of 
murdering all the Jews'.
65
 Browning likewise highlighted Eichmann's testimony in 1961, 
and in particular his eyewitness account of an 'Einsatzgruppen execution' at Minsk.
66
 
Browning testified that, according to Eichmann, 'it was one of the worst things he had 
every [sic] experienced in his life'.
67
 As already noted, in contrast to the Eichmann trial, 
the transition to the use of gas vans by the Einsatzgruppen was not specifically debated 
or evidentially foregrounded in either 1985 or 1988. However, in 1988, Browning 
testified to their initial use at Chelmno (Poland).
68
  
 
Historians were once again the main form of evidence of the relevant Einsatzgruppen 
mass shootings in London in 2000 and through the oral and written testimonies of 
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Christopher Browning and Peter Longerich. However, as already indicated, at this trial 
an additional focus, and therefore differentiated data-stream, aimed to prove not only their 
central and systematic command, escalation and murderous consequences, as similarly 
challenged in the Zündel trials, but Hitler's authority, knowledge and continued 
complicity in its policy. It was acknowledged by Browning in 2000 that there is nothing 
so crudely written as: “We are going to invade the Soviet Union so that we can destroy 
the Jews”; there is no such ‘smoking pistol document’.
69
 However, a range of 
corroborative evidence demonstrated that the Einsatzgruppen had followed orders rather 
than pursuing 'random actions by the local commanders' as charged by Irving.
70
 Although 
limited in number, a chronology of directive included the 'Wehrmacht guidelines' of 19 
May 1941, as evidence, prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, of the authorisation of 
"ruthless, energetic and drastic measures" against Jews in general, Heydrich's order to the 
Einsatzgruppen, of 2 July 1941, as proof of the targeting of "Jews in party and state 
functions", as well as the instigation (by indigenous anti-Jewish factions) of 'pogroms in 
the Jewish ghettos', Himmler's direct order (and escalation of policy) on 1 August 1941, 
to SS units in the area of the Pripet marshes (Belarus), as evidence that authorisation had 
extended to Jewish women, and correspondence between Hinrich Lohse (Reichskomissar 
for the Ostland) and Alfred Rosenberg (Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories), in November and December 1941, as proof that a central directive had by 
now authorised the SS to execute all Jews 'irrespective of the economic interests of the 
Wehrmacht', although in future, mass shootings 'were to be carried out in a better 
organised manner'.
71
 According to Longerich this latter correspondence demonstrated 
that, regardless of the interests of the civilian authorities governing the occupied 
territories, the Einsatzgruppen now had 'carte blanche' over the execution of the Jews.
72
 
Retrospective documentation relating to the shootings was also foregrounded. In 
particular, Himmler's speech to SS officers on 4 October 1943 was presented as evidence 
of the 'widespread killing operations in which the SS had been engaged', and the "Bruns 
report", recorded on 25 April 1945, as corroboration of both the horror of a specific 
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Einsatzgruppen execution in Riga on 1 December 1941 and the directive for discretion 
mentioned in the Lohse/Rosenberg correspondence.
73
  
 
As in the earlier trials, specific Einsatzgruppen reports were especially foregrounded in 
2000 as evidence of not only the shooting operations themselves but of a systematic 
policy, official escalation 'in the scale of shootings' and the subsequent killing of 'large 
numbers of Jews'.
74
 In particular, the report of Einsatzkommando 3 (Karl Jäger), dated 2 
August 1941, made reference to "general orders from above which cannot be discussed 
in writing".
75
 Thereafter reports from this Einsatzkommando recorded both increasing 
numbers of Jews shot and the inclusion of Jewish women and children.
76
 The 'so-called 
Jager [sic] report', dated 1 December 1941, specifically categorised the killing of 134,000 
civilians, of whom barely 1.5% had been non-Jewish.
77
 Finally, the ‘Higher SS and Police 
Leader’ report, of 26 December 1942, detailing the killing of 363,211 Jews, was 
foregrounded as evidence of both the continuation and scale of the shooting programme 
across Ukraine, Southern Russia and Bialystok.
78
  
 
However, unique to this trial was the foregrounding of a range of documentation relating 
to the investigation into the role of Hitler in the command of the Einsatzgruppen. As Gray 
queried in his 'Judgement': 'Was Hitler aware of what was going on and did he approve 
of it?'
79
 The Defence team, led by Richard Rampton, contended that: 
 
 … the scale of the killing was so immense and its effect on the war effort so 
great, that it is difficult to conceive that Hitler was not consulted and his 
authority sought.
80
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But a documentary record, however limited, also supported this charge. When organised 
chronologically, it began with Hitler's instruction to the ‘Chief of the Army Leadership 
Staff’ (General Jodl) on 3 March 1941, ordaining, in the intended invasion of the Soviet 
Union, both "the confrontation of two world views" and the subsequent elimination of the 
"Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia", and was followed by 'a package of measures' that 
included Jodl's subsequent directive to the Armed Forces on 13 March 1941, as evidence 
that "special responsibilities" arising from the "struggle" between "two opposing political 
systems" had been allocated to Himmler and the SS, statements made by Hitler to senior 
army officers on 17 and 30 March 1941, as proof of the intended elimination of the 
"Bolshevik Commissars and the Communist intelligentsia", and a memorandum of a 
conference, held on 16 July 1941, noting Hitler's instruction for the shooting of "anyone 
who just looks funny".
81
 However, most critically, an instruction from Heinrich Müller 
(Head of the Gestapo) to the Einsatzgruppen on 1 August 1941 specifically commanded: 
 
The Fuhrer [sic] is to be kept informed continually from here about the work 
of the Einsatzgruppen in the East.
82
 
 
This single instruction was foregrounded as proof that Hitler was not only aware of, but 
wanted to be kept updated on, the Einsatzgruppen shootings.
83
 As the shootings escalated 
from selective to wholesale murder in the latter months of 1941, additional documentation 
was submitted as evidence of Hitler's continued complicity and approval. Foregrounded 
was Hitler's 'table talk' of 25 October 1941, in which he had regaled in the widespread 
knowledge that "exterminating Jewry goes before us", Joseph Goebbel's diary entry of 22 
November 1941, as proof of Hitler's demand (at a meeting held the previous day) for an 
"energetic policy against the Jews, which, however, does not cause us unnecessary 
difficulties", Himmler's note on 30 November 1941, as evidence of discussions with 
Hitler on the subject of a transport of Berlin Jews deported to and killed in Riga, Hans 
Frank's diary entry of 16 December 1941, as proof of Hitler's instruction to the Gauleiter 
(12 December 1941) to extend the murder programme to the 'Generalgouvernement', 
Himmler's appointment book for 18 December 1941, as evidence of both a forthcoming 
meeting with Hitler to discuss the 'Judenfrage' and subsequent instruction to annihilate 
the Jews as if partisans, and finally the ‘Higher SS and Police Leader’ report (No. 51), 
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dated 26 December 1942, signed by Himmler on 29 December 1942 and submitted to 
Hitler on 31 December 1942, as not only evidence of the execution of 363,211 Jews (as 
if partisans) in Ukraine, Southern Russia and Bialystok over the preceding four months, 
but proof of Hitler’s explicit knowledge of this particular slaughter.
84
 According to the 
Defence, the totality of this primary source documentation comprised evidence of both a 
process of incremental decision-making from the centre and Hitler's continued complicity 
as well as direction and instruction at its various stages.
85
  
 
Although the transition from mass shootings to the use of gas by the Einsatzgruppen was 
not central to the historiography reconstructed in London, the 'Wetzel memoranda' was 
once again foregrounded as evidence of its origins. It was especially noted that, within a 
context of the experimental use of gas in both mobile vans and at Auschwitz-Birkenau 
(on Soviet POWs), Wetzel (Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories), after 
meeting with Viktor Brack (Reich Chancellery and T4) and then Eichmann on 25 October 
1941, had drafted a letter to Rosenberg (Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern 
Territories) and Lohse (Reich Commissioner for the East) stating that there were 'no 
objections if Jews who were not fit for work were "removed" ... ' by gassing apparatuses 
being planned in Riga.
86
  
 
It is not surprising that distinct facts were established from the discrete data-streams 
foregrounded and in accordance with the 'facts in issue'. In 1961 facts relating to a record 
of the central initiation, instruction and policy of mass shootings, the identity of the 
intended victims, and the hundreds of thousands of Jewish men, women and children 
subsequently murdered by the Einsatzgruppen after June 1941, were not in dispute.
87
 
Moreover, Hitler's complicity and leadership of the Einsatzgruppen murders was not in 
doubt, although marginalised and rarely mentioned in the relevant Judgement.
88
 Likewise 
the prominent role of Himmler and Heydrich in the command of the Einsatzgruppen was 
similarly confirmed, but again marginalised as fact within a narrative that foregrounded 
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Eichmann's authority and remit.
89
 Legal demands governing the date from which 
Eichmann could be indicted explicitly ignored the actions of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland 
from 1939.
90
 But, from the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union, he was found to have 
been part of a group of RSHA officials initially informed of their intended role in the 
'extermination of the Jews', and thereafter in consistent contact with the Units as they 
carried out their orders in 'the East'.
91
 Consequently, it was found that Eichmann had been 
aware from the summer of 1941 that 'anything connected with the expulsion of Jews 
would lead to their final destruction'.
92
 This included Jews deported from the Reich in 
October 1941, contrary to Eichmann's insistence that he had specifically sent the first 
transports of German Jews to the Lódz ghetto (Poland) 'in order to rescue them from death 
at the hands of the Operations Units'.
93
 As the Judges concluded: 
 
It is therefore clear that all the Jews dispatched by the Accused and his Section 
to the East for “posting for work” or under any other camouflage term, were 
dispatched to death by him knowingly … .
94
 
 
Although the documentary evidence relating to Eichmann's command was sparse the 
Judges accepted the testimony of Noske (Einsatzgruppe B and RSHA) as 'a sufficient 
basis for drawing conclusions, especially as the Accused himself has not disputed the 
accuracy of Noske’s testimony'.
95
 From this testimony the Judges specifically established 
that, by the spring of 1942, Eichmann had been actively involved in their 'operational 
directives … by collecting the material relating to the extermination of Jews and preparing 
summaries thereof'.
96
 According to the Judges:  
 
The preparation of summaries was obviously intended to be of assistance to 
those who had authority from time to time to decide upon the continuation of 
the activities of the Operations Units.
97
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Crucially, the Judges found that Eichmann, despite his insistence to the contrary, had been 
'undoubtably occupied' with finding an alternative method of mass killing, other than 
shooting, 'as early as the end of the summer or the beginning of the autumn of 1941'.
98
 
Through the 'Wetzel memoranda' it was found that Eichmann had 'expressed the consent 
of the RSHA to the use of gas vans in October 1941'.
99
 The Judges noted Eichmann's 
acceptance of relevant evidence (predominantly the Wetzel documents) when under 
interrogation prior to the trial, and so, did 'not attach any value' once in court to his 
consistent denial or 'accept it'.
100
 Ultimately, the Judges found Eichmann to be present at 
all stages of Einsatzgruppen initiation and escalation of mass murder in the occupied 
territories of the Soviet Union 'from the commencement of their activities'.
101
  
 
The only claim the Judges could not authorise related to the removal of the traces of 
Einsatzgruppen crimes. In this case the Judges found that 'the evidence is not sufficient 
to place the responsibility for the activities of Blobel's unit [1005] on the Accused'.
102
 
Rather, they concluded: 
 
it does not necessarily follow that the Section of the Accused, which was 
occupied with carrying out the Final Solution, should also be engaged in the 
specific operation of covering up the traces.
103
  
 
Unfortunately, the findings of the juries in the Zündel trials of 1985 and 1988 are not 
known on the issues contested (Einsatzgruppen objectives, orders and murderous 
consequences), while any instruction by either Judge in their respective 'charge to the 
jury' was minimal. In 1985 Locke reminded the jury that the Einsatzgruppen had been 
presented as: 
 
German S.S units sent out into the field in regiments or battalions to kill 
people as the German Army advanced into Russia.
104
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He likewise reminded the jury that Hilberg had testified to the existence of documents, 
'prepared by Germans themselves', that proved their subsequent killing 'of Jewish persons 
and others' on a mass scale, including daily reports 'of how many were killed'.
105
 In 1988 
Thomas reminded the jury that Hilberg had testified in 1985 that 1.3 to 1.4 million Jews 
'had died as a result of the systematic shootings conducted by the Einsatzgruppen in the 
USSR, Galicia and Serbia'.
106
 He further reminded the jury that Browning had testified to 
the content of a number of reports, 'filed by the Einsatzgruppen commanders', detailing 
'the number of Jews liquidated'.
107
 He similarly reminded the jury that the Defence had 
not presented any evidence to support its claim that these reports had exaggerated the 
numbers of Jews murdered.
108
 Conversely, in a direct retort to the Defence's rejection of 
central and systematic governance of the mass shootings, the Crown had insisted: 
 
 … why would the man in the field exaggerate the reports if it was not a policy 
of their leaders to exterminate the Jews? The records are there … and speak 
for themselves … .
109
 
 
Thomas further reminded the jury that both Hilberg in 1985 and Browning in 1988 had 
identified the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings as 'phase one' in a 'policy to exterminate the 
Jews'.
110
 Of course, the impact, if any, of the respective instructions on the facts and 
narratives authorised by either jury relating to the Einsatzgruppen remains unknown.  
 
In London, in 2000, Gray found that much of the 'documentary evidence relating to he 
[sic] shooting in the East was destroyed'.
111
 However, he likewise found, that what 
remains 'suffices to establish that … four mobile SS units called Einsatzgruppen were 
established by Himmler's deputy, Heydrich'.
112
 He also found that the evidence presented 
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by the Defence 'indicates that the programme of shooting Jews in the East was systematic 
… originated in Berlin and was organised and co-ordinated from there'.
113
 Consequently: 
 
it inexorably follows that Irving was misrepresenting the historical evidence 
when he told audiences in Australia, Canada and the US (as he accepted he 
did) that the shooting of Jews in the East was arbitrary, unauthorised and 
undertaken by individual groups or commanders.
114
 
 
Gray more specifically ruled that the Jews targeted in the initial stages 'were males in 
leadership positions and in selected professions', but escalated to include women and 
children after August 1941. He also ruled that, as early as the report from 
Einsatzkommando 3, dated 2 August 1941, 'it would appear ... that such restrictions as 
had been imposed on the Jews who were to be shot had been relaxed', while, by the date 
of ‘Report 51’ (26 December 1942) 'even Jewish labourers who might have made a 
contribution to the Nazi war effort were not spared'.
115
 Gray further ruled that 'the 
evidence, principally in the form of reports by the Einsatzgruppen': 
 
appears to establish that between 500,000 and 1,500,000 people (including a 
large proportion of Jews) were shot by those groups and by the auxiliary 
Wehrmacht units seconded to assist them.
116
 
 
He also found that these reports (in various forms) 'represent the primary source of 
knowledge about the shootings on the Eastern front up to the spring of 1942'.
117
 He 
acknowledged that the Defence had suggested that the 'true figure' of those shot by the 
Einsatzgruppen had been even higher, but found that there was 'no useful purpose … 
served by my attempting to assess whether the evidence supports a higher figure'.
118
 Gray 
accepted that as the mass shootings of Soviet Jews spread to the killing of Jews in other 
regions, in particular the Warthegau, Lublin and Serbia, 'gas vans and associated 
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personnel were then moved to the East … in late 1941 and early 1942'.
119
 Although the 
use of gas by the Einsatzgruppen was not foregrounded in his ‘Judgement’ he found that 
there 'is no dispute that the use by the Nazis of gas to kill human beings had its origins in 
the euthanasia programme' (Brack).
120
  
 
On the specific subject of Hitler's authority and continued complicity in the 
Einsatzgruppen mass shootings, Gray found that, despite both an ambiguous and partial 
'documentary picture, 'the evidence bears out the contention of the Defendants that Hitler 
sanctioned the killings'.
121
 More specifically, Hitler's instruction to the ‘Chief of the Army 
Leadership Staff’ (General Jodl), on 3 March 1941, was evidence, from that date, of his 
central role in 'converting Nazi ideological thought into concrete action … [and] laying 
the ground for a racist war of extermination'.
122
 Once accepting that Hitler was aware of 
and approved the programme of the mass shootings of predominantly Soviet Jews, Gray 
found that: 
 
it is reasonable to suppose that he would have been consulted about and 
approved a policy to exterminate them by another means, namely by the use 
of gas'.
123
  
 
Gray likewise concluded that 'the vast manpower required to carry out the programme at 
a critical stage in the war would surely have required the approval of Hitler'.
124
  
 
It is obvious that the narratives both foregrounded and authorised on the Einsatzgruppen 
mass shootings in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union after June 1941 were 
established as both empirically accountable and ‘truth-full’ in accordance with the 
demands of each legal case. They were also informed by a consistent record of the 
relevant mass shootings that reaffirmed the central instruction of Einsatzgruppen 
objectives prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, the primary role of the RSHA in its 
instruction and implementation of policy, the consistent leadership of Himmler and 
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Heydrich, but also Hitler, the deliberate targeting of specific categories of Soviet citizens, 
and especially Jews, from the outset, the escalation of both numbers of Jews killed and 
the inclusion of Jewish women and children after August 1941, the later submerging of 
all other interests (including the war effort) to the ideological slaughter of Jews across the 
occupied territories, and the transition to the use of gas vans as an alternative method of 
mass murder from the end of 1941. This record further reaffirmed the systematic murder 
of between 500,000 to 1.5 million European civilians by the Einsatzgruppen, 
predominantly Jews.  
 
There were obvious revisions of historiography authorised across all four trials. Most 
notably, the elevated role of Eichmann's leadership in Einsatzgruppen command found in 
1961 had been revised by the 1980s. In the later trials it was acknowledged that Eichmann 
occupied an informed role in Einsatzgruppen instruction and reporting from his privileged 
position in the RSHA, but his authority was now marginalised in narratives that focused 
on the leadership of Himmler, Heydrich, and especially Hitler.
125
 In contrast to the 1961 
narrative, the authority and continued complicity of Hitler was not only reaffirmed in 
2000 but explicitly reinstated within Einsatzgruppen historiography. It is also obvious 
that, although Eichmann was mentioned in discussions on the transition to gas in both the 
Zündel (1988) and Irving trials, there was no suggestion that he had instigated its use.
126
 
Furthermore, in contrast to the 1961 finding that all Jews sent by Eichmann 'to the East' 
were immediately shot by the Einsatzgruppen, it was acknowledged by 2000 that German 
Jews had not been included in the relevant instruction until the end of 1941.
127
 However, 
these revisions were minimal. 
 
It is also noted that, in 2000, the focus on central, and especially Hitler's, authority and 
governance omitted knowledge acquired through local and regional studies of the 
occupied territories of eastern Europe during the 1990s.
128
 In all four trials the focus on 
the leadership of the mass shootings reinforced narratives of not only systematic policy 
                                                 
125
 ZT 1989, 'Respondent's Factum', pp46-48. HRIRH, (TB) T2, 'Judgement', para. 6.101. 
126
 Ibid, paras. 6.68-6.105. 
127
 Ibid, Day 14, pp100-101, 107-122; Day 20, pp186-196; Day 22, pp92-93; Day 24, pp135-140; Day 26, 
pp114-115. 
128
 Ulrich Herbert (ed.), National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives 
and Controversies (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000); Matthäus, 'Controlled Escalation’; Dan Stone, 
'Beyond the "Auschwitz Syndrome": Holocaust Historiography after the Cold War', Patterns of Prejudice, 
44:5 (2010), pp454-468; Henri Zukier, 'Diversity and Design: The "Twisted Road" and the Regional Turn 
in Holocaust History', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 27:3 (2013), pp387-410. 
185 
but top-down control and directive. Yet, it is now common knowledge that, since the 
opening-up of relevant archives in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, this top-down narrative 
has been challenged by evidence of decision-making and initiative by and through 
bureaucracies and personnel 'on the ground'.
129
 In these studies central instruction is still 
reaffirmed, but the "controlled escalation" of the Einsatzgruppen shootings is now viewed 
as the consequences of the interplay of decision-making, not only between the centre and 
periphery, but between agencies across and within the occupied regions.
130
 Of course the 
relevant primary source material was not available to the Prosecution teams in Israel or 
Canada, but it was known to historians by the time of the Irving trial in London.
131
 
However, even when local initiatives were referenced in this trial, for example the 
shooting of a transport of Berlin Jews on arrival in Kovno (Belarus) in November 1941, 
the focus was on central instruction, in this case Himmler's reprimand of the relevant SS 
and Police Leader (Friedrich Jeckeln) and subsequent order to remain within 'RSHA 
[central] guidelines'.
132
 Although an omission, rather than a revision of facts or 
interpretation since 1961, this focus was inevitable in a case that sought to contest Irving's 
claim that the shootings had been 'random, unauthorised and carried out by individual 
groups or commanders'.
133
  
 
The comparative reconstruction of the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings, of predominantly 
Soviet Jews, between June 1941 to December 1942 therefore confirms a case-specific 
focus across the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials. It also confirms that an evidential 
base existed that was capable of accommodating and supporting a range of accounts, facts 
and narratives relevant to this mutually investigated historiography. This base 
differentiated in both content and form, and included eyewitness testimony (perpetrator 
and survivor), a chronology of primary source material and the expert opinion and report 
of historians. However, although an integral feature of Holocaust historiography, the 
volume of contemporaneous documentation relating specifically to the Einsatzgruppen 
was notably fragmentary in all four courtrooms. Although the deliberate burning of 
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official documentation by Eichmann had been acknowledged in 1961, any limitations of 
evidence was not specifically raised in a trial in which the value and weight of eyewitness 
experience and record of the mass shootings, especially survivor testimony, was both 
privileged and rarely challenged.
134
 And yet it is suggested that the findings of Eichmann's 
authority over the Einsatzgruppen, and especially his role in the initiation of and transition 
to the use of gas as an alternative method of mass murder, were based on an ambiguous 
evidential base.
135
 Conversely, by 2000, Judge Gray acknowledged that not only had 
'much of the documentary evidence relating to he [sic] shooting in the East' been 
destroyed, but the material 'implicating Hitler' in its command was 'sparse'.
136
 This 
conclusion by Gray may have been more evidentially accurate, but it would have been 
anathema to the Israeli case, court and public audience in 1961.  
 
It is obvious that the 'mixed bag' of available evidence was discretely and variously 
employed in accordance with the 'facts in issue'. The only primary source material 
foregrounded in all four courtrooms was the Einsatzgruppen reports. These reports were 
not only able to accommodate and support a range of interpretations and findings, but 
appear to have extended their historical and legal probative reach and value since 1961. 
There were only two other documentary sources shared by the various trials, the ‘Higher 
SS and Police Leader’ report of 26 December 1942 and the 'Wetzel memoranda', with 
both sources variously interpreted in accordance with the demands of each case. 
However, it is also obvious that, with the exception of Eichmann's elevated authority in 
1961, the interpretations of the relevant data-stream were not fundamentally 
incompatible. Furthermore, a broader record of Einsatzgruppen initiative, co-ordination, 
discriminate target, escalation, links and transition to a gassing programme, and the 
overall slaughter of up to 1.5 million European civilians, predominantly Jews, emerged 
across all four courtrooms. Once again, with the exception of Eichmann's elevated 
authority found in 1961, but also the omitted research of the 'regional turn' in 2000, this 
record, and the authorised narratives, were not only consistent across the discrete trials 
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but were compatible with the established historiography prevailing at the time of each 
trial and remain familiar in present-day Holocaust scholarship.
137
  
 
It is clearly demonstrated that the narratives both foregrounded and authorised were 
'cooked' in accordance with the focus on Eichmann's leading role in 1961, Einsatzgruppen 
objectives and intended victims in 1985 and 1988, and Hitler's authority and continued 
complicity in 2000. Consequently, each narrative both distorted and failed to 'do justice' 
to the complexities of the prevailing historiography. In a repetition of mistakes identified 
in ‘key’ perpetrator trials (chapter two), they ignored, for example, the motives and type 
of perpetrator constituting the Einsatzgruppen, as well as the wider network of 
perpetrators also involved in the mass shootings. They also minimised the complexity of 
decision-making, including the crucial impact of local initiatives, while the later trials, 
again in common with earlier perpetrator trials, ignored the voices of Jewish communities 
and individuals. Thus, although survivor testimony of the 'blood bath' was intentionally 
foregrounded and heard in the Eichmann trial, the focus on Einsatzgruppen instruction in 
Canada and Hitler's authority in London ensured that this integral evidence was reduced 
to background noise in 1985, 1988 and 2000.  
 
However, it is also clearly demonstrated that, despite being 'cooked', the narratives 
authorised on the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings between June 1941 and December 1942 
were both empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content. Once again, the consistency 
of facts and record implied the dominance of past evidential constraint, regardless of the 
discrete demands of the Eichmann Zündel and Irving trials. Nevertheless, it is concluded 
that its reconstruction in each courtroom clearly exposed the primacy of preconceived 
and prefigured narratives that both governed and ‘made sense’ of the relevant past traces.  
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Chapter Six: Homicidal Gas Chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau 
 
Auschwitz-Birkenau is foundational to Holocaust historiography. It is recognised as the 
largest site of extermination, while its combined role as a labour camp witnessed the 
survival of thousands of its prisoners at the time of its liberation in January 1945, and 
therefore the survival of a living record of its atrocity and genocide.
1
 In comparison to the 
'pure' extermination camps at Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka, Auschwitz-Birkenau has 
been identified as the 'capital of the Holocaust'.
2
 It has also evolved into a symbol of 
inhumanity beyond its genocide.
3
 It is therefore not surprising that the murder apparatus 
of gas chambers at this camp was a key site of historiographical debate at the criminal 
trials of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the libel case 
instigated by David Irving (2000). It is likewise not surprising that challenging the facts 
of Auschwitz-Birkenau is at the centre of Holocaust denial.  
 
Comparative reconstruction of this historiography across the discrete discursive contexts 
of the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials once again records the presentation of varying 
accounts of Auschwitz-Birkenau in accordance with the 'facts in issue'. It subsequently 
records the transition of focus from Eichmann’s authority and input at all stages of the 
camp in 1961 to the minutiae of its gassing and incineration apparatus in 1985, 1988 and 
2000. It also records the evolution of Auschwitz-Birkenau’s status in Holocaust 
historiography since 1961, and, therefore, its greater prominence in the later trials. It 
further records the establishment of an infrastructure of evidence that was capable of 
supporting the historiographical and legal demands of each case. Most striking about this 
evidence was the continued necessity of eye-witness testimony despite its secondary 
status in both history and the law. Likewise surprising was the acknowledged fallibility 
of not only eye-witness testimony but all forms of contemporaneous traces in the later 
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trials, but especially in 2000. In what would have been anathema to the Israeli case, court 
and pubic audience, Judge Gray confirmed that, despite the 'cumulative' weight of 
evidence relating to the homicidal purpose of the camp, the criticisms raised by Irving 
‘deserves to be taken seriously’.
4
  
 
Through comparative reconstruction it is clear that distinct facts were established in 
accordance with those 'in issue'. And, aside from the elevated authority of Eichmann 
found in 1961, that they were not contradictory. Rather, the very different facts 
established in the later trials were the result of the deliberate transfer of attention onto the 
minutiae of the gassing and incineration processes. Furthermore, despite the very 
different focus at the later trials, a consistent record of Auschwitz-Birkenau emerged and 
informed all four courtrooms that remains familiar in present-day Holocaust scholarship.  
 
Through comparative reconstruction it is obvious that the narratives authorised on 
Auschwitz-Birkenau were 'cooked' in accordance with the foregrounding of Eichmann, 
and specific charges, in 1961, and the reductive focus on the architecture of gas chambers, 
the chemistry of Zyklon-B, the physics of cremation and the human biology of gas 
absorption in 1985, 1988 and 2000. However, it is also obvious that these narratives were 
empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content. Yet again, the consistency of fact and 
record of homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau implied the dominance of past 
evidential constraint across the four trials. However, comparative reconstruction of this 
most iconic symbol of the Holocaust clearly exposed the primacy of preconceived and 
prefigured narratives that both 'floated free' of and governed the relevant past traces. 
 
 
The existence of facilities that acted as gas chambers and crematoria at Auschwitz-
Birkenau was an accepted fact at the criminal trials of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and Ernst 
Zündel (1985, 1988) and the libel case instigated by David Irving (2000).
5
 All four trials 
also distinguished between the main camp (Auschwitz I) and Birkenau (Auschwitz II) 
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and accepted that the majority of its crematoria (II-V) were sited at the latter.
6
 However, 
beyond these basic facts, the diversity of legal case and context challenged their very 
intention and use (1985, 1988, 2000), as well as their command (1961), design (1985, 
1988, 2000), systematic process (1985, 1988, 2000) and viability as killing apparatus 
(1985, 1988, 2000). In 1961 Auschwitz-Birkenau was introduced to the Eichmann trial 
as 'the largest and most terrible of the extermination camps … remembered in the annals 
of humanity as the symbol of horror and infamy'.
7
 The existence of its gas chambers, and 
the subsequent murder and incineration of up to 2 million Jewish civilians, was not in 
doubt or debated.
8
 At no point was the murderous capacity and viability of the gas 
chambers or crematoria investigated far less questioned. When giving evidence Eichmann 
never once denied the genocidal instruction or intention of the camp.
9
 Rather, throughout 
his testimony and cross-examination, he confirmed his numerous visits to Auschwitz-
Birkenau (between 1941 and 1944), the categorisation and extermination of 'Transport 
Jews' routed (by IVB4) to the camp, the burning of bodies on a 'gridiron' and the use of 
Zyklon-B as its unique killing agent.
10
  
 
Yet, despite its reputation, Auschwitz-Birkenau was not singled out from a range of 
concentration and extermination camps included in the Prosecution's grand narrative of 
wholesale slaughter.
11
 But, specific charges against Eichmann did raise its profile. 
According to the leading prosecution counsel, Gideon Hausner, Eichmann could be found 
at every stage of its transition from a site of concentration and forced labour to an 
extermination camp. More specifically, Hausner charged him with direct involvement in 
the initial selection of an area 'for the erection of the extermination apparatus', procuring 
the necessary supplies of Zyklon-B, issuing detailed directives for the implementation of 
deportations to the camp, supplying its gas chambers with the 'sacrificial victims', 
instructing the execution of Jews as punishment, conveying the order for the burning of 
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bodies in crematoria, organising the collation of records of Jews killed, directing the 
'tremendous pillage' at the camp, ordering the delivery and murder of 150 of its prisoners 
for anthropological research, and, even when defeat of Germany was imminent, 
circumventing Heinrich Himmler's 'Blood for Goods' negotiations in order to keep the 
'Auschwitz mills' working.
12
 Eichmann denied the majority of these charges outright or 
sought to mitigate or negate his role and responsibility.
13
  
 
In Canada, in both 1985 and 1988, Ernst Zündel's defence team forced attention onto the 
facticity of specific 'extermination camps' in general, and the use of gas chambers as 
homicidal apparatus at Auschwitz-Birkenau in particular.
14
 Yet, as the Crown, led by 
Pearson Griffiths, reminded the jury in 1985, the denier publication under scrutiny, 'Did 
Six Million Really Die?' (DSMRD), did not consider the construction or operation of gas 
chambers.
15
 In 1988, the Crown, led by John Pearson, likewise confirmed that the subject 
was rarely mentioned in either the overall content of DSMRD or its statements of fact.
16
 
The existence of gas chambers was therefore not relevant to either the 'facts in issue' or 
to Zündel’s state of mind, and the Crown, particularly in 1988, did not introduce specific 
evidence on the subject.
17
 However, as Zündel's lawyer, Douglas Christie, verified in 
1985, there was nothing more relevant to the case of the Defence than to prove that the 
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'alleged gas chambers that you see in Auschwitz today are … scientific impossibilities'.
18
 
Or, as more directly summarised by Judge Thomas in 1988, according to the Defence 
there were 'no homicidal gas chambers … no Zyklon-B to kill people … and no cremation 
for living and dead persons'.
19
 Rather, gas chambers had existed but only as 'disinfection' 
facilities, Zyklon-B had been utilised but only to protect people from disease and 
crematoria had operated but only to accommodate dead bodies as standard practice.
20
  
 
Consequently, in both 1985 and 1988, the Crown was forced to focus on (and prove) the 
minutiae of the gassing and incineration process, with specific focus on holes in the roof 
of crematorium II (to allow the introduction of Zyklon-B into the chamber), the 
positioning of wire-meshed columns (allowing the dispersal of Zyklon-B), the molecular 
properties of hydrogen cyanide (as explanation of why those gassed were found stacked 
up on top of each other as they fought for air), sources of heat in the chamber (required 
to activate the vaporisation of gas), the existence of ventilation systems (required to 
hasten the removal of the dead bodies), the staining of floors and walls (as evidence of a 
chemical reaction with cyanide), the protective capacity of gas masks (adequate to the 
levels of Zyklon-B utilised), the use of water to hose down the chamber (necessary to 
dilute cyanide remnants and hasten the removal of bodies), the porosity of mortar in the 
walls (determining the absorption or dilution of cyanide after hosing down), the number 
and capacity of ovens (as evidence of the viability of the volume of bodies incinerated), 
the existence of belching smoke, flames and heat-resistant bricks in chimneys (as proof 
of intensive incineration), the self-fuelling of human fat (as explanation for the quantities 
of coke supplied), and the comparative poisoning of lice and humans (as evidence that 
smaller quantities are needed for killing the latter).
21
  
 
This denier focus and treatise was largely repeated in London in 2000. However, there 
were also additional links between David Irving and the Zündel trials on the subject of 
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Auschwitz-Birkenau. As raised in chapter three, Irving acted as a key witness on behalf 
of Zündel in 1988 and it was the reading of the 'forensic analyses' of the so-called 
'Leuchter Report', presented by the Defence at that trial (see below), that had convinced 
him that the established historiography on its homicidal gas chambers had been a 'big 
lie'.
22
 Irving had later published the 'Leuchter Report' for circulation in the UK, and had 
written a foreword in which, inter alia, he highlighted Germany's 'atonement for the "gas 
chambers of Auschwitz"' despite their homicidal use being 'a myth'.
23
 His subsequent 'sea 
change' was infamously summarised in his address to a meeting of ‘so-called revisionists’ 
in 1991:
24
 
 
I don't see any reason to be tasteful about Auschwitz. It's baloney. It's a 
legend. Once we admit the fact that it was a brutal slave labour camp and 
large numbers of people did die, as large numbers of innocent people died 
elsewhere in the war, why believe the rest of the baloney? I say quite 
tastelessly in fact that more women died on the back seat of Edward 
Kennedy's car at Chappaquiddick than ever died in a gas chamber in 
Auschwitz.
25
 
 
Once in court the Defence's leading counsel, Richard Rampton, confirmed that, 
‘Auschwitz in Mr Irving's utterances and certainly in our eyes is at the centre of Holocaust 
belief. It is therefore at the centre of Holocaust denial'.
26
 Irving likewise agreed that 
'Auschwitz is really the battleship, the capital ship of this entire case’.
27
 Specific attention 
was placed on Crematorium II, identified by the Defence's expert witness, Robert Jan van 
Pelt, as the ‘centre of the atrocity’, and by Irving as demolishing the gas chamber 'story'.
28
 
As Rampton insisted, the Defence would prove 'two things', firstly that Irving had based 
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his denial of gas chambers on a discredited 'piece of so-called research which is not worth 
the paper it is written on' (the 'Leuchter Report'), and secondly that his denial has a 
political motive.
29
  
 
Faced with the repetition of denier treatise presented in both Zündel trials it is not 
surprising that a similar reductive history of Auschwitz-Birkenau was foregrounded in 
London in 2000. Consequently, its genocide was once again largely presented through 
oppositional arguments on the architecture of gassing facilities, the physics of cremation, 
the chemistry of Zyklon-B and the human biology of gas absorption.
30
 Notably, in contrast 
to the historiographies of extermination policy and the mass shootings of the 
Einsatzgruppen (chapters four and five), the authority, knowledge and continued 
command of Adolf Hitler over the gassing programme at Auschwitz-Birkenau was 
largely absent from Irving's charges. However, in contrast to the Zündel trials, the 
prominence of the camp in this legal case was formally acknowledged in the agreement 
by both parties to divide the trial into 'two separate compartments'; one being Auschwitz, 
the other 'all the other issues'.
31
  
 
In support of the various accounts presented the data-stream submitted on Auschwitz-
Birkenau differed across the four trials and did so in both content and form. In 1961, in 
accordance with the focus on Eichmann's authority over the camp, the main form of 
evidence was eyewitness testimony of perpetrators, including Eichmann, and survivors.
32
 
Through survivor testimony a record of evidence detailed the pillaging of those arriving 
at the camp (Gedalia Ben-Zvi), the absence of registration of those killed on arrival (Raya 
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Kagen), the forced walk to the crematoria (Nachum Hoch), the use of Zyklon-B (Aharon 
Beilin), the inoperable shower heads and existence of wire-meshed columns, ventilation 
shafts and lifts in the gas chambers and crematoria (Yehuda Bakon), the marking and 
'butchering' of those suspected of swallowing valuables (Ben-Zvi), the removal of the 
ashes of burnt bodies for use on the roads (Bakon) and the inability of the crematoria to 
keep pace with the rate of murder of the Hungarian Jews in 1944 (Ben-Zvi).
33
 Some 
witnesses also identified their own drawings (Bakon) or the photographs of others (Esther 
Goldstein, Vera Alexander) that documented life and survival at the camp as well as its 
killing apparatus (Bakon).
34
 Many witnesses likewise testified to the murder of family 
members at the camp.
35
 As with all survivor testimony, this evidence was awarded both 
probative value and weight by the Judges.
36
 However, as in the case of the Einsatzgruppen 
mass shootings (chapter five), none of the witnesses had met Eichmann during their 
ordeals and therefore could not testify to his crimes relating to Auschwitz-Birkenau.  
 
Rather, to help prove the specific charges against Eichmann relevant to the camp, the 
Prosecution relied principally on the perpetrator testimonies of Kurt Gerstein (Waffen SS 
Hygiene Institute) and Rudolf Höss.
37
 Although formally submitted as evidence of 
gassing at the Belzec camp, the so-called 'Gerstein statement' was foregrounded as 
evidence of discussions between Gerstein and Eichmann's section (IVB4), in the Reich 
Security Main Office (RSHA) in June 1942, on the procurement of the more lethal and 
rapid working cyanic acid for use in the extermination camps.
38
 According to Gerstein, 
Eichmann's deputy, Rolf Günther, had ordered between 100 and 260 kilogrammes of 
potassium cyanide on 8 June 1942 and more than 2,000 kilogrammes at the beginning of 
1944 (April-May).
39
 Although Eichmann was not specifically mentioned by Gerstein in 
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this exchange, he had 'made a partial admission' in court that he had heard at the time of 
Guenther's activity in connection with the supply of gas'.
40
  
 
But it was the various testimonies made by Höss (once imprisoned in 1946 to 1947) that 
constituted the primary source of evidence of Eichmann's role at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
41
 
Foregrounded from these testimonies was Höss' claim that Eichmann, following orders 
from Heinrich Himmler in the summer of 1941 that the Auschwitz site 'was destined to 
be the main centre for extermination of the Jews', had met with him 'shortly afterwards, 
and together they chose Birkenau as the extermination place'.
42
 During the same visit Höss 
claimed that Eichmann had given instructions on extermination procedure, that included 
the extraction of gold teeth from the corpses and the shaving of women's hair.
43
 He also 
claimed that Eichmann had expressed the view that 'all the Jews arriving in the camp 
should be exterminated immediately and not used for labour'.
44
 It was noted that, at the 
time of Eichmann's visit, Zyklon-B had already been tested on Russian 'Prisoners of War' 
(POWs) interned at the camp.
45
 Consequently, when Eichmann made a further visit to 
Auschwitz-Birkenau, Höss had 'told him about this use of Zyklon-B and we decided to 
introduce this gas in future for the mass executions'.
46
 However, in Berlin, around 
November 1941, they had discussed 'extermination methods', but, according to Höss, 'I 
could not secure information about the date the operation was to begin. Eichmann had not 
yet managed to obtain suitable gas'.
47
 Once in operation, Höss claimed that Eichmann had 
not only specifically categorised those routed to the camp by IVB4 as 'Transport Jews', 
but had marked them 'with certain figures and letters to avoid their getting mixed up with 
transports of other detainees'.
48
  
 
In notes written at the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Höss also detailed the 
overall killing process at Auschwitz-Birkenau; from the system of transportation to the 
camp, the separation of men from the women and children deemed 'unfit for work' and 
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'taken to the nearest extermination installation that was empty', to the introduction of 
Zyklon-B 'through a special aperture', death after 'thirteen to fifteen minutes', and the 
removal, desecration and burning of bodies.
49
 Höss had likewise confirmed the use of five 
crematoria, with a killing capacity of 10,000 corpses per day, and had estimated that over 
the duration of the camp it was possible to murder 2.5 million people, although in his 
opinion 'one and a half million, at most, were exterminated'.
50
 Although Eichmann had 
not been directly referenced by Höss in these notes, the Judges recognised that: 
 
 … this horrifying description, given by the master butcher himself, in the 
language of a dry office report, has been fully confirmed by witnesses who 
testified before us.
51
 
 
As further evidence of Eichmann's influence over the camp, a combination of perpetrator 
and survivor testimony was also submitted as corroborative evidence of his involvement 
in the so-called 'skeleton industry', and, more specifically, in accordance to the charge 
that:
 52
 
 
 … in response to Eichmann's order 150 Auschwitz prisoners were "supplied" 
for death in the Natzweiler Camp in Germany, so that their skeletons might 
be sent for anthropological research at the SS Institute of Race Research 
(Ahnenerbe), which had requested skulls of “Jewish Communist 
Commissars”.
53
 
 
Foregrounded was the testimony of Wolfram Sievers (Director of Ahnenerbe), as 
evidence that he had directly requested to Eichmann that he "create suitable conditions in 
Auschwitz" for the necessary examinations 'in accordance with Himmler's instructions', 
the testimony of Josef Kramer (Commander of the Natzweiler Camp), as proof that the 
Jews selected from Auschwitz-Birkenau, and sent to the Natzweiler camp, had been 
gassed in August 1943, in accordance with instructions provided by Professor Hirt 
(Ahnenerbe, University of Strasbourg), and then delivered to Strasbourg, and the 
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testimony of Henri Henri-Pierre (Prisoner at Hirt's laboratory) as evidence that the bodies 
had arrived in three consignments.
54
  
 
Additional perpetrator and survivor testimony was further foregrounded as evidence of 
not only Eichmann's direct input into the so-called 'Blood for Goods' negotiations (May 
and July 1944), but his continued zealous pursuit of the 'Final Solution' at Auschwitz-
Birkenau, contrary to his claim that he had instigated negotiations to save the lives of an 
initial 100,000 and finally 1 million Jews.
55
 In particular, Hansi and Joel Brand (Relief 
and Rescue Committee Budapest) testified that it had been Himmler's, and not 
Eichmann's, initiative at this late stage of the war to 'barter … Jewish lives against goods 
required by the Germans, especially trucks', that Eichmann had authorised the selection 
of Joel Brand to act as intermediary (in Istanbul) between himself (on behalf of Himmler) 
and the relevant Allied and Jewish authorities, that Eichmann had promised to blow-up 
the gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau if Brand returned from Istanbul with a positive 
reply, or, alternatively, to “letting the mill run” if unsuccessful, and that Eichmann 
continued to transport Hungarian Jews to the camp as the negotiations continued.
56
 As 
corroborative evidence, the testimony of Dieter Wisliceny (Eichmann's Deputy) at the 
IMT was foregrounded as proof that when Brand did not return from Istanbul, and the 
negotiations 'collapsed', Eichmann had 'expressed satisfaction', while Eichmann's own 
testimony was foregrounded as evidence that after March 1944 the gas chambers at the 
camp 'were working to full capacity, and could hardly cope with the pace of the 
transports'.
57
  
 
Contemporaneous documentation relating to Eichmann’s authority over the camp was 
sparse. Only one item, relating to a set of instructions from Richard Glücks (Economic 
and Administrative Main Office (EAHO), on 21 November 1942, specifically referenced 
the categorisation of 'Transport Jews' and the connection with IVB4, while those 
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foregrounded as proof of plunder at the camp did not mention or relate to Eichmann.
58
 
However, the latter documentation acted as corroborative evidence of items submitted 
throughout the trial that placed Eichmann in a systematic policy of plunder accompanying 
all stages of the 'Final Solution'.
59
 It was also noted that Eichmann had admitted that 
plunder was inherent to the work of IVB4.
60
  
 
In contrast, documentation specifically corroborated Eichmann's role in the 'skeleton 
industry'. Foregrounded was a range of correspondence between Sievers, Rudolf Brandt 
(Personal Administrative Officer to Himmler), Himmler and Eichmann from February 
1942 to September 1944, that included a memorandum from Sievers to Brandt, dated 9 
February 1942, as evidence that the work of Professor Hirt should be extended to 
examinations of the skeletons and skulls of Jews, a letter from Himmler, dated 7 July 
1942, as proof that he had approved Hirt's research, a letter from Sievers to Brandt, on 2 
November 1942, as evidence of his request for the delivery of 150 skeletons of Jews from 
Auschwitz-Birkenau, and that a draft letter of confirmation should be sent to IVB4 'for 
the attention of the Accused', a subsequent letter of instruction from Brandt to Eichmann, 
dated 6 November 1942, and specifically titled, "Subject: The Establishment of a 
Collection of Skeletons in the Anatomy Institute at Strasbourg", extracts from Sievers 
diary, as evidence that he had discussed examinations and procedures to be carried out at 
the camp with Günther (Eichmann's deputy) on 28 April 1943, and a document, dated 21 
June 1943, as proof that Eichmann's section had been duly informed that:
61
 
 
the research work in Auschwitz had been completed and that the people 
examined (79 Jews, 30 Jewesses, two Poles, and four other persons) are to be 
transferred to the Natzweiler concentration camp.
62
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A final document, dated 5 September 1944, from Sievers to Brandt was evidence of the 
former’s request for instructions on what to do with the collection of skeletons 'in view 
of the danger that Strasbourg might be occupied by the Allied armies'.
63
 Although the 
Judges acknowledged that Brandt's reply to Sievers was not known, they accepted the 
submission of a certificate from a member of the French police stating that, when the city 
was liberated, 'bodies and body parts were found, with some identified as '"apparently 
Jews"'.
64
  
 
Documentation likewise provided corroborative evidence of Eichmann's role in the 
'Blood for Goods' negotiations. Foregrounded by the Judges was a report compiled by 
Moshe Sharett (Zionist leader and negotiator), as proof of both his meeting with Joel 
Brand in Istanbul in June 1944 and the absence of any reference to Eichmann's alleged 
proposal to release an initial 100,000 Jews, the 'Kasztner Report', as evidence of a 
statement made by Eichmann, on 9 June 1944, that if he did not receive a positive 
response from Joel Brand in 3 days he would “operate the Mill at A”, and a report by 
Eberhard von Thadden (Foreign Office, Jewish Desk), following a plan of action provided 
for him by IVB4, as proof that contrary to preparing to save 100,000 Jewish lives after 
May 1944 Eichmann was organising the evacuation of all Jews from Budapest 'within 24 
hours in the middle or at the end of July in one huge operation'.
65
 When combined, this 
data-stream placed Eichmann within a decision-making process that related to the entire 
duration, as well as murderous perpetration, of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp.  
 
In the 1985 Zündel trial the notorious facts of the Holocaust considered for judicial notice 
had included the use of 'gassing' as a 'means of annihilation'.
66
 However, as shown in 
chapter three, this fact was ruled inadmissible on a point of law, although 'with no little 
regret' by Judge Locke.
67
 In its place, the testimony of survivors of Auschwitz-Birkenau 
once again constituted a primary form of evidence of the camp's homicidal utility. Most 
prominent was Dr Rudolf Vrba, who, according to Griffiths: 
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worked … on the ramps, as it is called, at Birkenau and Auschwitz, and he 
kept mental tally of the trainloads that were coming in, how many people 
were sent towards the crematoria and how many people were allowed to come 
into the barracks.
68
 
 
Vrba would therefore 'be an original source that people like Dr. Hilberg would go to’.
69
 
Vrba's evidence was corroborated by the testimonies of Alfred Friedman, Ignatz Fulop, 
Dennis Urstein and Henry Leader.
70
 Although the evidential authority and respect 
awarded to survivor testimony in 1961 was replaced by the procedurally ordinary tactics 
of cross-examination in 1985 (chapter three), experiential evidence was foregrounded as 
proof of the selection process on arrival at the camp, and the active role of Dr Mengele 
(Friedman, Vrba, Urstein), the plunder of Jewish possessions (Ignaz Fulop, Vrba, 
Urstein), the transport of the 'elderly, children and mothers with children' by truck, or 
forced to walk to the Birkenau camp, from where 'they never came out' (Friedman, Vrba, 
Leader), the non-registration of those killed on arrival (Vrba), sightings of homicidal gas 
chambers, crematoria and multiple ovens, (Friedman, Vrba, Urstein, Fulop, Henry 
Leader), the introduction of Zyklon-B into vents on the roof of the gas chamber (Vrba), 
flames and/or smoke rising from the crematoria chimneys (Friedman, Fulop, Urstein), the 
removal of bodies by Jewish prisoners to be burnt in crematoria (Vrba, Urstein) or pits 
(Vrba), the sighting of burnt bones in pits, including the ‘heads of children’ (Vrba), the 
extension of apparatus 'to accommodate the oncoming influx of Hungarian Jews' (Vrba), 
and the murder of between 1.75 and 2.5 million Jewish civilians (Vrba).
71
 As Griffiths 
concluded: 
 
Were all these men lying? Were these men suffering from some group 
fantasy? The stories gel so nicely, having come from different camps, 
different times … You saw them … heard what they said, the way they said, 
and you saw the men themselves. I'd suggest to you that each and every one 
of these men is worthy of your belief.
72
 
 
                                                 
68
 Then known as Walter Rosenberg. Ibid, Vol. III, p474.  
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Friedman: Ibid, Vol. II, pp304-470; Fulop: Vol. III, pp591-627; Urstein: Vol. VIII, pp1738-1801; Leader: 
Ibid, pp1802-1834. 
71
 Ibid, Vol. XXI, pp71-74, 76, 77-79, 84, 88,113, 115, 118, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 131, 134, 137, 217. 
72
 Ibid, Vol. XX, p4632. 
202 
It was noted that none of the survivors had directly witnessed the gassing process.
73
 But, 
as Fulop insisted, 'anyone who had seen a gas chamber would not be around to testify'.
74
 
However, Urstein had directly participated in the post-gassing process after being 
selected, alongside 29 other prisoners, to remove the bodies of Jews gassed in 
crematorium III.
75
 He subsequently detailed not only the facts of its homicidal structure 
and utility but its horror when finding: 
 
 … a lot of bodies … naked … men, women and children … entangled with 
one another as if they had all recently been trying to get on top of one another. 
The strongest were on top. The children were at the bottom.
76
  
 
Urstein estimated 'six to seven hundred bodies, forty per cent of which were children up 
to ten, eleven and twelve years old'.
77
 Urstein further reaffirmed the existence of a 'shower 
fixture', every 12 inches along the ceiling, 'a lot of steel piping going to the ceiling with 
wire mesh', and no windows, and that, after the gassing process, the floor of the chamber 
had been covered in a 'lot of water'.
78
 He likewise testified that he and the other prisoners 
had been given 'a hook with a handle on it', approximately 3 feet long, and ordered to: 
"Get these Jew bastards out", and that once removed, the bodies were 'stacked on top of 
one another on a head-to-foot basis'.
79
 He and the others had then been ordered to 'wash 
out the chamber', before being loaded onto a truck and returned to their barracks.
80
 The 
whole process had taken 'three hours'.
81
  
 
The expert testimony of Raul Hilberg constituted the other primary form of evidence of 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. Acting as evidence by proxy (chapter three) Locke reminded the 
jury that Hilberg had testified that a gas chamber had been reconstructed in the main camp 
of Auschwitz, that two gas chambers had been constructed at Birkenau in 1942, that had 
acted as 'temporary structures', with the bodies buried at this stage, and then 'four massive 
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extensive structures were built and labelled "crematoria" in 1943'.
82
 Hilberg had further 
testified that, once gassed, designated prisoners had worn gas masks 'when they were 
dragging out the bodies', that hair, and teeth containing gold, were removed from the 
corpses 'by different squads of camp workers, and yet others then took the bodies to be 
burned'.
83
 Hilberg had accepted that 'scientific documents or other types of documents' 
referring explicitly to homicidal gassing had not been found.
84
 However, he had insisted 
that it was 'unlikely' that the 'German hierarchy' would have produced documents that 
clearly stated they were killing people, hence the use of camouflage language surrounding 
extermination policy (chapter four).
85
 Yet, despite gaps in the documentary record, 
Hilberg had stated that 'numerous German documents … [showed] that gas was being 
delivered', and not 'solely, to fumigate clothing and buildings', 'independent evidence' had 
corroborated the Gerstein statement' on the delivery of Zyklon-B to the camp, aerial 
photographs revealed 'poisonous chemicals being employed by the Germans', 'documents 
and other writings' had 'caused him to form the opinion' that ventilators had been installed 
in the gas chambers, and that 'plans of the ovens' did exist.
86
 Locke noted that Hilberg had 
not brought these documents to the court, 'because he was not asked to'.
87
 Also, as the 
Crown had suggested, 'documents in the German language would do no good'.
88
 Hilberg 
had finally testified that 'approximately one million people', predominantly Jews, had 
been murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
89
 Although this was a lower figure than Vrba's, 
Hilberg had maintained that it had been calculated on the basis of 'much more information 
than had been at his [Vrba's] disposal'.
90
  
 
In contrast to the absence of contemporaneous documentation, a range of drawings, maps 
and photographs were foregrounded as visual evidence of the camp and its gassing 
                                                 
82
 Ibid, p101. 
83
 Ibid, p107. 
84
 Ibid, pp105-106. 
85
 Ibid, pp102, 105-106. 
86
 Unfortunately the relevant documents or writings are not identified by Locke, with the exception of the 
'Gerstein statement'. Ibid, pp102, 104-105, 107. See also: Her Majesty the Queen and Ernst Zündel 
(251/85), Appeal (1987), 'Respondent's Factum', p15, Ontario Court of Appeal. All proceeding references 
to the 1987 Appeal will be prefixed by ZT 1987. 
87
 ZT 1985, Vol. XXI, p102. According to the Crown, Hilberg had more accurately testified that it was 
because the introduction of documents into the court 'was for the Crown to decide', ZT 1987, 'Respondent's 
Factum', p14. 
88
 ZT 1985, Vol. XXI, p214. 
89
 ZT 1987. 'Respondent's Factum', p16. 
90
 Ibid. 
204 
apparatus.
91
 Those specifically highlighted were maps of the Auschwitz and Birkenau 
sites (Vrba, Müller), a map of crematoria I and II (Vrba), a drawing by Urstein (in the 
courtroom) of crematorium III, estimates from Vrba's 1944 report of the numbers of Jews 
gassed in Birkenau (1942-1944), and photographs of specific activities, buildings and 
personnel in the camp (the 'Auschwitz Album').
92
 However, since irrelevant to the facts 
expressed in DSMRD, evidence on the chemical properties and absorption rates of 
Zyklon-B was not submitted by the Crown but extracted through the cross-examination 
of the Defence's expert chemist, Dr Lindsay.
93
 More specifically, and aligned to denier 
charges, Lindsey was forced to admit that cyanide (Zyklon-B) is lighter in weight than 
air, and, therefore, if introduced onto the ground, it would rise slowly, that people standing 
would be killed, even if near to the floor, and that a small child would be killed first as 
nearer to the ground, at a specific saturation in the air (300 parts cyanide per million of 
air) death by inhalation can be as quick as 3 minutes, one of the treatments when coming 
into contact with cyanide is to soak the area with water to dilute it, and therefore, someone 
removing corpses killed by cyanide, but hosed down, would not die from the contact, that 
gas masks at that time did protect against cyanide, that it takes higher concentrations of 
cyanide to kill insects, such as lice, than it does to kill humans, and that corpses can 
generate heat when cremated and therefore act as fuel.
94
 Griffiths then concluded for the 
Crown: 
 
Yes, there were gas chambers, ladies and gentlemen, and that is the evidence 
in this trial. There is reliable evidence of that before you, and I’d like you to 
accept it. Having accepted it, put the lie to the allegations here that there were 
no gas chambers.
95
 
 
In the 1988 retrial the main form of evidence for the Crown was historian expertise 
through the testimony of Christopher Browning.
96
 Foregrounded from this testimony was 
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Browning's conclusions that experimental gassing had taken place at Auschwitz-Birkenau 
in 1941, that intended gassing had commenced 'on a larger scale' during 1942, that 
increased quantities of Zyklon-B had been 'shipped to Auschwitz during the Hungarian 
deportation' after March 1944, and that its 'gas chambers and crematoria' had been blown 
up prior to the camp's liberation in 1945.
97
 Also foregrounded was Browning's claim that 
Eichmann, in both his memoirs and testimony in 1961, had admitted to visiting the camp, 
had witnessed the 'farmsteads where the gas chambers were', agreed that the pellets of 
Zyklon-B in these gas chambers had been 'different from the carbon monoxide used 
elsewhere', and, in a note to his attorney, Robert Servatius, had firmly situated Höss (but 
not himself) in its killing programme.
98
 Likewise foregrounded was Browning's claim that 
Philip Müller, a 'sonderkommando' for three years at Auschwitz-Birkenau, had testified 
in 1979 to the gassing process in his book 'Eye Witness: Auschwitz'.
99
 Browning had 
insisted that Müller's testimony was 'very credible'.
100
   
 
In a trial in which Browning’s expertise acted as evidence by proxy (chapter three), 
contemporaneous documentation relating to Auschwitz-Birkenau was sparse. Indeed, the 
only item foregrounded in 1988 was a copy of a letter sent from Karl Bischoff (SS 
Construction Management Auschwitz) to Hans Kammler (Head of the Waffen SS Supply 
Department), dated 29 January 1943, as implicit evidence of 'ventilation systems' and 
explicit references to 'either a gassing chamber or a gassing cellar or a gassing room' in 
crematorium II.
101
 As the Crown had asserted, 'it really doesn’t matter whether it is 
chamber, cellar or room. The important point is that reference is made to gassing in the 
documents'.
102
 As in 1985, since of limited relevance to the statements of fact identified 
in DSMRD, but also in the absence of survivor testimony, the Crown's evidence of the 
gassing process was largely extracted through cross-examination of Defence witnesses, 
but this time Fred Leuchter, relating to what Christie had claimed was the ‘first on-site, 
scientific investigation’ of the camp, and James Roth (chemist), relating to Leuchter's 
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sampling procedure and conclusions.
103
 Foregrounded admissions from these witnesses 
accepted, once again, that cyanide is slightly lighter than air and rises very slowly, that 
those dropping Zyklon-B pellets from the roof would not be in danger, that cyanide gas 
forces the person to gulp for air and invokes sickness, headaches and vomiting, and, in 
direct opposition to Leuchter’s infamous conclusions, that the killing of lice required far 
greater amounts of cyanic gas than the killing of humans.
104
 The Crown had subsequently 
concluded that ‘the defence evidence about gas chambers really was much to do about 
nothing’.
105
  
 
In London in 2000 the main form of evidence was yet again historian expertise through 
the oral and written testimony of Robert Jan van Pelt. As with the other expert witnesses 
for the Defence, van Pelt's findings were contained in his commissioned report and 
submitted as 'evidence-in-chief'.
106
 His testimony, in support of this evidence, was 
therefore largely elicited through cross-examination by Irving.
107
 This testimony, and its 
subject reach, was extensive, covering, as outlined above, the architecture of gassing 
facilities, with additional focus on crematorium II, the physics of cremation, the chemistry 
of Zyklon-B and the human biology of gas absorption. Perpetrator testimony was once 
again a foundational source of evidence, but now represented through the report and 
testimony of van Pelt. Once again Höss' testimony at the IMT was foregrounded as proof 
of the introduction of Zyklon-B 'into the death chamber through a small opening', gas 
chamber capacity of '2,000 people at one time', a killing timescale of 3 to 15 minutes, the 
removal and desecration of the dead by 'Special commandos', and 'the extermination, by 
gassing and burning, of at least two and a half million' people, predominantly Jews.
108
 The 
testimony of architects (Walther Dejaco, Fritz Ertl), physicians (Drs Johann Paul Kremer 
and Fritz Klein) and SS officers (Hans Aumeier, Pery Broad) based at Auschwitz-
Birkenau further detailed the selection process of those sent to the gas chambers on 
arrival, the homicidal intent of the gas chambers, including the introduction of Zyklon-B 
through holes in the roof, or through 'a side opening', the increased capacity of crematoria 
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II and III, the removal of bodies into ovens, the construction of new crematoria for 
"special actions", with instructions 'that no reference should be made to gassing', and 
Himmler's order in 1944 for 'the cessation of gassing in Auschwitz and the dismantling 
of the extermination installations in the crematoria'.
109
  
 
Survivor testimony was also foregrounded, but again represented through van Pelt's report 
and testimony as corroborative evidence of the selection process, both on arrival and 
when subsequently deemed "unfit", the introduction of Zyklon-B into wire-meshed 
columns, the internal design and mechanics of the gas chambers and crematoria (from the 
gas-tight doors, peep holes, 'dummy' shower heads, mesh columns, and ventilation 
systems to the desecration and transfer of the bodies, the lifts, furnaces, pits and 
incineration process, including the self-burning of human fat) and the subsequent 
systematic murder of large numbers of Jews.
110
 This testimony, specifically David Olere's 
drawings, also comprised the primary source of evidence against Irving's challenge to the 
existence of chimneys on the roof of crematorium II.
111
  
 
Contemporaneous documentation likewise accompanied van Pelt's testimony, with a far 
greater number and range of items submitted than in the previous trials. Foremost, was 
copies of blueprint material found in the surviving archive of the ‘Central Construction 
Office’ at Auschwitz-Birkenau. More specifically, initial drawings of new buildings 
(crematoria IV and V), dated August 1942, demonstrated the incorporation of 'undressing 
rooms' (although not designated as such), 'morgues' (gas chambers according to van Pelt), 
several windows to be placed 'above eye level' (coinciding with windows in other 
documents required to be gas proof according to van Pelt) and a drainage system, 'which 
appears to link up with the camp sewage system'.
112
 Additional drawings, produced in late 
1942, demonstrated the redesign of the entrance to crematorium II, moving it to the street 
side of the building (for access from the railway station according to van Pelt), the 
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replacement of a slide into the morgue/chamber (when initially intended for corpses) by 
a new stairway (now intended for 'living people to walk downstairs' according to van 
Pelt), and the provision of ventilation into the chamber of crematorium II (to extract 
poisonous air and so speed up the removal of the corpses to the incinerators according to 
van Pelt).
113
 Finally, a 'fresh drawing', dated 19 December 1942, demonstrated the 
redesign of the double door leading into the chamber of crematorium II to open outwards 
(since impossible to open inwards as initially designed against the 'crush of corpses 
against … the door of those who struggled to get out' according to van Pelt).
114
 Also 
unique to the trial was the submission of a computer-generated model of crematorium II 
(presented as a slide show) reconstructed by van Pelt from these blueprints.
115
  
 
Additional contemporaneous documentation was further foregrounded as evidence of the 
extension of both gassing and cremation capacity at Auschwitz-Birkenau from 1942. This 
documentation, when organised chronologically ranged from a patent application for 
'multi-muffle ovens', made by the Topf engineering company (although not specific to 
Auschwitz-Birkenau but operating on the same principle as the ovens supplied to the 
camp in 1942/43), the record of a meeting between members of the ‘Auschwitz 
Construction Office’ and Topf on 19 August 1942, as evidence of discussions on the 
construction of four crematoria and 'triple oven incinerators near the … "bath-houses for 
special actions"', a report by Heinrich Kinna (Main Personnel Office SS), dated 16 
December 1942, as proof of an order to liquidate 'limited people, idiots, cripples and sick 
people', a letter from Karl Bischoff to Hans Kammler, dated 29 January 1943, indicating 
the reference to the use of a 'Vergasungskammer' (gas chamber or cellar), a letter from 
the camp to the Topf company, dated 6 March 1943, as proof of the use of hot air to pre-
heat the morgue in crematorium II, a further letter from Bischoff, dated 31 March 1943, 
as evidence of the request for the 'delivery of a gastight door with a spyhole of 8mm glass, 
with a rubber seal and metal fitting', the timesheet of a construction worker at the camp, 
as evidence of the fitting of 'gastight windows' to crematorium IV, and finally a letter 
from Bischoff to Kammler, dated 28 June 1943, as proof of the intended murder of 4,756 
people every 24 hours in the five crematoria at the camp.
116
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Further corroborative evidence was provided by a number of photographs and reports of 
forensic findings. Two contemporaneous photographs were foregrounded as proof of 
chimneys on the roof of crematorium II in both 1942 and 1944.
117
 An additional 
photograph was foregrounded as evidence of Hungarian women and children, on arrival 
at the camp in 1944, walking from the railway spur towards crematorium II rather than to 
the women and children's section of the camp.
118
 A chronological record of post-war 
forensic findings was also foregrounded as corroborative evidence of cyanide found in 
the zinc covers of the ventilation openings removed from the gas chambers at Birkenau 
immediately after the war, as well as in 25.5kg of human hair recovered from the camp, 
and in the remaining bricks of the gas chambers tested in 1990.
119
 As the Defence 
contended this: 
 
substantial body of evidence … should demonstrate to any fair-minded 
objective commentator that gas chambers were constructed at Auschwitz and 
that they were used to extermination [sic] Jews on a massive scale.
120
  
 
It is obvious that common and familiar themes on Auschwitz-Birkenau emerged from the 
discrete data-streams foregrounded. However, as to be expected, distinct facts were 
established in accordance with those 'in issue'. In 1961, the Judges found that Auschwitz-
Birkenau had been 'the largest of the extermination camps' and constituted a 'reign of 
terror … in the shadow of the smoke going up from the crematoria'.
121
 They likewise 
found that Eichmann had played an integral role in this ‘reign of terror’. More 
specifically, the use of Zyklon-B, as a 'system of carrying out executions', may have been 
initiated by Höss' deputy, Karl Fritzsch, to kill Russian POWs, but it was Eichmann, 
jointly with Höss, who had decided to extend its use to the 'mass killing of Jews' after 
visits to the camp in the autumn of 1941.
122
 Eichmann had also been involved in the supply 
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of large quantities of Zyklon-B to Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1944.
123
 Although it had been 
ordered by Günther, the Judges ruled that 'the activities of ... the Accused's deputy, are to 
be attributed prima facie to the Accused'.
124
 They also found that Günther, 'with the 
knowledge of the Accused', had attempted to introduce Zyklon-B to the other 
extermination camps in 1942, but he had not been successful and they continued to use 
'motor exhaust gas'.
125
 
 
The Judges ruled that Eichmann had been in control of the delivery of victims to the camp, 
and, despite the administrative authority of the Economic-Administrative Head Office 
(EAHO), had continued to exercise command over their fate. They found that those routed 
to Auschwitz-Birkenau through IVB4 had been categorised as "Transport Jews", and 
'condemned to death by a general decree … by the Accused’s Section'.
126
 It had also been 
within Eichmann's competence: 
 
to give instructions in advance that a specific transport should not be taken 
off for immediate extermination, but only after some time had elapsed, as laid 
down by him.
127
  
 
The Judges likewise found that Eichmann had been one of three recipients of reports 
notifying him of the transports sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau, and had likewise been 
informed of those executed in the camp (on the orders of Himmler and Heinrich Müller) 
as punishment.
 128
 The Judges further found that Eichmann had been actively involved in 
the policy of plunder at the camp: 
 
 … since he was responsible for bringing the victims to the camps where the 
acts were committed, with the knowledge that these acts would be 
committed.
129
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Eichmann had likewise been complicit throughout the 'skeleton industry'.
130
 More 
specifically, the Judges found that Eichmann, either directly or through Günther, had 
given the necessary instructions to the personnel at Auschwitz-Birkenau for the selection 
and delivery of prisoners to the Natzweiler camp, 'knowing for certain that the end of 
these detainees would be their execution'.
131
 The Judges further found that it had been 
Himmler, and not Eichmann, who had initiated the 'Blood for Goods' proposal, but 
Eichmann had 'carried it out'.
132
 They found that Eichmann's 'whole effort to appear now 
before this Court as the initiator of the above transaction is nothing but a lie'.
133
 Rather, at 
the time of the negotiations, Eichmann: 
 
was not engaged in preparations for the emigration of 100,000 Jews, as he 
had the temerity to allege in his evidence, but in the deportation of all 
Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz at an accelerated pace, that is to say, the 
extermination of those Jews who still remained in German hands and who 
were to be the subject of barter against goods.
134
 
 
Somewhat uniquely, the Judges disputed the testimony of Joel Brand when claiming that 
Eichmann had 'promised him to blow up the extermination installations at Auschwitz the 
moment an agreement was concluded'.
135
 Since it had not been mentioned in Mr Sharett's 
report (of his meeting with Brand) the Judges found it 'inconceivable' that such an 
important promise would not have been put in writing if 'communicated to him by 
Brand'.
136
  
 
The Judges finally found, in accordance with Höss' testimony, that the numbers of Jews 
murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau had totalled between 1.5 and 2.5 million, although they 
chose to 'refrain from deciding which is the correct figure'.
137
 However, although they 
found Höss' testimony on the extermination process to be 'authentic', since corroborated 
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by its survivors, the Judges found insufficient evidence to support his statement that 
Eichmann had 'brought him the order for the extraction of gold teeth and the cutting off 
of women's hair …,' or the order from Himmler 'for the … burning of the bodies', or that 
he had expressed the view on the immediate extermination of those routed to Auschwitz-
Birkenau by IVB4.
138
 The Judges likewise found that Eichmann did not have the authority 
to initiate the orders of punishment in the camp.
139
 'Accordingly, the Accused will have 
the benefit of the doubt'.
140
 Consequently, although placing Eichmann at every stage of 
Auschwitz's genocide from late 1941 to the mass murder of Hungarian Jewry in 1944, the 
Judges did not find him in 'complete control' over the Jews sent to the camp as indicted 
by the Prosecution.
141
 
 
It is again unfortunate that there is no record of the facts or narratives authorised on the 
subject of Auschwitz-Birkenau in either the 1985 or 1988 Zündel trials. Once again both 
Judges summarised the cases relevant to the camp and provided some basic instructions 
to their respective juries. In 1985 Judge Locke highlighted the corroborative weight of 
survivor testimony, and maintained that Hilberg had been 'consistent', and therefore a 
'great weight should be given to his evidence'.
142
 He reminded the jury that the Crown's 
primary eyewitness, Rudolf Vrba, had 'testified at great length' on his observations; from 
the selection process at the ramp dividing Auschwitz and Birkenau to the 'bundling' and 
removal of gassed bodies 'to the crematorium to be burned'.
143
 Locke also reminded the 
jury that Vrba had counted the trucks delivering the bodies to the crematoria 'day and 
night' and it was through 'that method that he … estimated the numbers of people who he 
saw enter but never come out'.
144
 Vrba had subsequently calculated the murder of 1.765 
million Jewish civilians during the time he had been imprisoned at the camp. Locke 
therefore suggested:  
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I do not think there is any problem … with you concluding that he saw what 
he saw, if you accept that; but he did not see anyone actually gassed.
145
  
 
Locke also reminded the jury of Urstein's direct participation in the removal of gassed 
bodies in crematorium III.
146
 Once again, although he had not directly witnessed 'anyone 
actually gassed', Urstein had insisted: 
 
“You see the selection. People aren't shot. The Nazis have a way to put them 
away. It's like the Humane Society gassing cats; they don't shoot them, they 
gas them”.
147
  
 
In response to specific facts in DSMRD, but also central to overall denier treatise, Locke 
also reminded the jury of admissions elicited from Defence witnesses during cross-
examinations that related to the properties and absorption of Zyklon-B, the removal of 
gassed bodies, the presence of smoke from the chimneys, 'when the trains did come in', 
and the self-fuelling of human fat.
148
 In relation to denier attempts to challenge the 
feasibility of the homicidal use of gas chambers based on the remaining ruins of the camp, 
Locke finally reminded the jury that ' what exists on the ground today cannot be compared 
to what may have existed then … which were taken apart brick by brick and dismantled 
as the Russians moved west … '.
149
  
 
In 1988 Judge Thomas was arguably more candid in his 'charge' than Locke. Indicative 
was his reminder to the jury that: 
 
there have been numerous trials in the world … and there has been no 
evidence called in this court room to indicate to you at any time in the past 
anyone has suggested that gas chambers did not exist.
150
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Thomas also reminded the jury that, under cross-examination, the Defence's key expert 
on gassing and incineration design and process, Fred Leuchter, had been forced to admit 
that he did not have 'the expertise required to reach the type of conclusion that he reached 
… [and] that became clear when basic questions were put to him'.
151
 In particular, 
Leuchter's findings on the effects of Zyklon-B on humans had been 'totally unfounded'.
152
 
As Thomas further reminded the jury, in addition to the invalid methodology of 
examining memorial sites, 'more than forty years after the event', Leuchter had admitted 
‘that he had not done a great deal of research before he went … he had not looked at the 
documentation … .
153
 
 
Thomas likewise reminded the jury that, under cross-examination, Defence witness, 
James Roth, had testified that Leuchter’s sampling procedure had been ‘unscientific’, 
while the conclusions of their expert historian, David Irving, ‘comes from … a man who 
has been able to profit substantially from his writings … in which he absolves Hitler from 
any significant blame in the matter … '.
154
 However, conversely, Thomas also reminded 
the jury that Browning had accepted that: 
 
there is no document in existence ordering the commencement of gassings … 
no documents ordering the stopping of gassings, no document setting out the 
organizational plan or blueprint to carry out gassings … and no autopsy report 
of any person killed by Zyklon-B.
155
 
 
He likewise noted that although the delivery of a ventilation system for the gas chambers 
was implied in the Bischoff/Kammler letter, dated 29 January 1943, this conclusion was 
‘hearsay’.
156
 Once again, there is no way to confirm if any of the comments made and 
raised by the respective Judges formed any of the facts or narratives subsequently 
authorised on Auschwitz-Birkenau by the juries in 1985 or 1988. 
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In London in 2000 Judge Gray acknowledged that the only general fact initially agreed 
by both parties had been:  
 
 … that from the autumn of 1941 large numbers of Jews were deported to 
Auschwitz from Germany and from the eleven other countries which had 
been occupied or formed part of Nazi controlled Europe.
157
 
 
The overall question that he had to decide upon was: 
 
whether the available evidence, considered in its totality, would convince any 
objective and reasonable historian that Auschwitz was not merely one of the 
many concentration or labour camps established by the Nazi regime but that 
it also served as a death or extermination camp, where hundreds of thousands 
of Jews were systematically put to death in gas chambers over the period from 
late 1941 until 1944.
158
  
 
Gray found that, as the trial had progressed, Irving had ‘modified his position’, and had 
accepted that 'there was at least one gas chamber (or "cellar") at Auschwitz, albeit used 
solely or mainly for the fumigation of clothing'.
159
 Irving had also accepted 'that gassing 
of Jews had taken place at the camp "on some scale"', but 'firmly denied … that 500,000 
Jews were killed in morgue 1 of crematorium 2'.
160
 In light of these concessions, but also 
the consistent claim of the Defence that 'almost one million Jews were put to death in the 
gas chambers of Auschwitz', Gray focused his findings on the scale of the gassings.
161
 In 
a summary of the arguments, evidence and rebuttal relevant to the capacity of the 
homicidal apparatus at the camp (see above), he specifically found that the 'first and most 
significant body of … contemporaneous documentary records' was the 'blue print 
material' found in the camp's surviving archive of the ‘Central Construction Office’.
162
 
But, in place of overt references, van Pelt had: 
 
                                                 
157
 HRIRH, (TB) T2, 'Judgement', para. 7.5. 
158
 Ibid. 
159
 Ibid, para. 13.69. 
160
 Ibid. 
161
 Ibid, paras. 13.69-13.70. 
162
 Ibid, paras. 7.1-7.130, 7.58-7.59. 
216 
sought to illustrate by means of detailed analyses of certain features of the 
drawings that it reasonable [sic] to infer that certain chambers were designed 
to function as gas chambers.
163
 
 
Arising from these analyses, Gray found that this material had clearly depicted both the 
adaptation of crematoria II and III and the new construction of crematoria IV and V.
164
 
More specifically, the drawing of the redesign of crematorium II in 1942 constituted 
'powerful evidence that the morgue was to be used to gas live human beings who had 
been able to walk downstairs'.
165
 Conversely, there was 'no hint in the documents' that the 
redesign of crematoria II and III aimed to convert the buildings into air raid shelters as 
Irving contended.
166
 As corroborative evidence, Gray found that the Bischoff letter, dated 
31 March 1943, requisitioning 'a gas-tight door with a spy-hole of extra thickness', had to 
indicate homicidal intention, since it was 'difficult to see why a spy-hole would be 
necessary in the door of a chamber used only for fumigating corpses or other objects'.
167
 
The Bischoff/Kammler letter, dated 28 June 1943, was 'further cogent evidence of 
genocidal gassing', because the figures provided on the incineration capacity of the five 
crematoria 'cannot have been needed to incinerate those who succumbed to disease'.
168
 
Gray also found, from the rates of incineration referenced in this letter, that 'if the 
incinerators were operated continuously and many corpses were burnt together … no 
more than 3.5kg of coke would have been required per corpse' rather than the 35kg 
premised by Irving.
169
  
 
Gray likewise found that the similarity of eyewitness accounts, 'and the extent to which 
they are consistent with the documentary evidence … would require exceedingly 
powerful reasons to reject it'.
170
 In particular, the account provided by Henry Tauber 
(Sonderkommando) was 'so clear and detailed that …. no objective historian would 
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dismiss it as invention unless there were powerful reasons for doing so'.
171
 It was also 
corroborated by the testimony of Stanislov Jankowski and Schlomo Dragon 
(Sonderkommando).
172
 Gray also found that the testimony of Höss and Pery Broad (SS) 
appeared 'credible to a dispassionate student of Auschwitz' and he could find no evidence 
of 'cross-pollination' in their accounts.
173
  
 
Gray further found that 'the apparent absence of evidence of holes in the roof of morgue 
[sic] at crematorium 2 falls far short of being a good reason for rejecting the cumulative 
effect of the evidence on which the Defendants rely'.
174
 He confirmed that Irving had 
finally accepted that the 'Leuchter Report' was both 'fundamentally flawed' and had 'no 
[methodological] validity'.
175
 In particular, Leuchter had been wrong when assuming 'that 
a greater concentration of cyanide would have been required to kill humans than was 
required to fumigate clothing'.
176
 Subsequently, no 'objective historian': 
 
would have regarded the Leuchter report as a sufficient reason for dismissing, 
or even doubting, the convergence of evidence on which the Defendants rely 
for the presence of homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz.
177
  
 
However, Gray was ‘sympathetic’ to Irving’s claim that the contemporaneous 
documentation 'yield little clear evidence of the existence of gas chambers designed to 
kill humans'.
178
 He agreed that the ‘isolated references to the use of gas … can be 
explained by the need to fumigate clothes so as to reduce the incidence of diseases such 
as typhus’.
179
 Similarly, the quantities of Zyklon-B delivered to the camp, 'may arguably 
be explained by the need to fumigate clothes and other objects'.
180
 Furthermore, 'the 
photographic evidence for the existence of chimneys protruding through the roof of 
morgue 1 at crematorium 2 is, I accept, hard to interpret'.
181
 Gray likewise accepted that 
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Irving had made ‘valid comments’ about the unreliability of various accounts made by 
both perpetrators and survivors.
182
 In such accounts, he agreed, there is the possibility of 
exaggeration, while 'various motives … such as greed and resentment (in the case of 
survivors) and fear and the wish to ingratiate themselves with their captors (in the case of 
camp officials)' can lead to invention and even false record.
183
 However, when considering 
the combined effect of the 'convergent evidence relied on by the Defendants', Gray 
concluded: 
 
 … that no objective, fair-minded historian would have serious cause to doubt 
that there were gas chambers at Auschwitz and that they were operated on a 
substantial scale to kill hundreds of thousands of Jews.
184
 
 
It is therefore obvious that the narratives both foregrounded and authorised at each trial 
were evidentially accountable and ‘truth-full’ in content in accordance with the legal 
demands of each case. Furthermore, despite discrete ‘facts-in-issue’, a generic 
historiographical record of Auschwitz-Birkenau also emerged and informed these 
narratives. This record acknowledged that Auschwitz (I) had initially served as a 
concentration camp, and then a key slave labour camp, under the direct management of 
Rudolf Höss and the administration and command of the EAHO, but also influenced by 
and through the official personnel of Himmler and the RSHA, that hundreds of thousands 
of Jews from allied and occupied Europe had been transported (by Eichmann) to its main 
and surrounding sites, that survival in its labour camps had been brutal and short, that 
gassing chambers and crematoria (both adapted and newly constructed) were located at 
the main camp (Crematorium I) but predominantly at Birkenau (Crematoria II-V) from 
1942, that supplies of Zyklon-B had been delivered as their unique killing agent, that 
selections directed transports of Jews into the gas chambers on arrival, with the deaths of 
vast numbers of civilians unregistered, that deception and plunder accompanied the 
gassing process, with the desecration of the bodies continuing after death in the removal 
of gold teeth from all corpses and hair from the women, that the gassed bodies were 
largely incinerated in ovens but also in pits, and, despite regular break-downs, the 
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outcome was the murder of hundreds of thousands of predominantly Jewish civilians.
185
 
This record did not contradict the prevailing historiography on the camp across the 
relevant decades and remains familiar in present-day Holocaust scholarship.
186
 
 
The comparative reconstruction of homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau 
therefore confirms a case-specific focus in accordance with the 'facts in issue' governing 
the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials. Accordingly, it also confirms fundamental 
changes of historiographical focus in the later trials that would have been 
incomprehensible to the court in Israel in 1961. To doubt the fact of homicidal gas 
chambers and crematoria at 'the largest and most terrible of the extermination camps’ was 
not an option in 1961, while an architectural examination of their apparatus, far less the 
demand for proof of holes in the roof of one of the crematoria, would have been anathema 
to the Israeli case, court and public audience.
187
 Likewise, the forensic probing of the 
burning capacity of coke and ovens, far less human corpses, would have been met with 
incredulity. And yet, rather paradoxically, given Hausner's intended grand narrative of 
mass slaughter in 1961, and in contrast to denier tactic from the 1980s, insight into 
Auschwitz-Birkenau and its genocide was far more extensive in the later trials, especially 
in 2000, than both presented and reconstructed in 1961. This insight reflected the greater 
focus that had been placed on the camp after 1961, and consequently its primary target of 
Holocaust denier strategy. But it was also the outcome of the distinct focus on and 
forensic examination of the killing apparatus and process itself. Consequently, although 
the later trials reduced the historiography of the camp to mechanistic narratives of gassing 
and incineration apparatus and practice, they not only corroborated but augmented the 
long-established scholarship of Auschwitz-Birkenau.
188
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It is clearly shown that a diverse evidential base existed that was capable of 
accommodating and supporting the historiographical and legal demands relating to the 
camp. This evidential base differed in both content and form, but it was also extended 
after 1961 to incorporate historian expertise and opinion, a chronology of primary source 
material, specifically architectural blueprints, and computer-generated modelling by 
2000. It is rather surprising that, once again, the items shared across all four trials were 
minimal, while eyewitness testimony, both perpetrator and survivor, remained the 
primary form of both evidence and fact. More specifically, despite consistent denier 
challenges, (since viewed as two of the 'three-pillars' of "exterminationist" evidence), and 
contemporary acknowledgement of their flaws, the historiographical and legal value and 
weight of the Rudolf Höss and Kurt Gerstein testimonies, alongside Eichmann, has 
persisted since 1961.
189
 Likewise, despite both denier and legal challenges to their 
credibility, survivor accounts of life, death and survival at Auschwitz-Birkenau have 
retained their evidential probity and status. Indeed, the consistency, and therefore 
corroboration, of content across eyewitness testimonies since 1961 is striking. 
Furthermore, despite being procedurally challenged and confined in 1985, and 
intentionally absent from directly testifying in the courtrooms of 1988 and 2000 (chapter 
three), survivors continued to find their voice in these trials, albeit not without question 
as in 1961 and largely obscured by the minutiae of the murder process.  
 
That said, it is also clear that, despite the compatibility and extension of evidence 
foregrounded by 2000, the data-stream of this integral historiography of the Holocaust is 
not infallible. Although recognised in both Israel and Canada, it was in London that the 
evidential ambiguity of the homicidal utility of the camp was specifically exposed and 
verified. In fact, the continued primacy of eyewitness testimony reaffirms the ambiguity 
of the documentary record as well as its experiential credibility and value. And yet, as 
noted in chapter two, despite their necessity to the historiography of Auschwitz-Birkenau, 
perpetrator and survivor testimony is allocated secondary status as a 'soft' (and subjective) 
option by both history and Anglo-American law. 
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It is likewise clear that varying facts were established in accordance with those 'in issue', 
while the authorised narratives, however grand in content and reach, remained partial in 
accordance with the focus on Eichmann, and specific charges, in 1961, and gassing and 
incineration apparatus, capacity and homicidal utility in 1985, 1988 and 2000. However, 
with the exception of Eichmann's elevated role in the camp found in 1961, and most 
notably his authorisation of Birkenau as the site of extermination and primary influence 
over the introduction of Zyklon-B into its gas chambers, neither facts nor narratives were 
contradictory. Rather, the content of a generic record of life, death and survival in the 
camp had remained consistent between 1961 and 2000 and remains familiar in present-
day Holocaust scholarship.  
 
Once again, the narratives authorised on homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau 
were 'cooked' in accordance with the focus on Eichmann's authority in 1961, and, in 
response to denier strategy and tactic since the 1980s, the foregrounding of the minutiae 
of the killing process in 1985, 1988 and 2000. But, all narratives were also empirically 
accountable and 'truth-full' in content in accordance with the demands of each legal case. 
Once again, the consistency of fact and record across all four trials implied a form of past 
evidential constraint. However, comparative reconstruction of this integral, and iconic, 
symbol of Holocaust historiography clearly exposed the primacy of preconceived and 
prefigured narratives governing the past traces in each courtroom.
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Chapter Seven: The Total Number of Jewish Victims 
 
The murder of six million Jewish citizens of Europe, as the consequence of Nazi-initiated 
genocide, is a foundational fact of Holocaust historiography. It is also notorious as public 
record. It is therefore not surprising that the total number of Jewish victims was often 
noted and discretely investigated at the criminal trials of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and 
Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the libel case instigated by David Irving (2000), but for 
different legal (and extra-legal) reasons. Comparative reconstruction of both this fact and 
its various calculations and contexts once again reveals the diversity of accounts 
presented in accordance with those ‘in issue’. It subsequently records the transition of 
focus from perpetrator cognisance and responsibility in 1961 to typical denier charges of 
exaggeration and invention by the 1980s. It also records that, despite an extensive data-
stream, this precise total was not authorised at any of the four trials.  
 
Comparative reconstruction also reveals that, given the unique focus on Eichmann’s 
culpability in 1961, discrete facts were found at this trial’. But they were not incompatible 
to those established in the later trials. Rather, and despite the acknowledged imprecision 
of census data and statistics, a consensus emerged across all four trials over the numbers 
of Jewish citizens murdered at the various stages of the genocide, the eradication of Polish 
Jewry in particular and the total loss of between five and six million 'innocent lives'.
1
 
However, in light of the imprecision of statistical data, it is shown that the Judge at the 
‘Irving trial’ was rather cautious in his relevant conclusions and arguably did not place 
the five to six million deaths beyond further denier challenges.  
 
Comparative reconstruction likewise clearly demonstrates that the narratives authorised 
across all four trials were 'cooked' in accordance with the focus on Eichmann in 1961, 
and the various challenges to the six million figure in 1985, 1988 and 2000. But, they 
were also empirically accountable and 'truth-full' in content. Yet again, the consistency 
of figures across the various sites of mass murder and in total implied the dominance of 
past evidential, and more specifically statistical, constraint, regardless of their varying 
utility. However, comparative reconstruction clearly shows that preconceived and 
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prefigured narratives both determined and governed the relevant evidence, even when 
quantitative in content.  
 
 
The notorious fact that a total of six million Jewish citizens of Europe had been murdered 
as a consequence of Nazi-initiated genocide was regularly referenced across the criminal 
trials of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the libel case 
instigated by David Irving (2000), with the focus of attention ranging from perpetrator 
knowledge and responsibility in 1961 to direct confrontation of the numbers killed in 
1985, 1988 and 2000. In 1961, Eichmann was directly charged with the murder of 
millions of Jewish citizens between 1939 and 1945, while in 1985, 1988 and 2000, in 
response to denier accusations of exaggeration and invention, attention was placed on 
both the facticity and feasibility of the six million figure. In all four cases the 
establishment of the number of Jews murdered at the various stages of extermination 
policy were incorporated within a range of historiographical debates, such as the 
Einsatzgruppen mass shootings and those gassed at Auschwitz-Birkenau, but discrete 
attention was also paid to the total number of Jewish victims at each trial.  
 
In Israel the first count of the indictment specifically charged Eichmann with 'causing the 
deaths of millions of Jews' between 1939 and 1945.
2
 A precise figure was not formally 
stated, but, as infamously asserted by Gideon Hausner in his opening address: 
 
When I stand before you here, Judges of Israel, to lead the Prosecution of 
Adolf Eichmann, I am not standing alone. With me are six million accusers. 
But they cannot rise to their feet and point an accusing finger towards him 
who sits in the dock and cry: "I accuse".
3
 
 
The figure of six million also continued to be presented throughout the Prosecution's 
case.
4
 And, although recognising that the perpetrators had extended beyond the 'leaders 
of the nation', it was Eichmann who had to bear responsibility as if with his own hands 
he had 'lashed the victims into the gas chambers, who shot in the back and pushed into 
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the open pit every single one of the millions who were slaughtered'.
5
 In his defence 
Eichmann did not dispute that millions of Jews had been murdered and admitted to a 
figure of five million during his pre-trial interrogation.
6
 However, once in court, he 
claimed that the five million figure had referred to the killing of all 'enemies of the Reich' 
and not solely Jewish civilians.
7
 In terms of individual responsibility, Eichmann 
acknowledged 'human guilt', because of his role in the deportation of Jews to their death, 
but consistently denied legal guilt since he had not ordered the killings.
8
 Rather, faced 
with 'Acts of State', he had been 'simply a tool in the hands of stronger powers and 
stronger forces, and of an inexorable fate'.
9
 Governed by the indictment, the Prosecution, 
therefore, had to prove the numerical consequences of the Holocaust alongside 
Eichmann's cognisance of and complicity in its total slaughter.  
 
In Canada, in both 1985 and 1988, a total figure of six million murdered Jews was again 
specifically referenced but now explicitly contested. As indicated in the title of the denier 
tract under scrutiny, 'Did Six Million Really Die?' (DSMRD), the overall thesis asserted 
an 'imaginary slaughter'.
10
 More specifically, individual statements contained within 
DSMRD claimed that less than 300,000 Jews had been killed in camps during the war, 
that the six million 'allegation' was numerically impossible, since there had been less than 
this number of Jews living in the relevant European territories prior to 1939, and that its 
figure had been the invention of post-war propaganda.
11
 As stated in 1985, by the 
Defence's legally qualified expert, Robert Faurisson: 
 
 … when you ask a Frenchman how many Frenchmen died during the War, a 
Frenchman usually doesn’t know … but everybody knows that six million 
Jews died. It’s not because the information is right, accurate. It is because it 
is repeated and repeated and repeated.
12
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Consequently, the Crown in both 1985 and 1988 was forced to prove both the facticity 
and feasibility of the six million figure.  
 
The notorious fact of six million Jewish deaths had similarly been denied by David Irving, 
forcing yet another rebuttal of alternative and much smaller figures in London in 2000.
13
 
As explicitly stated by Richard Evans, in his expert report on behalf of the Defence, the 
claim that 'far less than six million' Jews had been 'killed by the Nazis' was one of four 
core 'beliefs' of a Holocaust denier.
14
 Although exact figures were not provided by Irving, 
he accepted that 'between one and two million Jews' had been 'deliberately murdered … 
during the course of the War' by means other than disease, overwork or starvation.
15
 He 
specifically identified one million deaths through mass shootings on the Eastern front, 
and an unstated number through the use of gas vans, since witnessed by Eichmann.
16
 The 
disparity between his two million figure and the five to six million Jewish victims that, 
as also recorded by Evans, defined the Holocaust, directly related to Irving's denial that 
millions of Jews had been murdered by gas in extermination camps.
17
 Rather, according 
to Irving, the acclaimed 'factories of death' had been the propaganda invention of British 
intelligence officers during the war.
18
 Consequently, as in Canada, the huge disparity of 
figures forced the Defence to prove the facticity of the numbers murdered alongside the 
wider focus on the reality and utility of both gassing apparatus and extermination camps 
(chapter six).  
 
A discrete evidential base was subsequently foregrounded across all four trials in 
accordance with the 'facts in issue'. The exception was the mutual use of the 
Einsatzgruppen reports, as evidence of the number of Jews murdered by mass shootings.
19
 
As shown in chapter five, although varying reports were submitted in each courtroom, a 
consensus emerged over the numbers murdered by these killing units, as well as the 
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privations of war. However, additional evidence was necessary in each trial to prove the 
murder, and, in Israel, Eichmann's direct knowledge and responsibility, of much larger 
numbers of Jewish civilians. In 1961, and unique for this trial, Salo Baron (Professor of 
Jewish History, Columbia University) was legally admitted as an expert historian, who, 
in amongst his testimony on the breadth and contribution of Jewish culture and life prior 
to the Holocaust, identified the overall fall of world Jewry from 16.5 million in 1939 to 
10.5 million in 1945; a clear six million loss.
20
 Baron also detailed the removal of Jewish 
populations in specific countries, most prominently Poland, 'the country where there had 
been approximately 3,300,000 Jews' prior to 1939 and only '73,955' remaining in August 
1945.
21
 Baron accepted that he was not a 'statistician', but testified that estimates could be 
calculated on the basis of 'several sources'; in particular the ‘Polish Commission’ census, 
15 August 1945, and a general survey documented by Gregory Frumkin of 'Population 
Changes in Europe Since 1939'.
22
 Baron also noted that the six million figure had been 
'stated by the Nuremberg Tribunal'.
23
  
 
However, the key form of evidence, of both the facticity of millions of Jewish deaths and 
Eichmann's cognisance of and responsibility for their 'inexorable fate', was perpetrator 
testimony, including Eichmann. As shown in chapter six, Rudolf Höss had detailed the 
gassing of between 1.5 and 2.5 million Jews at Auschwitz-Birkenau, as well as 
Eichmann's leading role in the murder process in the camp.
24
 But the main focus of 
attention relating to the total number of Jewish victims was on the testimonies of those 
who claimed to have witnessed Eichmann's confession, in the face of Germany's military 
defeat, to his role in the murder of five to six million Jews. Foregrounded by the 
Prosecution were extracts from Theodor Horst Grell's testimony (Jewish Affairs Section, 
Foreign Ministry, Budapest) to a German court on 14 June 1961, as evidence that 
Eichmann, in a conversation in the late autumn of 1944, had identified himself as war 
criminal number one in the eyes of the enemy powers and admitted that “he had some six 
million people on his conscience”.
25
 Likewise, extracts from Dr Wilhelm Hoettl's 
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testimony (Group leader, Department VI, RSHA), at both the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) and in an Austrian court on 19 June 1961, showed that, in a discussion 
on the inevitability of the Russian advance, Eichmann had exclaimed that “he stood no 
chance anymore … in view of his role in the programme to exterminate the Jews, the 
Allies were considering him to be a top war criminal”.
26
 Furthermore, when Hoettl had 
asked for the total figure of Jews “exterminated”, Eichmann had estimated some six 
million; 4 million in extermination camps and 2 million by shootings, disease etc.
27
 Hoettl 
also testified that Eichmann had shown no remorse at this slaughter.
28
 Extracts from 
Dieter Wisliceny's testimony (Eichmann's Deputy), in an affidavit signed at the IMT on 
14 November 1945, likewise documented that at their last meeting in February 1945 
Eichmann had claimed:  
 
I will laugh when I jump into the grave because of the feeling that I have 
killed 5,000,000 Jews. That gives me great satisfaction and gratification.
29
 
 
The only form of secondary source material specifically foregrounded as numerical 
evidence of Jewish deaths was the 'Polish Commission' Reports.
30
 According to these 
‘Reports’, approximately 1.75 million Jews had been murdered at the 'Operation 
Reinhard' and Majdanek camps: 700,000 at Treblinka; approximately 600,000 at Belzec; 
at least 250,000 at Sobibor; and 200,000 at Majdanek.
31
  
 
In Canada, in both 1985 and 1988, the Crown attempted to secure judicial notice of the 
notorious fact that millions of Jews had been systematically murdered by the Nazi 
regime.
32
 In 1985 the request was rejected on legal grounds, while specific numbers were 
omitted from the general fact judicially noticed in 1988 (chapter three). Since forced to 
rebut the much lower numbers of Jewish deaths cited by DSMRD, the main form of 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, p1519. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid, Vol. I, p202. 
30
 See footnote 23. 
31
 AET, Vol. V, pp2149, 2151. 
32
 In 1985 the fact requested for judicial notice stated that 'millions of Jews had died from 1939 to 1945 in 
Europe as a result of a concerted effort by Germany to annihilate them’, ZT 1985, Vol. III, 1985, p480. For 
the Crown's argument on judicial notice see Vol. X, pp2072, 2103, 2115-2121, 2170. In 1988 the fact 
noticed was of the Holocaust as the 'mass murder and extermination of Jews by the Nazi regime during the 
Second World War', ZT 1988, Vol. VI, p1010. For the debate and ruling on judicial notice in 1988 see, 
Ibid, pp995-1010. 
228 
evidence at both trials was the testimony of historians Raul Hilberg (1985) and 
Christopher Browning (1988). In 1985, in addition to references to the Einsatzgruppen 
reports, as evidence of the numbers of Jews murdered by mass shootings (chapter five), 
and the testimony of Rudolf Vrba, relating to the murder of 1.75 million Jews whilst 
imprisoned at Auschwitz-Birkenau (chapter six), Hilberg foregrounded, but did not 
submit, four primary sources. Acting as evidence by proxy, Hilberg claimed that the 
'Korherr Report' (1942-1943), comprising monthly statistics of Jewish populations in 
regions then under German control, had documented their consistent decline 'as people 
died'.
33
 From this ‘Report’ historians had accurately documented a Jewish population of 
around 3.35 million in Poland in September 1939 and only 50,000 remaining in 1945.
34
 
Jewish Council reports of ghetto populations had similarly detailed the death of Jews 
through disease, and other privations, in the relevant sites as well as the numbers deported 
to the varying extermination camps.
35
 The 'Stroop Report' had specifically recorded the 
deportation of 300,000 Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto to the 'death camp' of Treblinka, 
while Hans Frank (Governor General of the Generalgouvernement) had stated in his 
personal diary that official policy had killed 'millions and millions of Jews'.
36
  
 
Hilberg also foregrounded census data as evidence of both pre-war and post-war Jewish 
populations in Europe. In particular, 'Chambers Encyclopaedia' had documented 6.5 
million Jews living in pre-1939 Europe, excluding Russia, but, when including Russia, 
an additional 3 million Jews increased the relevant European Jewish population to 9.5 
million.
37
 Additional census data, of the districts and regions under German influence and 
occupation, specifically reaffirmed the loss of over 3 million Jews in Poland between 
1939 and 1945.
38
 From both primary and secondary source material Hilberg had 
calculated that 5.1 million Jewish civilians had been murdered, including 3 million in the 
camps, 'from starvation, disease, brutality and, yes, gassing'.
39
 Once again Hilberg had not 
produced the relevant documentation in court, since 'a railroad car full of German 
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documents … wouldn't be any assistance at all'.
40
 However, as the Crown reminded the 
court: 'If Dr Hilberg misrepresented those documents, rest assured that Dr Faurisson 
would have told you about it. He didn't'.
41
  
 
In 1988, and again in addition to evidence relating to the murder of up to 1.5 million 
Jewish civilians by the Einsatzgruppen (chapter five) and hundreds of thousands more by 
gassing at Auschwitz-Birkenau (chapter six), Browning foregrounded three sets of 
contemporaneous German statistics, copies of which, in contrast to 1985, were legally 
submitted. According to Browning the 'Burgdorfer Report/Statistics', commissioned by 
the German Foreign Office in the summer of 1940 (17 July), indicated that the number of 
Jews living in Europe at that date was between 9.8 and 10.72 million.
42
 An additional 
survey, conducted by the SS in the same summer, as part of the 'Madagascar Report', 
indicated that 4 million Jews were living in those areas of Europe then controlled by 
Germany, while the minutes of the 'Wannsee Conference' was proof of both the 
documentation of an estimated 11 million Jews living across all countries of Europe at 
the beginning of 1942, and evidence that far fewer numbers of Jews had emigrated to 
safety than cited in DSMRD.
43
 Excerpts from Hans Frank's diary, dated 16 December 
1941, were also foregrounded as proof of the intended “destruction” of 3.5 million Jews 
then confined in the 'Generalgouvernement'.
44
 Although Browning acknowledged that the 
11 million figure in the Wannsee minutes had been inflated, because of errors made on 
the number of Jews living in France, it was possible to calculate from official German 
figures that in 1939 'there was in the area of ten million Jews in Europe'.
45
  
 
In addition to Hilberg's 1985 testimony, which was read out in court, Browning similarly 
foregrounded and submitted census data found in 'Chambers Encyclopaedia' and the 
‘World Almanacs’ of 1939 and 1950.
46
 He acknowledged that some of the census data of 
the relevant countries had been broken down into religion, while others were 'a little bit 
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more nebulous'.
47
 Reaffirming Hilberg's evidence from ‘Chambers’, Browning testified 
to its documentation of 6.5 million Jews living in Nazi-dominated lands in 1939, 
excluding Russia, but, when including Russia, the 'ballpark figure for the number of pre-
war Jews is about 9.5 million'.
48
 ‘Chambers’ also showed that 'barely 2,500,000 remained 
alive when the war ended 6 years later'.
49
 The 'World Almanacs' further detailed the 
number of Jews world-wide in 1939 as 16,643,120 and by 1948 as 11,373,000; a loss of 
over 5 million Jewish citizens.
50
  
 
In London in 2000 the main form of evidence was again historian testimony, in particular 
Christopher Browning and Peter Longerich, but also Richard Evans. However, in contrast 
to both the Eichmann and Zündel trials, a more detailed data-stream was foregrounded in 
support of their expert reports and testimony. In addition to the Einsatzgruppen reports, 
once again as evidence of the numbers of Jews murdered by mass shootings (chapter 
five), and source material relating to gassing and incineration capacity at Auschwitz-
Birkenau (chapter six), the contemporaneous documentation included Hans Frank's diary 
extract of 16 December 1941, as evidence that at a Gauleiter and Reichleiter meeting in 
Berlin on 12 December 1941 he had been told to: ‘“Liquidate them yourselves”’ in 
reference to ‘Poland's two or three million Jews' then sited in the 'Generalgouvernement', 
a letter from Arthur Greiser (Gauleiter of the Warthegau) to Heinrich Himmler, on 1 May 
1942, as proof of the killing of 100,000 Jews in 2-3 months in the region in which the 
extermination camp of Chelmno was then in operation, a document, dated 5 June 1942, 
as evidence of the killing of 97,000 Jews in 3 gassing vans over a 6 month period 
(December 1941-June 1942), a letter from Himmler to Gottlob Berger (Head of the Reich 
Security Main Office), dated 28 July 1942, as proof of an order to 'free' the occupied 
Eastern territories (Soviet Union) of Jews by the end of the year, and just days after the 
beginning of the 'Operation Reinhard' programme, 'accurate' lists of deportations from 
Germany and Western Europe, as evidence of 'the number of people per train' sent to the 
extermination camps from the summer of 1942, a letter from Albert Ganzenmüller 
(Ministry of Transport) to Karl Wolff (Office of the Reichsführer-SS), dated 28 July 1942, 
as proof of the deportation of 5,000 Jews each day from Warsaw to Treblinka, and 5,000 
Jews twice a week from Przemysl to Belzec, with additional transports to be directed to 
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Sobibor from October, Wolff's reply on 13 August 1942, as evidence of 'his joy at the 
assurance that for the next two weeks … there would be a daily train carrying 5,000 of 
the “chosen people” to Treblinka', the records of ghetto populations in Poland, as proof 
of 'a fairly good rough figure of Polish Jews' sited in the relevant camps prior to their 
'liquidation', and the 'Korherr Report', as evidence of the deportation of around 1.42 
million Jews from the Eastern provinces for 'Sonderbehandlung' (special treatment) by 
March 1943.
51
  
 
Contemporaneous material was also foregrounded to counter Irving's accusation that the 
mass murder of Jews in gas chambers had been a British invention. In particular, Foreign 
Office files demonstrated that the flow of information of mass gassing passed into London 
from external sources. Foregrounded from these files was a report forwarded to the British 
Foreign Office in August 1942, from the ‘Secretary of the World Jewish Congress’, as 
evidence that the US and UK governments had been duly informed of a plan to 
exterminate Jews in occupied Nazi territories, which included the possible use of prussic 
acid.
52
 Additional reports had also been sent to London, in August 1943, that informed 
the Foreign Office of the deportation and extermination of Polish civilians, specifically 
from the regions of Lublin and Bialystok, including their systematic killing in gas 
chambers.
53
 Evans testified that the ‘Head of the Psychological Warfare Executive’ 
(PWE), Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, had referred to a lack of direct evidence in the 
reported 'atrocity stories' at this stage, but insisted that it was not the same as stating that 
gas chambers did not exist, or that the use of such 'stories' as propaganda from 1942, by 
the British PWE, equated to their invention.
54
  
 
In place of 'overt documentary evidence' relating to all extermination camps, 'coupled 
with the lack of archeological [sic] evidence' of Belzec. Sobibor and Treblinka, the main 
form of evidence of the numbers gassed at these sites was eyewitness testimony.
55
 In 
addition to the perpetrator and survivor testimony utilised by Robert Jan van Pelt as 
evidence of mass gassing at Auschwitz-Birkenau (chapter six), the perpetrator testimony 
of Kurt Gerstein (Waffen SS Hygiene Institute) was foregrounded as proof of the gassing 
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of thousands of Jews daily at Belzec and Treblinka.
56
 Browning agreed that: 'As with any 
body of eyewitness testimonies, there are errors and contradictions as well as both 
exaggerations and apologetic obfuscation and minimisation'.
57
 However, he insisted that 
the testimonies converged to establish 'beyond reasonable doubt what took place in those 
camps'.
58
  
 
Two forms of secondary source material were likewise foregrounded as evidence of both 
specific and total numbers of Jewish victims. In particular, pre-war and post-war census 
records revealed a pre-1939 Jewish population in Poland of around 3.3 million and in the 
Soviet Union of 5 million, but by 1945 only 300,000 survivors in the former and 3 to 4 
million in the latter.
59
 Browning also testified that a series of German court investigations 
in the 1960s had recorded the agreement of both Defence and Prosecution teams that the 
numbers of Jews gassed at the 'Operation Reinhard' camps had totalled 550,000 at Belzec, 
200,000 at Sobibor and 900-950,000 at Treblinka, with an additional 150,000-250,000 
gassed at Chelmno, based, primarily, on the rigorous calculations of German historian 
Wolfgang Schafler.
60
 As Browning claimed: 
 
So, in terms of Holocaust victims from Poland westward, we are not 
floundering … Where historians differ and where you get this figure of 
between 5 and 6 is because we do not have those figures for the Soviet 
Union.
61
 
 
Consequently, Richard Rampton concluded for the Defence, that the numbers of Jews 
murdered at all stages of the Holocaust had included the mass shootings of 1.5 million 
Russian and Baltic Jews, after the invasion of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1941 to 
1942, the gassing of 2.6 million Jews in Poland and the Warthegau from December 1941 
to 1943, and the gassing of 1.12 million Central, Southern and Western European Jews 
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deported to the East from autumn 1941, mainly at Auschwitz-Birkenau, until 1944.
62
 This 
catalogue of murder had totalled five to six million ‘innocent lives’.
63
  
 
A range of both disparate and mutual facts were subsequently established in accordance 
with those 'in issue'. In Israel, the Judges accepted that the indictment did not include 
exact totals of victims, but 'speaks of millions of Jews exterminated, mostly in the 
extermination camps, and hundreds of thousands by the Operations Units'.
64
 They 
likewise accepted that 'precise figures' were only available in a limited range of 
documentation, while statistical data was incomplete.
65
 Consequently, they did not 
attempt:  
 
to give specific figures even approximately but confine ourselves to a general 
finding, that the extermination of millions has been proved, and that … 
according to demographic calculations made by Professor Baron … there is 
no doubt that the total number of victims of the Final Solution was about six 
million.
66
  
 
Eichmann had also accepted this final figure, and, as the Judges found, 'he probably 
knows the details better than any other person, because it was in his Section that secret 
statistical data were [sic] collected on the progress of the extermination programme'.
67
 
The Judges also found that entire Jewish communities across countries had been 
'completely wiped out', and that Polish Jewry had been annihilated from its pre-1939 
number of '3,300,000 souls' to a 'remnant of some 70,000'.
68
  
 
On Eichmann's cognisance and responsibility for the deaths of 'about six million' Jews, 
the Judges confirmed that he had admitted under interrogation: 
 
 … I said to the men and to the soldiers. For five year's millions of the enemy 
attacked Germany. Millions of enemies were also annihilated, and according 
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to my estimate, the War also cost five million Jews. Now all this is over, the 
Reich is lost. And should the end come now, I said, I shall also jump into the 
pit.
69
  
 
However, Eichmann had been categoric during his defence that he had stated instead: 
 
The end has come, it is all over. The collapse is imminent … therefore, if this 
is the end of the Reich, then I shall gladly jump into the pit, knowing that in 
the same pit there are five million enemies of the state.
70
  
 
Although Eichmann had insisted that the 'enemies' had not related to European Jewry, but 
to the then advancing Russians and the fleets of the Allied bombers, the Judges found that 
'this explanation is nothing but a lie'.
71
 Rather, they accepted that not only had Eichmann 
expressly mentioned, both during interrogation and in his testimony to the court, the five 
million Jews killed 'in one breadth with his readiness to "jump into the pit"', but a number 
of witnesses had testified to the same facts and sentiment (Grell, Hoettl, Wisliceny).
72
 The 
Judges accepted that it was not explained to them on what grounds Eichmann had 
calculated the five million figure, but found that it 'stands to reason, that the Accused 
spoke at the time about the front on which he was active and where his listeners were 
active, i.e., the battlefront against the Jews'.
73
 Moreover, the Jews 'were considered 
enemies of the Reich, in the language of the Nazi propagandists, which the Accused 
adopted in its entirety'.
74
 The Judges also found that, in accordance with Wisliceny's 
statement, Eichmann had 'expressed satisfaction at the death of millions of Jews, and 
declared that the very thought would make it easier for him to "jump into the pit"'.
75
 They 
likewise found that this 'satisfaction' was 'sufficient to indicate his true attitude to the 
business of murder in which he had been engaged'.
76
 However, while Hausner had argued 
that the five million figure referred to by Eichmann had not included the victims of the 
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Operations Units, the Judges found that 'it is difficult for us to be definite on this point'.
77
 
They ultimately found Eichmann guilty of count 1 and convicted him: 
 
of causing the death of millions of Jews from August 1941 to May 1945 in 
Germany, in the territories of the Axis states, in the occupied territories of 
Germany and the Axis states and in the areas subject to the authority of 
Germany and the Axis states, with the purpose of implementing the plan 
known as the Final Solution of the Jewish Question.
78
  
 
As with the previous historiographies examined, the privacy accorded to jury 
deliberations prevents academic and public scrutiny of any facts established on the total 
number of Jewish victims in either of the Zündel trials. However, in their 'charge to the 
jury', both Judges reminded the respective courtrooms of the evidence submitted and/or 
testified in support of the murder of a total number of between five and six million Jewish 
citizens. In 1985 Judge Locke specifically observed that according to the Crown: 
 
 … there is evidence that millions were murdered in extermination camps 
through a variety of methods including hanging, shooting, starvation, 
overwork, exposure to the elements and gassing. That is the Holocaust.
79
  
 
He reminded the jury that this evidence, 'including census statistics of certain countries, 
ghetto figures, Gestapo figures', had documented a Jewish population of 9.5 million living 
in Europe prior to World War Two, with the vast majority, over six million, residing in 
Poland and the Soviet Union.
80
 Although Hilberg had acknowledged that 'allowances 
must be made for errors in census figures which … depending on various countries, are 
unreliable', Locke reminded the jury that contemporaneous sources, including the 
'Korherr Report', had recorded 'how many people were under German control at various 
periods of time, and the Germans published these figures, the death figures'.
81
 Locke 
likewise reminded the jury that Encyclopaedias had been employed as evidence of the 
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numbers subsequently murdered across Europe.
82
 Consequently: 'The numbers [5.1 
million] were submitted to you by Mr. Griffiths' who had concluded that DSMRD was a 
'lie' produced at great contrast to the documentation.
83
  
 
In 1988 Judge Thomas reminded the jury from the outset that he had judicially noted that: 
 
the mass murder and extermination of Jews in Europe by the Nazi regime 
during the Second World War is a historical fact which is so notorious as not 
to be the subject of dispute among reasonable persons.
84
  
 
As already highlighted, no specific numbers were included in this fact since the total 
number of Jews murdered was 'in issue' at the trial. Thomas subsequently reminded the 
jury that Browning had studied three sets of contemporaneous German statistics and 
estimated that 10 million Jews had resided in Europe at 1940. 'Therefore, six million could 
have been exterminated'.
85
 In terms of precise figures murdered, Thomas further reminded 
the jury that Hilberg had calculated in 1985: 
 
slightly in excess of five million Jews were killed: 3 million in the camps, 
most by gassing, 1.3 to 1.4 million Jews died as a result of the systematic 
shootings conducted by the Einsatzgruppen … the rest were accounted for by 
deaths in the ghettos.
86
  
 
These figures had been corroborated by Browning, who reaffirmed that a total of 1.4 
million Jews had been killed by the Einsatzgruppen, while gassing apparatus at the 
extermination camps of Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor, Treblinka, and 'on a larger scale' at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau, had murdered 'most of Polish Jewry' by the end of 1942.
87
 Thomas 
also reminded the jury that Hilberg, in 1985, had specifically made reference to the 
annihilation of Polish Jewry and had documented its diminution from 3.35 million in 1939 
to only 50,000 in 1945.
88
 In terms of total deaths, Thomas finally reminded the jury that: 
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Dr. Browning estimated between 5 and six million Jews died as a result of the 
systematic execution—as a result of the plans of the Nazi regime. Hilberg 
suggests 5.1 million.
89
  
 
Of course, regardless of the evidence and figures highlighted, and even reaffirmed, by the 
Judges, the total figure of Jewish victims authorised by the respective juries, if indeed 
part of their decision-making, remains unknown. 
 
In London in 2000 Judge Gray detailed a number of facts relating to the numbers of Jews 
murdered at various stages of the genocide. Consequently, in reference to the mass 
shootings, he found that: 
 
 … the evidence, principally in the form of reports by the Einsatzgruppen, 
appears to establish that between 500,000 and 1,500,000 people (including a 
large proportion of Jews) were shot by those groups and by the auxiliary 
Wehrmacht units seconded to assist them.
90
 
 
However, although noting that the Defence had suggested that a larger number of Jews 
had been shot, he ruled that: 'I do not see that, in the context of this case, any useful 
purpose would be served by my attempting to assess whether the evidence supports a 
higher figure'.
91
 When calculating the numbers of Jews systematically murdered by gas, 
Gray acknowledged evidential barriers to 'accurate' findings.
92
 However, he accepted that 
thousands had been murdered in mobile gassing facilities, but did 'not intend to explore 
any further the evidence as to the number of those killed in vans'.
93
 He further ruled that 
Irving had 'ultimately' accepted that the 'Reinhard camps' had been 'Nazi killing centres', 
in which hundreds of thousands of Jews had died.
94
 Therefore, while Irving continued to 
dispute the figures provided by the Defence on gassing at these camps, Gray concluded 
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that 'given the huge number of deaths accepted by Irving, little appears to me to turn on 
the disparity in their respective estimates'.
95
  
 
Likewise, on the subject of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Gray found that the calculation of 
accurate figures of those murdered in gas chambers was ‘compounded by the undoubted 
fact that many inmates died from disease and above all in the typhus epidemics which 
from time to time ravaged the camp’.
96
 He also accepted Irving’s argument that, over time, 
official numbers of those killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau had varied between 1.1 million 
and 4 million.
97
 Furthermore, debate had ensued amongst the Defence's own experts over 
the proportion of Jews gassed from their figure of almost 1 million deaths in the camp.
98
 
However, as found in chapter six, Gray accepted that 'the convergent evidence relied on 
by the Defence' indicated that 'no objective, fair-minded historian would have serious 
cause to doubt that … gas chambers at Auschwitz … operated on a substantial scale to 
kill hundreds of thousands of Jews'.
99
 Linked to Auschwitz-Birkenau, Gray also found 
that Irving had failed to provide evidence that British intelligence had invented the story 
of gas chambers for propaganda purposes.
100
 Rather, he found that 'the story was provided 
to the Foreign Office by the secretary of the World Jewish Council, who in turn had 
received it from a source in Berlin'.
101
 Gray further found that there was no evidence to 
prove that once known the British intelligence services had made propaganda use 'of the 
story'.
102
  
 
It is notable that Gray appeared cautious when making judgements on the numbers of 
Jews murdered at each stage of the genocide. It is also notable that, although Gray had 
referenced the accepted definition of the Holocaust as including the mass murder of five 
to six million Jews, he did not authorise a total figure in his ‘Judgement’.
103
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The comparative reconstruction of the total number of Jewish victims across the 
Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials therefore confirms the presentation of varying 
accounts in accordance with their case-specific content and form. Consequently, 
historiographical and legal focus ranged from Eichmann’s cognisance of, and 
responsibility for, the deaths of millions of Jews to the rebuttal of claims of exaggeration, 
feasibility and invention. It also confirms that an evidential base was determined and 
legally authorised in accordance with the demands of each case. Once again, mutually 
shared items of evidence were minimal, and restricted to copies of the Einsatzgruppen 
reports, as probative of the numbers of Jewish civilians murdered by mass shootings, and 
secondary sources of census data, as probative of the existence and then destruction of 
European Jewry, predominantly in Poland, between 1939 and 1945. The most discrete 
data-stream was submitted in 1961, in accordance with its unique focus on Eichmann's 
cognisance and witnessed celebration of the death of millions of Jewish civilians once 
faced with Germany's military defeat. Yet again, Eichmann was marginalised in the later 
trials as the rebuttal of denier tactic foregrounded numerical evidence of both pre-and-
post-1939 European Jewish populations.  
 
It is clearly shown that a range of discrete numerical facts were established in accordance 
with the demands of each legal case. However, they were not contradictory. A broad 
consensus emerged across all four trials on the size of the European Jewish population 
prior to 1939, the mass murder of consistent numbers of its citizenry at each stage of the 
genocide, the resulting total decline of European Jewry at 1945, and, in particular, the 
slaughter of Polish Jewry. The numbers authorised may have been approximations at each 
trial, as well as variously revised, but a total figure of over five million 'innocent lives' 
persisted between 1961 and 2000. However, despite the consistency of this total figure, 
the oft-quoted 'six million' deaths foundational to Holocaust historiography (and 
collective memory) was not specifically authorised at any of the four trials. Even when 
most assertively cited by the Prosecution in Israel the Judges did not sanction this exact 
figure, while, as witnessed in the later trials, disputes still ensued amongst historians over 
the totality of between 5 and six million deaths. Of course, when faced with the murder 
of millions of civilians surely a precise figure is immaterial? However, for Raul Hilberg: 
'The numbers matter' as each discrepancy relates to unaccounted-for Jewish lives.
104
 
Conversely, since the gaps largely relate to a lack of numerical evidence of Jews 
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remaining in the then Soviet Union, the totality of deaths could be even higher than six 
million.  
 
Ambiguity over the exact figures was acknowledged in all four trials, but was most visible 
in the London judgement in 2000. Although Judge Gray accepted Evans' definition of the 
Holocaust, including the mass murder of “between 5 and 6 million Jews”, he more 
cautiously found mass shootings of between 500,000 to 1.5 million, the killing of 
'thousands' in mobile gas vans, the gassing of 'hundreds of thousands' in the ‘Operation 
Reinhard’ camps, and again 'hundreds of thousands' at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
105
 In other 
words, if Gray's figures are taken at their lowest possible configuration, the number of 
Jewish victims could total around 1 million. Consequently, although the limitations 
surrounding the calculation of victims of genocide were acknowledged as early as 1961, 
the ‘Judgement’ in 2000 arguably opened-up the notorious fact of six million deaths to 
continued challenge by Holocaust deniers. 
 
It is clearly demonstrated that the narratives authorised were 'cooked' in accordance with 
the focus on Eichmann's cognisance and complicity in 1961, the finding of a pre-war 
Jewish population in Europe, from which six million deaths was numerically feasible, in 
1985, 1988 and 2000, and the invention of gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau by the 
British government, again in 2000. Rather paradoxically, despite the focus on the murder 
of millions of human beings, the voices, as well as the violence, behind the figures were 
once again relegated to background noise in the later trials. Likewise, although 
understandable given its annihilation, the numerical impact of the Holocaust on Jewish 
communities across Europe was masked by the focus on Poland. But, it is also clear that, 
regardless of crucial omissions in the narratives authorised, they were empirically 
accountable and 'truth-full' in content in accordance with the demands of each legal case. 
With quantitative evidence at its core, the consistency of figures not only implied past 
statistical constraint but it was explicit in the census data utilised across the discursive 
contexts of the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials. However, despite the stability of the 
figures presented, the reconstruction of the foundational fact of six million Jewish victims 
yet again exposed the primacy of preconceived and prefigured narratives in each 
courtroom that both 'floated free' of and governed their numerical content. 
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Conclusions 
 
As a study of historiography in general and the history-law relationship in particular this 
thesis identifies a number of key findings. History is a 'made-up' discourse or genre about 
the past, with the epistemic authority of its prevailing Rankean-based content and form 
justifiably challenged. Although initial disputes among historians and theorists have 
somewhat waned since the 1990s, and despite acknowledged sites of practical and 
theoretical amalgamation, generic distinctions still remain between 'empiricist-analytical' 
and 'narrative-linguistic' explanations of history-making. As shown in chapter one, four 
key distinctions are identified. First and foremost, although both genres accept that past 
realities existed, dispute remains over the presence of the past when narrated into 
historiography. Consequently, history has either a 'matching function' with the past or a 
'making function' as the past.
1
 Secondly, although both genres agree that empirical 
accuracy and accountability is foundational to historiography, distinctions remain over 
the primacy of the past traces or the fictive form. Therefore, historical knowledge is either 
bounded by its primary sources or preconceived and prefigured into familiar plot lines 
that 'float free' of their content.
2
 Thirdly, both genres accept the netted authorship of all 
histories but disputes remain over the mechanisms of adjudication. Verification of not 
only empirically accurate and accountable but convincing, credible and even truthful 
accounts/representations is therefore sited in either evidential constraint or the historian's 
affiliated interests and perspectives. Finally, although both genres recognise that the once-
acclaimed history/fiction division is an oversimplification, distinct differences remain 
over history's realist authority and esteem. Historiography is therefore either a privileged 
form of knowledge about 'the past' or no more 'truth-full' than other genres of historying. 
Consequently, the concept and judgement of 'good history' in its academic form remains 
contested. 
 
In recognition of the 'unique relationship' of collaboration between historians and jurists, 
but more specifically the contrasting opinion on the legitimacy of bringing historical 
inquiry into the courtroom, the empiricist and narrativist theories of 'good history' were 
then applied to the history-law relationship in Holocaust-related trials. As background 
and introduction to the rationale of collaboration chapter two compared acclaimed 
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similarities of craft with the distinctive objectives, practices and utility defining the 
history and law disciplines, specifically the Anglo-American genre. In theory 
contradictions were found at all sites of assumed symbiosis. A study of existing literature 
likewise reaffirmed a range of contradictions when examining the history-law 
relationship in practice. As chapter two also found, in trials related to the Holocaust since 
the International Military Tribunal (1945-1946), the history-law relationship has proven 
to be an inherently flawed and dysfunctional methodology. Consequently, a record of 
acclaimed disciplinary reciprocity is contrasted by a 'consensus of critique' detailing a 
history in which the Holocaust has been consistently misappropriated and reduced to 
background noise, its crimes diminished, its survivors derided, silenced and inherently 
'racialised', its perpetrators abstracted and even civilised and its histories 'cooked'.
3
 As 
shown in chapter three, primary and secondary research of four specific trials, the criminal 
cases of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and Ernst Zündel (1985, 1988) and the libel case 
instigated by David Irving (2000), reaffirmed this critique. As chapter three also found, a 
close reading of the daily recorded transcripts of each of these four trials disclosed that 
the greatest barrier to comprehension of the complexities and facts of the Holocaust was 
the legal form itself. Implicit, therefore, is that the history-law relationship is not a model 
of 'good history' as conventionally authorised.  
 
The findings of the 'consensus of critique' are long-standing. However, with the exception 
of a few vocal historians, Henry Rousso in particular, there is little sign of disciplinary 
opposition to future collaboration as cases relating to the Holocaust continue to be brought 
to trial.
4
 To help understand this persistent trust in the history-law relationship specific 
methodological omissions found in the current literature were redressed. Consequently, 
attention was shifted away from the historical, legal, moral and political contexts and 
insights underpinning the existing 'consensus of critique' (chapter two) and placed instead 
on the method and findings of historiographical reconstruction. The evaluation of 
collaborative competence was also transferred from familiar perspectives, of such as legal 
propriety, the securing of justice, pedagogy and 'representational efficacy', and judged 
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instead through empiricist and narrativist demands of 'good history'.
5
 Likewise, rather 
than focusing on the (mis)use of the Holocaust in individual trials, comparative analysis 
was employed as a means of both investigation and assessment across courtrooms. 
Informed by empiricist and narrativist genres of historiography the aim was to answer 
four questions relevant to their demands of 'good history': (1) although governed by 
discrete legal contexts did Anglo-American practice determine and establish empirically 
accountable evidence and facts of (empiricist) or as (narrativist) the Holocaust? (2) 
although case-specific, were the narratives authorised 'truth-full' in content? (3) although 
variously filtered and shaped were they also compatible and consistent across trials? and 
(4) although legally probative were the facts and interpretations limited by the past traces 
(empiricist) or preconceived and prefigured by narratives that 'floated free' of their content 
(narrativist)? Ultimately, did the history-law relationship operate as a 'matching function' 
with the past (empiricist) or a 'making function' as the past (narrativist), in this case 
relating to the Holocaust?
6
  
 
Utilising the criminal cases of Adolf Eichmann and Ernst Zündel and the libel case 
instigated by David Irving as its comparative base, chapter three confirmed that four 
historiographies integral to the Holocaust were common to each courtroom: the evolution 
of extermination policy (chapter four), the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings 1941-1942 
(chapter five), homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau (chapter six) and the total 
number of Jewish victims (chapter seven). These subjects formed the research focus of 
the history-law relationship in practice. Organised thematically, and once extracted from 
the legal form, a range of findings were identified that provide original insight into the 
judicial processing of historical inquiry in general and contemporary reconstruction of 
specific historiographies in particular. Most obviously, it was expected, and reaffirmed 
by each thematic chapter, that diverse accounts/representations of the four 
historiographies would be foregrounded in accordance with the 'facts in issue' governing 
each trial. Consequently, in 1961 the focus was on Eichmann's authority and role across 
all stages of the 'Final Solution' reconstructed at the trial. In the later courtrooms, the 
authority and continued command of Adolf Hitler was reinstated into the relevant 
historiographies, as well as a wider focus on top-down and systematic leadership of 
extermination policy in general and the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings in particular. 
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Greater attention was also awarded to the genocidal intent and practices of Auschwitz-
Birkenau in 1985, 1988 and 2000, with its murder and violence largely obscured within 
mechanistic narratives of gassing and incineration capacity and process. Likewise, the 
horror and incredulity expressed and witnessed in 1961 at the systematic murder of up to 
six million Jewish citizens of Europe was submerged within calculations of its numerical 
feasibility. 
 
Each thematic chapter also confirmed that an evidential base was both determined and 
established in support of the various accounts/representations presented. This base 
differed in content, form and volume across subject and trial and was both mutually and 
variously interpreted. Through comparative analysis, each chapter specifically identified 
the breadth and diversity of evidence both available to historians and jurists and found to 
be of probative weight across historiographical subject and legal context. It also 
demonstrated a growing reliance on historian expertise and testimony, acting as evidence 
by proxy of both documentation (1985, 1988) and eyewitness testimony (1988, 2000). 
Despite the volume of documentation submitted, in the Eichmann and Irving trials in 
particular, it was surprising that very few items of evidence were mutually foregrounded 
across all four courtrooms regardless of the historiography reconstructed. The most 
common were the Einsatzgruppen reports, Hans Frank's diary and Heinrich Himmler's 
speech to SS officers in Posen on 4 October 1943. Other documents, such as Hitler's 
instructions to General Jodl, dated 3 March 1941, the 'Wetzel memoranda' of October 
1941 and the 'Wannsee Protocol', dated 20 January 1942, were similarly shared by more 
than one trial but not necessarily foregrounded as probative evidence across all four 
courtrooms. Despite the volume submitted in the Eichmann and Irving trials, but also the 
privileged status awarded to documentation by both history and Anglo-American law, it 
was also surprising that eyewitness testimony remained an essential source of evidential 
proof. In particular, the post-war testimonies of Eichmann and Rudolf Höss, but also Kurt 
Gerstein, remained foundational to knowledge of the evolution and perpetration of the 
use of gas as a method of mass murder. Likewise, survivor testimony remained equally 
foundational to knowledge of the mass shootings in the Eastern Occupied Territories 
(1961) and life, survival and death in Auschwitz-Birkenau (1961, 1985, 1988, 2000). 
Indeed, the similarity, and therefore corroboration, of testimony, both perpetrator and 
survivor, was striking across all four trials and especially when detailing the murder 
process at this camp. Moreover, whether testifying directly to court or through historian 
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evidence or report, the survivor voice continued to be heard up to 2000, although not 
without question in the later 'procedurally ordinary' trials.
7
  
 
It was also expected, and again demonstrated by each thematic chapter, that discrete facts 
would be established by each trial and adjudicated as 'true' in accordance with those 'in 
issue'. However, less expected was that, with few exceptions, they were not incompatible. 
Each chapter also found that the narratives foregrounded at each trial were informed by a 
historiographical record that, again with few exceptions, was not inconsistent. Essentially, 
each chapter provided original insight into not only the detail and reach of each 
surrounding record but the consistency of its content and interpretation between 1961 and 
2000. Moreover, again with few exceptions, the surrounding record and narratives 
reconstructed were consistent with the content of established scholarship of the Holocaust 
prevailing at the time of each trial and remain familiar in present-day historiography. The 
elevation of Eichmann's authority at all stages of the 'Final Solution' in 1961 was the most 
obvious exception. But, as shown in chapter three, prevailing scholarship was reflected 
in its reaffirmation of a grand narrative of the intentional extermination of European 
Jewry and the framing of its key perpetrator as not only criminal but depraved and 
somehow distinguishable from the majority of humanity. Similarly, the shift of focus in 
Holocaust scholarship after 1961, from 'intention' to 'function' as an explanatory 
framework for the transgression to extermination, was clearly represented in the later 
trials. Likewise, historians’ debates over the precise dating of this transgression was not 
only reflected in the later trials but clearly represented in 2000 through the evidence of 
Christopher Browning and Peter Longerich. The later trials also reflected the 
foregrounding of Auschwitz-Birkenau since 1961 and augmented the expanding 
scholarship relating to the camp. Consequently, despite the dominance of Anglo-
American case and practice in the courtroom, the transference of Holocaust scholarship 
to non-historians, and, more specifically in the Zündel trials, the diminution of both 
history and its experts, the historian’s voice and established scholarship not only reached 
the higher standards of legal proof but maintained influence over the content of all four 
historiographies. 
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Crucially, each thematic chapter demonstrated the reconstruction of not only empirically 
accountable, but, since based on established facts, 'truth-full' narratives of each 
historiography in accordance with the demands and adjudication criteria of legal case and 
context. Although including discrete facts and interpretations in accordance with those 'in 
issue', these narratives ultimately reaffirmed the truth 'beyond reasonable doubt' 
(Eichmann) or 'on the balance of probability' (Irving) of a complex, pervasive and 
systematic policy of extermination, initiated and continuously authorised by Hitler and 
perpetrated through political, professional and state infrastructures across occupied and 
influenced Europe (chapter four), the central instruction and subsequent discriminate 
shootings of up to 1.5 million predominantly Soviet Jewish civilians by the 
Einsatzgruppen in the Eastern Occupied Territories between June 1941 and December 
1942 (chapter five), the intentional homicidal utility of gas chambers at Auschwitz-
Birkenau, and the subsequent murder, desecration and physical removal of hundreds of 
thousands of predominantly Jewish men, women and children up to 1944 (chapter six), 
and the total genocide at 1945 of between five and six million European citizens, 
predominantly Polish, simply because they were identified as Jews (chapter seven). These 
same narratives were likewise foregrounded at the Zündel trials as probative by Judges 
Locke (1985) and Thomas (1988), although the exact findings remain known only to the 
respective juries. As both empirically accountable and 'truth-full', these narratives were 
not only adjudicated as credible accounts/representations in accordance with the demands 
of legal case and context but met the criteria of both 'empiricist-analytical' and 'narrative-
linguistic' genres of academic historiography detailed in chapter one. Consequently, 
despite being a flawed methodology, at the level of historiographical reconstruction the 
history-law relationship in the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials proved capable of 
being a model of 'good history' in accordance with the demands of its academic form.  
 
However, as also detailed in chapter one, distinctive to these genres of academic 
historiography is the primacy of the past traces (empiricist) or the discursive form 
(narrativist). The consistency of both facts and foregrounded narratives across discrete 
legal contexts indicates an instrument of stability in operation, or at least constraint, 
which, according to empiricist theory, is sited in the content of the past traces. 
Subsequently, the consistency of both facts and narratives across the Eichmann, Zündel 
and Irving trials indicates that the history-law relationship is not only a model of ‘good 
history’, but, in accordance with empiricist theory, operates as a 'matching' function with 
the relevant past.  
247 
 
And yet, as shown in the thematic chapters, factual and narrative consistency does not 
explain the adaptability of the evidential base in accordance with the extra-historical 
demands of each legal case and context. It also does not explain why items of evidence 
found to be foundational in 1961 were either ignored at the later trials or afforded 
alternative explanations. Conversely, it does not explain why the single piece of evidence 
of Hitler's continued cognisance of the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings (Heinrich Müller's 
instruction of 1 August 1941) foregrounded in 2000 was not mentioned in 1961, 1985 or 
1988. Factual and narrative consistency likewise does not explain why the 
Einsatzgruppen reports had both extended their evidential reach and status between 1961 
and 2000 beyond the actual shootings and resulting 'blood bath' to proof of official policy 
(1985, 1988, 2000), Hitler's complicity (2000), standardised killing practice (2000) and 
the focus on Jewish civilians as intended target (1985, 1988, 2000).
8
 Nor does it explain 
the foregrounding of Auschwitz-Birkenau since 1961 and the evidential focus on its 
gassing and incineration capacity and process.  
 
The ability of the past traces to accommodate and support a variety of equally credible 
interpretations is inherent to academic historiography and acknowledged by the advocates 
of both 'empiricist-analytical' and 'narrative-linguistic' genres. Changes in evidential 
focus and reputation are likewise inherent to academic historiography and equally 
accepted by both genres. However, when evidential content, interpretation and reputation 
is so obviously determined by the demands of an extra-historical perspective, in this case 
various legal cases, then they are clearly being preconceived and prefigured in accordance 
with narratives that 'floated free' of the relevant past traces.  
 
Factual and narrative consistency also masks the ambiguity of the past traces. Although 
rarely referenced in the Eichmann trial, evidential fallibility was intentionally 
foregrounded in the later courtrooms as a deliberate strategy and tactic of Holocaust 
denial. As shown in each thematic chapter, although regularly raised as an issue by 
Zündel's lawyer, Douglas Christie, in 1985 and 1988, evidential ambiguity and fallibility 
was specifically raised and verified by Judge Gray in 2000. Hence, in what would have 
been unimaginable to the courtroom in Israel, Gray accepted that the documentary 
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evidence implicating Hitler in the command of the Einsatzgruppen was 'sparse', and in 
the gassing programme 'not wholly irrefutable'.
9
 On the subject of homicidal gas 
chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau he accepted that not all of the evidence 'is altogether 
reliable' and this applied 'with particular force to the evidence of the eye-witnesses'.
10
 
Gray likewise acknowledged that 'the documentary evidence, including the photographic 
evidence, was capable of more than one interpretation'.
11
 Furthermore, he found 'few overt 
references to gas chambers at Auschwitz in contemporaneous documents', while 'the 
physical evidence remaining at the site of Auschwitz provided little evidence to support 
the claim that gas chambers were operated there for genocidal purposes'.
12
 Although Gray 
ultimately found that a ‘convergence of evidence’ far outweighed the vulnerabilities of 
individual categories, his formal sympathy towards Irving's critiques both misrepresented 
common historiographical practice and clearly exposed the disciplinary disparities 
relating to the law's demand for evidential stability (chapter two).
13
 In effect, Gray's clear 
unmasking of the circumstantial foundations of knowledge integral to Holocaust 
historiography contradicted the acclaimed certainty of his 'Judgement' (chapter three). 
But, crucially, the evidential ambiguity of the past traces reaffirmed both the necessity 
and the primacy of preconceived and prefigured narratives, in these cases predominantly 
legal, that floated free of their content. 
 
Factual and narrative consistency also masks the various revisions authorised across the 
four trials. Of course, revisions of both content and interpretation are expected when 
determined by discrete 'facts in issue'. The most obvious revision was the elevation of 
Eichmann at all stages of the 'Final Solution' in 1961 and the subsequent marginalisation 
of his role in the later trials. As posited by Eichmann's lawyer, Robert Servatius, the 
explicit conclusion of the Prosecution's case in 1961 was that Eichmann 'rather than 
Hitler, Himmler or Goering was the great culprit'.
14
 In contrast, the foregrounding of the 
leadership of Hitler in 'converting Nazi ideological thought into concrete action … ' was 
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reinstated into Holocaust historiography in 1985 and 1988 but especially in 2000.
15
 As 
already noted, likewise obvious was the revision of the certainty of Hitler’s antisemitic 
and premeditated 'intention' in 1961 by the more convoluted and radicalised decision-
making of 'function' as explanatory framework of extermination policy at the later trials. 
As specifically found in chapter four, acceptance of a direct order of extermination by 
Hitler in 1961 had, by 1988 and 2000, translated into 'signals' or 'incitements' from 
Hitler.
16
 Similarly, an unquestionable acceptance of top-down leadership in 1961 had 
developed into a greater complexity and uncertainty of decision-making and evolution in 
1985, 1988 and 2000. As found in chapter five, the absence of the findings of the 'regional 
turn' in 2000, relevant to the escalation of the mass shootings of the Einsatzgruppen ‘on 
the ground’, was more of an omission than a revision in a trial that intended to prove 
Hitler's, and wider central and systematic, authority over all aspects of extermination 
policy.  
 
But the most obvious revision was the transference of extra-historical (political) and 
therefore legal focus away from the criminality of the individual perpetrator in 1961 to 
the rebuttal and unmasking of Holocaust denier strategy, tactic and pseudo-scholarship 
by the 1980s.
17
 Consequently, in the later trials the past traces of the genocide were filtered 
and shaped by not only Anglo-American law and specific 'facts in issue' but by a 'miasma 
of denial' that would have been inconceivable in 1961.
18
 More specifically, as shown in 
chapter four, the undoubted leadership and continued antisemitism of Hitler in 1961 had 
to be proven anew by the 1980s. As shown in chapter five, the disgust and incredulity at 
the 'slaughter-house on wheels' in 1961 was relegated to background noise within 
narratives focusing on the command of the Einsatzgruppen from Berlin.
19
 As visibly 
reflected in chapter six, historiographical attention on Auschwitz-Birkenau had shifted 
from life, death and survival in the camp in 1961 to the minutiae of its gassing and 
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incineration facilities as proof of their murderous capacity. Likewise, as indicated in 
chapter seven, the horror and incredulity surrounding the mass murder of six million 
human beings clearly expressed and directly represented in 1961 was submerged in 
calculations of a sufficiently-sized Jewish population able to accommodate this number 
of lives lost. Consequently, and equally inconceivable to the case, courtroom and wider 
audience of 1961, the later trials not only illustrated the extra-historical evolution of 
Holocaust denial but demonstrated the primacy of its narratives over the past traces that 
subsequently preconceived and prefigured their interpretation and utility in the 
courtrooms of 1985, 1988 and 2000.  
 
Factual and narrative consistency further masks the 'cooked' reconstruction of each 
historiography in accordance with the demands of legal case and context. Although most 
obvious in Israel in 1961, in which Eichmann's authority over all stages of the 'Final 
Solution' was both foregrounded and magnified, it was likewise obvious in the later trials 
in the focus on the rebuttal and unmasking of Holocaust denial. As already highlighted, 
regardless of the extensive record surrounding each historiography, legal, and therefore 
historical, focus was subsequently placed on Hitler's authorisation and continued 
command and cognisance of all stages of a systematic policy of extermination (chapter 
four), central instruction over the discriminate mass shootings of Jewish men, women and 
children by the Einsatzgruppen (chapter five), the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp in general, 
and the architecture of its gas chambers, the biology and chemistry of its unique killing 
agent and the physics of its crematoria in particular (chapter six), and the numerical 
calculations of pre-and-post-1939 Jewish populations in Europe from which six million 
civilians could have been murdered (chapter seven). Consequently, despite meeting the 
criteria of 'good history' in the reconstruction of empirically accountable, credible and 
'truth-full' accounts/representations, knowledge of the Holocaust was inevitably distorted 
and its complexities inevitability minimised in all four trials.  
 
As each thematic chapter clearly demonstrated, 'cooked' is not the same as false, fictional 
or inaccurate. But it is a concept that very clearly acknowledges the preconception and 
prefiguration of each historiography through narratives that ‘floated free’ of the relevant 
past traces. This leads to the conclusion that, although the thematic chapters indicated the 
apparent 'matching' function of the history-law relationship, in finding the primacy of the 
discursive form over the content of the past traces it likewise confirms the primacy of its 
'making' function. Consequently, although the history-law relationship is capable of 
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producing 'good history' in accordance with prevailing 'empiricist-analytical' demands 
and techniques, its historiographical methods and outputs in the Eichmann, Zündel and 
Irving trials are most appropriately explained through the lens of the 'narrative-linguistic' 
genre.  
 
A number of observations arise from these conclusions and findings that contribute to 
contemporary debates on historiography in general and the history-law relationship in 
particular. They also contribute knowledge to Holocaust scholarship. In contrast to the 
existing 'consensus of critique' detailed in chapters two and three, the history-law 
relationship in the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials successfully negotiated the flaws 
of methodology to 'do justice' to the past traces of the Holocaust, including survivor 
memoir and testimony. Although procedurally restricted in the later trials, the survivor 
voice not only continued to be heard but its experiential truths remained central to the 
facts and record of historiographies foundational to not only each trial but to Holocaust 
scholarship both past and present. It is therefore suggested that the consistency and 
persistence of survivor memoir and testimony contradicts its relegation by both 
'empiricist-analytical' historiography and Anglo-American law as biased and unreliable. 
Conversely, the privileged value and weight awarded to an extensive archive of 
documentation, also necessary to the empirical accountability of Holocaust 
historiography, belied its fallibility. The research therefore supports those who argue that 
both 'empiricist-analytical' historiography and Anglo-American law should reassess a 
hierarchy of evidence that privileges fragmentary documentation 'over people who were 
there'.
20
 Reassessment does not mean the same as passive or unquestioning acceptance of 
the accounts of survivor memoir or testimony. As the first trials of John Demjanjuk (1986-
1988) infamously exposed, both can be fallible even under the rigour of Anglo-American 
practice. However, reassessment does mean that the ambiguity of all traces of the past 
should be more clearly acknowledged in historiography as the 'narrative-linguist' genre 
demands (chapter one). Although criticised in existing literature for misappropriating the 
evidence of the Holocaust (chapters two and three), it is therefore suggested that Anglo-
American practice is a more honest form of historiographical reconstruction since it 
clearly acknowledges its fallibility. 
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Likewise, in contrast to the existing 'consensus of critique' detailed in chapters two and 
three, the history-law relationship across the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials may have 
distorted and minimised the complexities of the Holocaust but it also successfully 
negotiated the flaws of methodology to 'do justice' to both the expertise of the historian 
and prevailing scholarship. As already shown, regardless of the inequality of partnership 
identified in chapter two, the confinement of historical evidence and opinion by Anglo-
American practice, and the diminution of its value and weight in the Zündel trials, 
historians maintained their influence over the content and interpretation of each 
historiography when acting as its witness by proxy. Consequently, the discrete facts and 
narratives established across the courtrooms in which historians were key witnesses 
(Zündel, Irving) did not contradict their testimony. Likewise, as already shown, although 
the narratives authorised were 'cooked' in both content and form they were also largely 
compatible, consistent and 'truth-full' in accordance with not only the demands of both 
empiricist and narrativist theories of 'good history' but in accordance with the findings of 
Holocaust historiography prevailing at the time of each trial. And, as consistently noted, 
with the exception of the elevation of Eichmann's authority in Israel, the narratives legally 
established between 1961 and 2000 remain familiar in present-day Holocaust scholarship. 
Consequently, in contrast to the existing 'consensus of critique', the research supports 
those who argue that it is reasonable for historians to trust the law with both their expertise 
and scholarship and therefore continue to ‘offer expert opinion in a legal action that turns 
on the research and writing of history itself’.
21
 Or, as more specifically concluded by 
David J. Rothman: ‘Advocacy has its place, and it can be promoted without 
compromising the craft’.
22
 This finding is especially pertinent at a time in which Lawrence 
Douglas posits that historians will extend their role in future Holocaust-related cases 
beyond the provision of historical context and explanation to proof of the individual guilt 
of different forms of perpetration.
23
 However, as the thesis demonstrates throughout its 
chapters, participation in the adversarial and dense form of Anglo-American practice is 
challenging. Its research therefore also supports those who argue that models of 'good 
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practice' should be developed that inform and prepare both historians and jurists involved 
in future collaborative inquiry.
24
  
 
Furthermore, and again contrary to the existing 'consensus of critique', it is suggested that 
the 'cooked' outputs of the history-law relationship are no different from the outputs of all 
Holocaust scholarship, with the confines of legal case and context acting as merely 
another form of 'netted' authorship (chapter one). As the magnitude of Holocaust 
scholarship proves, a single (transcendental) narrative does not exist, nor can it. As 
revealed in the consistent debates and expansion of Holocaust historiography, its past is 
regularly revised as new evidence is accessed and familiar evidence is re-evaluated and 
re-interpreted in accordance with changes in methodology and perspective. Whether 
labelled as 'netted', present-centric, or 'cooked' all historiography subsequently distorts 
and minimises the complexities of the Holocaust, while its past traces are infinitely 
appropriated and interpreted. Since these practices of historiography are common 
knowledge (chapter one) it is unclear why expectations of the law are somehow different 
to those of the history discipline. Rather, demands made of the law to 'do justice' to the 
complexities of the Holocaust are not only unreasonable, given its case-specific form, but 
contradictory to its reconstruction by historians beyond the courtroom. It is therefore 
suggested that in the production of 'cooked' historiographies the history-law relationship 
is no more flawed a methodology than the history discipline when seeking to 'do justice' 
to the Holocaust. Indeed, it is further suggested that the law is once again a more honest 
method of historiographical reconstruction since, as the 'narrative-linguist' genre 
demands, it admits its case-specific, and therefore preconceived and prefigured (and 
'cooked'), reconstruction of the past.  
 
Conversely, the research reaffirms the existing 'consensus of critique' detailed in chapters 
two and three in its identification of the barriers to public comprehension, and therefore 
any intended lessons, imposed by the legal form. The competence of the history-law 
relationship as a model of 'good history' is only obvious when extracting and organising 
the fact determination and finding processes from and beyond the density of Anglo-
American practice. Of course, the necessary extraction and organisation is not available 
to the court audience, media and wider public as a trial progresses. It cannot be 
emphasised enough that only those conversant in both Anglo-American practice and 
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Holocaust historiography would have been able to follow, far less comprehend, the 
empirically accountable and 'truth-full' accounts/representations reconstructed at the 
Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials. This conclusion is even more pertinent if engaging 
in the rebuttal of Holocaust denial. It is suggested that engaging with the strategy and 
tactic of denial through the medium of the law is not only a waste of time, since it never 
silences the voices of denial, but, and of greater concern, it allows its protagonists to 
exploit the density of the legal form to further confuse and instil doubt in a largely 
inexperienced media and wider public. It is therefore suggested that, even if the 
historian’s voice and established scholarship continue to be both heard and reaffirmed 
through the history-law relationship, the courtroom should not be utilised if pedagogy is 
the objective of its participants. Consequently, the research supports those who argue that 
the courtroom should not act as an intentional history lesson or tribunal. It likewise 
supports those who insist that the courtroom should not be utilised specifically to rebut 
Holocaust denial.  
 
The research also reaffirms the existing 'consensus of critique' detailed in chapters two 
and three in its exposé of the impact of extra-historical and extra-legal influences on the 
(mis)use of the Holocaust at each trial. Although most evident in the foregrounding of 
Eichmann's authority and depravity in 1961, as well as the wider context of national 
pedagogy (chapters two and three), external influences were likewise obvious in the focus 
on the rebuttal and unmasking of Holocaust denial in the later trials and the intended 
reassertion of the 'empiricist-analytical' genre in 2000 (chapter three). Consequently, in 
accordance with the findings of Michel Foucault raised in chapter one, each trial reflected 
dominant discourses prevailing in each epistemic context. It is also noted that, although 
the facts of the Holocaust, and the authority of its scholarship, were certainly reaffirmed 
at each trial, they did not add any unexpected knowledge to the prevailing historiography. 
Consequently, as mentioned in chapter one, none of the participants were surprised by 
what they found in the evidence or by the content of the narratives of the Holocaust 
subsequently reconstructed at each trial. The research therefore supports those who argue 
that a study of Holocaust-related trials is more illuminating of present-centric contexts 
and interests governing the reconstruction of the Holocaust as historiography than 
providing new knowledge or insights into its past.  
 
Finally, the research not only concludes that the history-law relationship is most 
appropriately explained through the 'narrative-linguistic' genre but reasserts its epistemic 
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and generic credibility as a method and theory of academic historiography beyond the 
courtroom. As already observed, Anglo-American practice may be a distinct discursive 
form of history-making, but its methodology is no more preconceived and prefigured than 
the historian's craft. As the thematic chapters specifically demonstrated, the form, in this 
case the discrete legal cases of the Eichmann. Zündel and Irving trials, preceded the 
evidential content of the past, in this case relating to the Holocaust. Each present-centric 
form also acted as the criteria of adjudication, and, in the case of Holocaust denial, 
'disconfirmation'.
25
 But, in a discipline of netted authorship, the form of historical 
scholarship, since inevitably governed by the various affiliations and interests of the 
historian, likewise precedes and adjudicates over the content of all history-making, 
including Holocaust historiography. Consequently, however unconscious the individual 
historian may be of the primacy of preconceived and prefigured narratives over her/his 
empiricist craft, historiography inevitably comprises fictive representations as the past, 
in this case as the Holocaust. As demonstrated by the thematic chapters, and in contrast 
to empiricist thinking, this fictive dominance is not a barrier to the reconstruction of 'good 
history'. But it is inherent to the 'truth-full' historying of academic scholarship. The 
research therefore supports those who argue that the 'narrative-linguist' genre is the most 
appropriate explanation of all historiography and not only in these postmodern times.  
 
The conclusions and findings of this thesis are based on a selective sample of Holocaust-
related trials. It is obvious that, regardless of their relevance to the intended research of 
the history-law relationship, the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials cannot stand as 
definitive exemplars of all Holocaust-related cases. Furthermore, although the selection 
of the four trials was based on the range of diversities pertinent to comparative study, 
rather than the content of each case, it is recognised that the majority of the selected trials 
(Zündel, Irving) related to the rebuttal of Holocaust denial. Consequently, the focus of 
these trials was on the historiographical record, or what Lawrence Douglas refers to as 
the 'Holocaust as History', rather than the more familiar focus on the guilt (or innocence) 
of individual perpetrators.
26
 Since most exceptions to the findings of compatibility and 
consistency related to the Eichmann trial it is not clear if trials of other perpetrators would 
have similarly challenged the findings of historiographical stability. However, regardless 
of its exceptions, the content and findings of historiographical reconstruction at the 
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Eichmann trial still met the criteria of ‘good history’ and likewise reaffirmed the primacy 
of both the logic and practice of the ‘narrativist-linguistic’ genre.  
 
It is also recognised that the focus on Anglo-American trials did not consider the history-
law relationship operating through other legal genres (continental law) or in contexts 
where accusations of a 'show trial' have been commonly raised (German Democratic 
Republic, Soviet Union).
27
 Once again it is not clear if a repetition of methodology 
through the lens of these alternative cases and legal forms would have altered the findings 
relevant to the Anglo-American contexts or genre. These recognised omissions indicate 
areas of future research.  
 
Notwithstanding the limitations of selection integral to all research, the method and 
findings of this thesis contribute knowledge to contemporary debates on 'what is history?', 
most recently identified as 'a dynamic field currently in the (re)making', and the history-
law relationship as it continues to judicially confront, inform and seek justice for the 
Holocaust both as a crime and historical record.
28
  
 
As shown, it distinctively applied theories of historiography to both practical sites of 
history-making and reconstructions as ‘the Holocaust’. In so doing, the thesis was 
transparent in demonstrating the fictive core of historying in its academic form. It 
consequently adds weight to the voices of those who insist that fictive is not the same as 
fictional and to the epistemic credibility of the ‘narrativist-linguistic’ genre.  
 
It also distinctively applied theories of historiography to the history-law relationship. In 
so doing, the thesis adds a new methodology of examination and evaluation of its 
competence to act as a model of ‘good history’. It likewise distinctively applied 
comparative analysis as a tool of both historiographical evaluation and reconstruction 
across courtrooms. These combined approaches add new information to the relevant 
scholarship by: (1) demonstrating that Anglo-American law can be as trusted as the 
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history discipline with historical inquiry and (2) detailing the content and processing of 
historiographical reconstruction across the Eichmann, Zündel and Irving trials.  
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